



Social Assistance, Politics and Institutions (SAPI) database Index of Programmes in the Middle-East and North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and China

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Middle-East and North Africa

Algeria

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Allocation forfaitaire de solidarité
Country	Algeria
Region	MENA
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The programme started in 2008
End date of programme	The programme appears to be ongoing
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Family transfers
Main programme objectives	The program aims to alleviate poverty
Pilot	NACc
Target population	Vulnerable groups including Elderly Head of family or people aged of 60 years or more that live alone with no income, widows in charge of children with no income and in a disadvantaged position.
Beneficiary selection	The program is mean-tested
Coverage – individual level	Pension Watch has reported that the programme covers 8% of the population.
Coverage – household level	NAC
Entitlement requisites	All applicants must bring along a filled administrative form, an identify card, copy of the birth certificate, proof of a residence, identity pictures (2), medical statement proving the labour incapacity or disability.
Means test – treatment of income	NAC
Means test – treatment of assets	NAC
Means test – treatment of work	Applicants must bring along proof of their disability or labour incapacity
Recipient of transfer	Households
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	3000 (Agence de Developpement Social 2015)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	According to the government website, 120 dinars per dependent is allocated in addition to the 3000 dinars (Agence de Developpement Social 2015)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer guaranteed period	NAC
Transfer conditions – human capital	NAC

Transfer conditions – work	Applicants must bring along proof of medical statement certifying their labor incapacity or disability
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Agence de Developpement Social
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Although beneficiaries are registered at the local level, there is little evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	The programme and related conditions are governed by executive decrees No. 94-336 and 9-470
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	NAc
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	NAc
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	http://www.ads.dz/crbst_4.html#.Vs9rdZwrLIV 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Algeria has a 'Government's Plan of Action for the Implementation of the President's Program (Garcia and Moore 2012)
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	The cost of the program represents 0,06% of GDP (Pension Watch 2015)
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	NAc
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending

Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Agence de Developpement Social (2015) <i>Allocation Forfaitaire de Solidarite</i>, <2016> accessed 26 Feb 2016</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank; Pension Watch (2015) <i>Comprehensive online resource on non-contributory (social) pensions: Country Fact File</i> accessed 25 Feb 2016</p>

Djibouti

Variable	Description
Programme title	Social Assistance Pilot Program on Labor and Human Capital
Country	Djibouti
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2010
End date of programme	There is no information rather the program has stopped or still ongoing.
Replace	NAc
Programme type	Employment guarantee
Programme function	Integrated Anti-poverty programmes
Main programme objectives	The program was implemented to stimulate the creation of employment opportunities to improve nutritional practices through behavioral change Enhance the living standards in Djibouti, through increased access to basic economic and social infrastructure, and services, in addition to employment generation opportunities
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The program targets poor and vulnerable households notably women, youth and food insecure individuals
Beneficiary selection	The programme uses geographical and categorical selection methods (World Bank 2010)
Coverage – individual level	According to the World Bank Public Works Database, the programme covers a total of 7500 individuals annually (World Bank 2010). The World Bank Safety Nets reports a total of 75,000 beneficiaries by 2013 (World Bank 2014)
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	NAc
Means test – treatment of assets	NAc
Means test – treatment of work	Yes
Recipient of transfer	The worker
Payment regularity	Payments are made on daily basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	In 2010 the daily wage was set at US\$ 3.00 daily in addition to food transfer (World Bank 2010)
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to continuity and conditions attached to the programs
Transfer conditions – human capital	No


Transfer conditions – work	Yes
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Djibouti Social Development Agency (ADDS)
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Although beneficiaries are registered at the local level, there is little evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Process and impact evaluation planned (no year provided) (World Bank 2010)
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at local level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation in decision making
Budgetary arrangements	Formal. The programme is financed by donors in collaboration with the government
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Djibouti has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	The World Bank reported the total cost of the programme at USD 3,640,000 annually (World Bank 2010)
Donor Financing	Yes. The program was financially supported by the Japan Social Development Fund donors with an estimated USD 3,640,000 (Japan Social Development Fund).
Government financing	No
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	World Bank (2010) <i>Making Public Works Work: Public Works Database</i> (Washington, DC) World Bank (2014) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2014</i> . Washington, DC: World Bank

Egypt

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	1,000 Villages
Country	Egypt
Region	MENA
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program appears to have started in 2007 (A. El-Majeed et al. 2014)
End date of programme	There is no official information whether the program has ended or still on going
Replace	NAc
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Conditional cash and family transfers
Main programme objectives	The program aims to increase the family's purchasing power on the short term
Pilot	NAc
Target population	All poor households
Beneficiary selection	NAc. There is no information on the targeting methods of the programme
Coverage - individual level	NAc
Coverage - household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test - treatment of income	NAc
Means test - treatment of assets	NAc
Means test - treatment of work	NAc
Recipient of transfer	NAc
Payment regularity	NAc
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer guaranteed period	NAc
Transfer conditions - human capital	NAc
Transfer conditions - work	NAc
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	NAc

Agency type	NAc
Centralisation of decision making	NAc
Local government discretion	NAc
Intermediation	NAc
Legal framework	NAc
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	NAc
Appeals procedure	NAc
Social accountability and participation	NAc
Budgetary arrangements	NAc
Website	0
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	NAc. No concrete poverty reduction strategy could be retrieved for Egypt
National coordination	NAc
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	
Cost	According to Modern Egypt website, the initiative costed US\$ 700 million in its first phase and carried out 1400 projects (Modern Egypt 2010). It is unclear to what extent this information is accurate
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	NAc
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	A. El-Majeed, E. A., El Tawila, S., Verme, P. and Gadallah, M. <i>et al.</i> (2014) <i>Inside Inequality in the Arab Republic of Egypt: Facts and Perceptions across People, Time, and Space</i> . Washington, DC: World Bank Modern Egypt (2010) <i>The “1,000 Villages” initiative aims to develop the 1,000 poorest villages in Egypt</i> .

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Productive Families' Project
Country	Egypt
Region	MENA
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The programme appears to have started in 2005
End date of programme	There is no official information whether the program has ended or still on going
Replace	NAP
Programme type	Integrated anti-poverty programmes
Programme function	Employment guarantee
Main programme objectives	The program aims to channel family efforts, turning them into productive unit, absorb unemployment and make use of materials available in the environment
Pilot	No
Target population	NAC. According to the website, the programme was implemented in 27 provinces. (State Information Service of Egypt 2009)
Beneficiary selection	NAC
Coverage – individual level	337 centres for a total of 1,288,284 beneficiaires (State Information Service of Egypt 2009)
Coverage – household level	NAC
Entitlement requisites	NAC
Means test – treatment of income	NAC
Means test – treatment of assets	NAC
Means test – treatment of work	NAC
Recipient of transfer	NAC
Payment regularity	NAC
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer guaranteed period	NAC
Transfer conditions – human capital	NAC
Transfer conditions – work	NAC
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Cabinet - Government of Egypt
Agency type	Public agency

Centralisation of decision making	NAc
Local government discretion	NAc
Intermediation	NAc
Legal framework	NAc
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	NAc
Appeals procedure	NAc
Social accountability and participation	NAc
Budgetary arrangements	NAc
Website	http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=730#.VtIVMpwrKUM 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	NAc. No concrete poverty reduction strategy could be retrieved for Egypt
National coordination	NAc
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	NAc
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending

Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	State Information Service of Egypt (2009) <i>Social Welfare: Services Offered for Family and Childhood</i> (2009), < http://www.sis.gov.eg/En/Templates/Articles/tmpArticles.aspx?CatID=730#.VtITf5wrKU1 > accessed 27 Feb 2016

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	MOSA Social Solidarity Pension
Country	Egypt
Region	MENA
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 1980
End date of programme	There is no official information whether the program has stopped or still ongoing
Replace	The pension is previously known as Sadat pension then Mubarak pension (Pension Watch 2015)
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Old age pension
Main programme objectives	The pension scheme provides financial support and insurance for the working poor who have not been included in or covered by any of the previous schemes, like casual workers, against old age, death and disability risks. Sadat pension also cover individuals aged 65 or above who have no pensions and are considered as inheritors for deceased persons before 1980 (Selwaness 2012)
Pilot	No
Target population	Poor households with older people
Beneficiary selection	Categorical targeting: individuals aged 65 or above who have no pensions and are considered as inheritors for deceased persons before 1980(Selwaness 2012)
Coverage – individual level	NAc
Coverage – household level	The world bank reported a total coverage of 82,000 households in 2008 (World Bank 2014). Another report states a total of 7million beneficiaries in 2014 (World Bank 2015).
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	NAc
Means test – treatment of assets	NAc
Means test – treatment of work	NAc
Recipient of transfer	Pensioner or head of households
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	Pensioners receive 300 Egyptian Pound (Pension Watch 2015)
Transfer guaranteed period	The pensioners are entitled for lifetime benefits
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	

Implementing agency	NAc
Agency type	NAc
Centralisation of decision making	NAc
Local government discretion	NAc
Intermediation	NAc
Legal framework	The Sadat Pension is legislated by the Law 112/1980
Legal framework changes	No
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	NAc
Appeals procedure	NAc
Social accountability and participation	NAc
Budgetary arrangements	NAc
Website	
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	NAc. No concrete poverty reduction strategy could be retrieved for Egypt
National coordination	NAc
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc. According to Pension Watch, the programme costed 0.28% of GDP in 2014
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	NAc
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Pension Watch (2015) <i>Comprehensive online resource on non-contributory (social) pensions: Country Fact File</i> accessed 25 Feb 2016</p> <p>Selwaness, I. (2012) <i>Rethinking Social Insurance in Egypt: An empirical study</i>. Cairo, Egypt</p> <p>World Bank (2014) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2014</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>World Bank (2015) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2015</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p>

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Jordan


Variable	Description
Programme title	National Aid Fund - Recurrent Cash Assistance
Country	Jordan
Region	MENA
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 1986
End date of programme	The programme is ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfer
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	It provides in cash support to a variety of groups such as the poor, elderly, divorced women, families taking care of orphaned children (below 28 years old), families with disabled persons, and families of detained prisoners, foster families, young women, Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians, humanitarian cases, abandoned women, persons receiving assistance and rehabilitation loans, families of seasonal workers, families of missing and absentee fathers, persons receiving Handicapped Care Aid, other candidates who received approval from the Board. All the beneficiaries of any of the NAF program are automatically eligible for health insurance (National Aid Fund, 2011 cited in (ILO 2014).
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets all households in poverty, notably elderly, divorced women, families taking care of orphaned children (below 28 years old), families with disabled persons, and families of detained prisoners, foster families, young women, Jordanian women married to non-Jordanians, humanitarian cases, abandoned women, persons receiving assistance and rehabilitation loans, families of seasonal workers, families of missing and absentee fathers, persons receiving Handicapped Care Aid, other candidates who received approval from the Board.
Beneficiary selection	The beneficiary selection relies on income test and categorical targeting
Coverage – individual level	According to the ILO, the programme has reached a total of 303,776 individuals by 2000. This number continued to increase and in 2010 the programme reached the total number of 194900 beneficiaries (ILO 2014)
Coverage – household level	In 2009, the programme has reached approximately 53,294 households. This number increased to 65658 in 2005 and to 74300 in 2010 (ILO 2014)
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	Eligibility is limited to those with an income no higher than JD 250 per month and who are not receiving other public social services or assistance.
Means test – treatment of assets	Income-producing property, arable land, or possession of a car (unless used by a disabled member of the family) are all considered to be disqualifying factors.
Means test – treatment of work	Yes - Labour incapacity are also considered in the assessment phase
Recipient of transfer	Beneficiary of head of households
Payment regularity	Payments are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	JD 40 (ILO 2014)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	JD 180 (ILO 2014)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A

Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAP
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to compliance with pre-requisites
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	National Aid Fund, Ministry of Social Development
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local governments discretion in decision making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with their closest authorities
Appeals procedure	NAC
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation in decision-making or implementation
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	http://www.naf.gov.jo/?lang=ara
	
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	The National Agenda
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC

Cost	According to the ILO, the programme costed 22 million JD in 2002. This amount rose to 55 million JD in 2005. According to the most recent, the total cost of this programme was 74 million in 2010.
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	NAc
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), < http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home > accessed 27 Feb 2016

Morocco

Variable	Description
Programme title	Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain
Country	Morocco
Region	MENA
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2005
End date of programme	The programme appears to be ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Integrated anti-poverty programmes
Programme function	Employment guarantee schemes and complementary services
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to tackle social deficit by increasing access to basic social services, promoting employment-generating activities and stable incomes, support vulnerable groups or groups with special needs (ILO 2014)
Pilot	N/A
Target population	The programme targets poor and vulnerable households in 360 poor municipalities and 250 poor districts in urban and peri-urban areas. (ILO 2014)
Beneficiary selection	N/A
Coverage – individual level	N/A. According to the ILO, approximately 1.6 million citizens have benefited from the entire program. However, no information on the annual coverage for social assistance could be found. (ILO 2014)
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	N/A
Recipient of transfer	N/A
Payment regularity	N/A
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer guaranteed period	N/A
Transfer conditions – human capital	N/A
Transfer conditions – work	N/A


B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Initiative Nationale pour le Développement Humain
Agency type	Public Agency
Centralisation of decision making	NAc
Local government discretion	High. Local Governments finance 20% of the total budget of the programme
Intermediation	NAc
Legal framework	NAc
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	NAc
Appeals procedure	NAc
Social accountability and participation	NAc
Budgetary arrangements	NAc
Website	http://www.indh.ma/index.php/en/ 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	There is no information on a social protection policy or poverty reduction strategy for Morocco.
National coordination	NAc
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	According to the ILO, the budget of the INDH is approximately 10 billion dirhams over 5 years (since its creation date in 2005). Yet, in 2006, the total fund available for the programme was estimated at 2.5 billion dirhams. An estimate is calculated based on calendar years for the first 5 years. (ILO 2014)
Cost	
Donor Financing	Yes. According to the ILO, 2 billion dirhams are given by international cooperation (ILO 2014)
Government financing	Yes. Central government finances 60% (6 billion), while local governments finance 20 % (ILO 2014)
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending

Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), < http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home > accessed 27 Feb 2016

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Promotion Nationale
Country	Morocco
Region	MENA
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The programme appears to have started in 1961 (L'Economiste 1996). The database covers the period of 2000 onwards
End date of programme	There is no official information whether the program has stopped or still ongoing
Replace	NAc
Programme type	Integrated anti-poverty programmes
Programme function	Employment guarantee scheme
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to provide work for unemployed and marginalized groups
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets vulnerable people in age of working
Beneficiary selection	NAc
Coverage – individual level	Between 1961 and 1991, 66.000 people of which 25000 full time, have been employed. In 1996, the coverage was approximately 35.000. The World Bank reported a total coverage of 45,000 beneficiaries in 2011 (World Bank 2014)
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	NAc
Means test – treatment of assets	NAc
Means test – treatment of work	Employment status is taken into account during assessment
Recipient of transfer	Worker
Payment regularity	NAc
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer guaranteed period	NAc
Transfer conditions – human capital	NAc
Transfer conditions – work	Yes
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	NAc
Agency type	NAc

Centralisation of decision making	NAc
Local government discretion	NAc
Intermediation	NAc
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation. The programme was established by the Dahir on 15 July 1961.
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	NAc
Appeals procedure	NAc
Social accountability and participation	NAc
Budgetary arrangements	NAc
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	There is no information on a social protection policy or poverty reduction strategy for Morocco.
National coordination	NAc
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	NAc. According to L'Economiste (1996), the World Bank promised to support the project but no additional information could be found on that.
Government financing	Yes but no information on the total government contribution could be found
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	L'Economiste (1996) 'La Promotion Nationale de nouveau sur la sellette', <i>L'Economiste</i> , 1996, < http://www.leconomiste.com/article/la-promotion-nationale-de-nouveau-sur-la-sellette > accessed 04-Mar-16 World Bank (2014) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2014</i> . Washington, DC: World Bank

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Public pension scheme
Country	Morocco
Region	MENA
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	There is no information on the starting date of the programme
End date of programme	There is no information on the end date of the programme
Replace	NAc
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Old age pension
Main programme objectives	The programme is a non-contributor schemes on behalf of the State to vulnerable groups. It is constituted of disability pensions, allowances of former resistant's and members of the Liberation Army, some annuities, and instituted pensions and allowances, for the most part, prior to independence) (Kingdom of Morocco unknown)
Pilot	NAc
Target population	The program targets vulnerable groups notably disabled, former resistant and members of the Liberation Army.
Beneficiary selection	NAc
Coverage - individual level	NAc
Coverage - household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test - treatment of income	NAc
Means test - treatment of assets	NAc
Means test - treatment of work	NAc
Recipient of transfer	NAc
Payment regularity	NAc
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer guaranteed period	NAc
Transfer conditions - human capital	NAc
Transfer conditions - work	NAc
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	The Moroccan Retirement Fund

Agency type	Public Agency
Centralisation of decision making	NAC
Local government discretion	NAC
Intermediation	NAC
Legal framework	NAC
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	NAC
Appeals procedure	NAC
Social accountability and participation	NAC
Budgetary arrangements	NAC
Website	<p>http://www.finances.gov.ma/en/Pages/CMR.aspx?m=THE%20MINISTRY&m2=Departments</p> 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	There is no information on a social protection policy or poverty reduction strategy for Morocco.
National coordination	NAC
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	NAC
Government financing	NAC
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending

Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	Kingdom of Morocco (unknown) <i>The Moroccan Retirement Fund</i> (`), < http://www.finances.gov.ma/en/Pages/CMR.aspx?m=THE%20MINISTRY&m2=Departments > accessed 04-Mar-16


<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Tayssir Conditional Cash Transfer
Country	Morocco
Region	MENA
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in the final semester of 2007 (World Bank 2011). Other report however mentions 2008 as the starting date (Grun 2011)
End date of programme	The programme appears to have ended in 2010.
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Conditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to support children education in poor rural areas
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targets poor households in rural areas with primary school children.
Beneficiary selection	The selection process was random. Cash transfers were disbursed to parents of primary school-age children, as long as their child did not miss school more than four times each month (Benhassine et al. 2010)
Coverage – individual level	The Tayssir pilot took place in 318 rural primary school sectors, each of which included two school communities, in the poorest areas within five of Morocco’s sixteen regions. The Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) pilot covered 53,288 households and 93,536 primary pupils, randomly selected for evaluation purposes in poor regions with high school drop-out rates. The government expanded the programme covering 206,434 primary pupils. The World Bank reported that the programme has in the end covered a total of 300,000 children (World Bank 2011)
Coverage – household level	The programme has managed to cover a total of 160,000 households (World Bank 2011)
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Household head
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	The monthly amount per child increased as each child progressed through school, starting from 60 MAD (US\$8) for each child in grades 1 and 2 (Benhassine et al. 2010)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	The transfer amount increases to 100 MAD (US\$13) for children in grades 5 and 6 (Benhassine et al. 2010)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to compliance with the primary conditions: school enrolment and attendance
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes. School enrolment and attendance

Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Moroccan Ministry of National Education, World Bank
Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are randomized at the local level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	There is no information on a social protection policy or poverty reduction strategy for Morocco.
National coordination	NAC
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	<p>Yes. The project is financed by a consortium of donors for a total of approximately 3.93 million USD. A calendar estimate is calculated for each year of the programme.</p> <p>An initial grant from the Spanish Impact Evaluation Trust Fund (US\$500,000) financed the baseline quantitative survey of schools and families. The grant was completed with Bank resources to allow for staff time. The team subsequently won a US\$93,500 allocation from the Gender Action Plan, and a share of a US\$386,000 Korean Trust Fund grant for Information Technology-based projects. It also received a share of a US\$750,000 grant from the Governance Partnership Facility. The trust funds have jointly financed the substantial data collection work of this pilot activity, as well as the Bank's own and facilitated technical assistance. They have also directly financed the pilot program when government procurement could not move fast enough. The Bank has also secured a 50 percent share of US\$2.2 million of a Japanese Social Development Fund grant, to ensure the sustainability and continuation of the pilot, its evaluation and scale-up preparation (World Bank 2011)</p>
Government financing	No. There is no evidence of government contribution to the programme
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending

Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
	<p>Benhassine, N., Devoto, F., Duflo, E. and Dupas, P. <i>et al.</i> (2010) <i>Cash Transfers for Education in Morocco</i>, <https://www.povertyactionlab.org/evaluation/cash-transfers-education-morocco> accessed 05-Mar-16</p> <p>Grun, R. (2011) <i>Conditional Cash Transfers in Morocco: Program "Tayssir"</i>. Washington DC, USA</p> <p>World Bank (2011) <i>Morocco: Conditional Cash Transfers and Education</i> (Washington DC, USA; pubd online 17-Sep-10), <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/MENAEXT/0,,contentMDK:22705763~pagePK:146736~piPK:226340~theSitePK:256299,00.html> accessed 05-Mar-16</p>

Tunisia

Variable	Description
Programme title	Programme Nationale d'Aide aux Familles Nécessiteuses (National Program of Assistance to Needy Families)
Country	Tunisia
Region	MENA
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 1986. The dataset considers information collected after 2000
End date of programme	The programme appears to be ongoing (ILO 2014)
Replace	NAc
Programme type	Integrated anti-poverty programmes
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfers and complementary services
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to alleviate poverty among the most vulnerable groups.
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets all households with income below the poverty line, disabled or incapable of work.
Beneficiary selection	The programme is categorical and mean-tested
Coverage – individual level	The programme covered a total number of 114534 in 2004, of which 68% are elderly and 17,3% are disabled. The total number of beneficiary households increased to 215,000 in 2008; the program allowed 585.000 families to access healthcare services at a low cost (CRES 2014). The World Bank reported a coverage of 235,000 households (2013) (World Bank 2014)
Coverage – household level	
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	Yes Income below the poverty line
Means test – treatment of assets	NAc
Means test – treatment of work	Yes. Labour-incapacity is taken into consideration during assessment
Recipient of transfer	Head of household
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	The cash transfer amount is 110 dinars and free healthcare
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No

B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministère des Affaires Sociales, de la Solidarité et des Tunisiens à l'étranger
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	NAC
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of social accountability or community participation
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	<p>http://www.social.tn/index.php?id=51&L=0ce</p> 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	NAC. There is no evidence of a poverty reduction strategy or social protection strategy for Tunisia
National coordination	NAC
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	According to the ILO, the programme cost was approximately 59,5 million dinars in 2004 and 55.9 million dinars in 2005 (ILO 2014)
Donor Financing	NAC. It is unclear whether donors have contributed to this programme. No information could be retrieved.
Government financing	Yes. However, no information on exact government contribution could be found.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending

Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>CRES (2014) <i>Redistribution des revenus</i> (Tunis, Tunisia), <http://www.cres.tn/index.php?id=182&tx_wdbiblio_pi1%5Bpointer%5D=1&tx_wdbiblio_pi1%5Bmode%5D=1&cHash=67f95978b89cde9f7b065366a28b3f91> accessed 05-Mar-16</p> <p>ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>World Bank (2014) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2014</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p>

West Bank and Gaza

Variable	Description
Programme title	Palestinian National Cash Transfer Program
Country	West Bank and Gaza
Region	MENA
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2011
End date of programme	There is no official information whether the program has stopped or still ongoing
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The program aims to alleviate poverty and bridge households poverty gap
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets the poorest households in Gaza and the West Bank
Beneficiary selection	Beneficiaries are selected according to a consumption-based proxy means test formula (PMTF) that estimates the welfare of each applicant household
Coverage – individual level	Given the average number of children per family, it is estimated that the total number of children living in beneficiary households is 287,794 (Perezniето et al. 2014).
Coverage – household level	According to MoSA, as of September 2013, 105,678 households were receiving the cash transfer (57,449 in Gaza and 48,229 in the West Bank) (Perezniето et al. 2014). The World Bank reported 100,000 households for 2013 (World Bank 2014). Most of these households are classed as extremely poor.
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	NAc
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Quarterly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	Beneficiaries receive a minimum of 750 Israeli Shekels (US\$195) per quarter to bridge 50% of the household poverty gap. Beneficiary households are also entitled to other state-provided assistance, including health insurance, food support (in the form of dry food rations in Gaza and in isolated areas of the West Bank, and vouchers in urban areas of the West Bank), school fee waivers, and cash grants to help with one-off emergency needs (Perezniето et al. 2014)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	Beneficiaries receive a maximum of 1800 Israeli Shekels (US\$468) per quarter to bridge 50% of the household poverty gap. Beneficiary households are also entitled to other state-provided assistance, including health insurance, food support (in the form of dry food rations in Gaza and in isolated areas of the West Bank, and vouchers in urban areas of the West Bank), school fee waivers, and cash grants to help with one-off emergency needs (Perezniето et al. 2014)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to continuation of the program

Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Social Affairs (MoSA)
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	At the district level: In West-Bank and Gaza
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	No
National coordination	No
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	NAc
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	Perezniето, P., Jones, N., Hamad, B. A. and Shaheen, M. <i>et al.</i> (2014) <i>Effects of the Palestinian National Cash Transfer Programme on children and adolescents: A mixed methods analysis.</i> London, UK

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Urban Voucher Program
Country	West Bank and Gaza
Region	MENA
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2009
End date of programme	The programme appears to be ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Integrated anti-poverty programmes
Programme function	Food transfer
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to improve the food security of urban households, to ease the pressure on households' limited cash resources by providing a diverse range of foods
Pilot	The programme had a pilot phase in 2009 supported by Oxfam GB
Target population	The programme targets food-insecure households
Beneficiary selection	<p>The programme uses a proxy-mean test formula. The UVP participants were eligible according to the following criteria:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Household sizes of 6 to 8 members - Households that earn less than 314 NIS per member per month, with priority given to those earning less than 250 NIS per member per month. - Households whose main breadwinner has been unemployed for more than three months <p>The following exclusion criteria were applied:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Households where any member has a UNRWA card. - Households who receive regular food assistance from other UN agencies or international/Local NGOs. - Households who receive WFP food through other interventions. - Employees of UN agencies, NGOs or the PA (Creti 2011) <p>The selection process through voluntary application required an effective and widespread information process to ensure that all eligible groups were reached. Systematic monitoring through regular visits to shops and beneficiaries was adopted to spread information and identify eligible households during project implementation. Any eligible household was asked to fill the PMT questionnaire and they were included to the programme if they met the PMT selection criteria (ibid.)</p>
Coverage – individual level	The pilot phase of the programme targeted 2,335 households, representing around 15,000 beneficiaries in urban areas of North Gaza, Gaza City and KhanYounis governorates in the Gaza Strip (Creti 2011). The World Bank reported a total coverage of 46,000 beneficiaries in 2010 (World Bank 2014). The programme benefited 116,000 beneficiaries in 2012 and the WFP was planning to reach 146,000 in 2013 (World Food Programme 24 May 2013).
Coverage – household level	The pilot phase of the programme targeted 2,335 households, representing around 15,000 beneficiaries in urban areas of North Gaza, Gaza City and Khan Younis governorates in the Gaza Strip (Creti 2011).
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	Households that earn less than 314 NIS per member per month, with priority given to those earning less than 250 NIS per member per month.
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	Yes.
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Monthly

Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAP. Vouchers in Gaza provide around US\$12 per month per person, and can be used to purchase bread, cereal, milk, yogurt, white cheese, eggs, pulses, vegetable oil, olive oil, rice, tahina and wheat flour. Vouchers in the West Bank provide US\$13 per month per person. Beneficiaries can use vouchers to purchase bread, cereals, milk, yogurt, white cheese, eggs, pulses, vegetable oil, tuna, tahina and salt (World Food Programme 24 May 2013)
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to continuity of the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	World Food Programme (WFP)
Agency type	Multilateral donor agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	At the local level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	
National coordination	
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	Yes. The Programme is financed by the WFP with support from Saudi Arabia (US\$2.5 million) and France (US\$2 million) (World Food Programme 2009)
Government financing	NAc. No information could be found
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	

Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrolment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Creti, P. (2011) <i>The Voucher Programme in the Gaza Strip: Mid-term review</i>. Gaza, Palestine</p> <p>World Bank (2014) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2014</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>World Food Programme (2009) <i>WFP Launches First Food Voucher Operation In Mideast</i> (Jerusalem), <https://www.wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-launches-first-food-voucher-operation-middle-east></p> <p>World Food Programme (2013) <i>WFP Palestine Voucher Programmes</i> (Gaza, Palestine), <https://unispal.un.org/DPA/DPR/unispal.nsf/0/05A70BD4BBB30A6485257B8F0065B705></p>

Yemen, Republic

Variable	Description
Programme title	Social Welfare Fund
Country	Yemen, Republic
Region	MENA
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 1996. The database covers information from 2000 onwards
End date of programme	There is no official information whether the program has stopped or still ongoing
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure income transfer
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfer
Main programme objectives	The program aims to provide assistance to the poorest member of society
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets vulnerable groups including Orphans; Widows with and without children; Divorced women with and without children; Single women above 30 who were unmarried and have no income source; The fully and partially disabled (permanent and temporary); The chronically poor (various measures below the poverty line); The elderly; Families with a missing head of household; Families with an imprisoned head of household or one recently discharged from prison
Beneficiary selection	<p>Originally the first stage of the targeting process was geographic.</p> <p>In the second stage, targeting was based on estimates of district-level food poverty. The governorates are in turn responsible for distributing cases to the districts on the basis of lists of the eligible. These allocations, however, are likely to be influenced by political considerations.</p> <p>At the third stage, within a district, applicants were evaluated according to 15 criteria measuring their degree of deprivation. Accordingly, the SWF targeted the vulnerable groups mentioned above. In addition to falling into one of these groups, recipients also needed to be deemed without income or income-earning potential (in principle, their only income should be the benefits from the SWF, although in practice this is untenable, given the small amount of the transfer). This means those already receiving assistance from any NGO or religious institution, or a pension, for example, were in principle not eligible.</p> <p>In October 2010, the government approved a new targeting methodology for beneficiaries of the SWF, based on a survey conducted by the SWF in 2008 and amendments in the 2008 Social Welfare Law. The new targeting mechanism categorises poor households that currently benefit from a SWF income supplement and those that should benefit but currently do not.</p> <p>By 2012, the SWF has a two stage targeting process. The 2005/06 Household Budget Survey combined with 2005 Census data to produce a proxy means test (PMT) model that generates district-level projections of the number of poor households. The PMT model identifies a series of economic variables along with associated weights, which are then used to predict the household's income level. These variables include quality of housing and household ownership of durable goods. The second stage involves surveying listed households using the same PMT model to obtain a score for each household relative to the regional poverty line. Households that score below a certain cut-off point are classified into six categories: A: income below 70% of the regional poverty line; B: income between 70% and 100% of the regional poverty line; C: income close to the regional poverty line (up to 24% above it); D: income approximately 25-55% above the regional poverty line; and E-F: income substantially above the poverty line (55% or more) – should not receive transfers. The new targeting categories are now grouped as either 'social' or 'economic' cases for support. This method is expected to result in households in categories E-F (estimated to number 272,000) to be phased out over a period of about three to five years, and</p>

	the gradual admittance of new category AD households that were identified by the 2008 survey as meriting support but that are currently on a waiting list. (Bagash et al. 2012)
Coverage – individual level	The SWF was estimated to reach over 1 million beneficiaries in 2009 which is approximately 2.3% of the population
Coverage – household level	
Entitlement requisites	To receive transfers, potential beneficiaries were required to fill out applications and provide proof of status and of lack of income or earning potential in the form of documentation and various certificates. Applicants are disqualified for incomplete or misleading applications and if a household member is found begging
Means test – treatment of income	In the third phase, recipients also needed to be deemed without income or income-earning potential (in principle, their only income should be the benefits from the SWF, although in practice this is untenable, given the small amount of the transfer).
Means test – treatment of assets	The PMT model identifies a series of economic variables along with associated weights, which are then used to predict the household’s income level. These variables include quality of housing and household ownership of durable goods.
Means test – treatment of work	Yes. Assessment takes into account labor constraints
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Quarterly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	Initially in 2006, SWF CTs had a value of YER 1,000 per beneficiary (roughly \$5). The payments have always been made on a quarterly basis (although there are sometimes delays).
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	Initially in 2006, SWF CTs had a value of YER 1,000 per up to a maximum of YER 2,000 per household per month. The payments have always been made on a quarterly basis (although there are sometimes delays), so a household would receive a maximum of YER 24,000 a year for a family of six, translating to about YER 333 per person per month, or approximately 10% of the 1998 national poverty. Since 2008, the government doubled the maximum benefits to YER 4,000 (\$20) per person per month.
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme. Local staff are required to conduct follow ups every three months, as well as yearly, and this could result in beneficiaries being left or taken off the lists if they no longer met the criteria, but a lack of monitoring and resource constraints in local SWF offices mean this does not happen in practice.
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Social Welfare Fund, Government of Yemen
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Medium centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Local governments are highly involved in selection process. Bagash et al. (2012) reports that the governorates are in turn responsible for distributing cases to the districts on the basis of lists of the eligible. These allocations, however, are likely to be influenced by political considerations.


Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	Yes. In October 2010, the government approved a new targeting methodology for beneficiaries of the SWF, based on a survey conducted by the SWF in 2008 and amendments in the 2008 Social Welfare Law.
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the jurisdiction level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Yes
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy / Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	The program costs US\$ 10 million
Donor Financing	<p>Yes. The EU has been supporting the SWF since 2002, focusing on policy reform and institutional capacity building to improve effectiveness and efficiency. The EU contributed €261,834.00 during 2009 and €642,742.0025 (100% of total) from 2010 to 2011.</p> <p>The World Bank has been providing technical assistance to the SWF since 2007, including the introduction of proxy means testing to improve targeting. UNICEF is also providing technical assistance to improve the SWF's M&E capacity (UNICEF, 2010).</p> <p>DFID and the government of the Netherlands were implementing a joint assistance programme to target a total of 30,000 vulnerable households, of which DFID's contribution was being used to reach 10,000 of the poorest Yemeni households over 12 months by committing £1.5 million over that period, with a no-cost extension that allowed the project duration to be extended. The government of the Netherlands committed £3.37 million between 2010/11 and 2012/1326. However, this programme was put on hold as a result of the crisis, given issues related to programme and resource management.</p> <p>(Bagash et al. 2012)</p>
Government financing	NAC
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending

Others	Pending
References	Bagash, T., Perezniето, P. and Dubai, K. (2012) <i>Transforming cash transfers: Beneficiary and community perspectives on the Social Welfare Fund in Yemen</i> . London, UK

Sub-Saharan Africa


Botswana

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Destitute Person Allowance (DPA)
Country	Botswana
Region	Africa
F. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The programme started in 2003
End date of programme	The programme is ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Integrated anti-poverty programmes
Programme function	Unconditional and food transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to support vulnerable individuals who have been identified as 'destitute' (Barrientos et al. 2010; Government of Botswana 2009, 2015a)
Pilot	No
Target population	The program targets citizen who are socio-economically disadvantaged, either a permanent destitute person (with disability, chronic health condition, insufficient assets and income sources) or a temporary destitute person (incapacitated due to floods, fire, motor vehicle accidents, health conditions etc.). Benefit levels differ depending on whether beneficiaries live in urban or rural areas and whether the beneficiary is designated as a temporarily or permanently destitute person (Government of Botswana 2009, 2015a)
Beneficiary selection	Selection is mean-tested. Eligibility is based on categories (disadvantaged, destitute (assets and households income).
Coverage – individual level	In 2005, the programme covered a total of 37.000 direct beneficiaries (Barrientos et al. 2010). it has reached 40,525 beneficiaries by 2009 (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	Registration is done at the Social and Community development Department of a local authority
Means test – treatment of income	The income threshold is set at P.120.00 per month for individuals without dependants, and P.150.00 for individuals with dependents aged under 18 years old (Barrientos et al. 2010; Government of Botswana 2015a)
Means test – treatment of assets	Potential beneficiaries should not possess more than four livestock units (Barrientos et al. 2010; Government of Botswana 2015a)
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Household head (or beneficiary) or appointee
Payment regularity	Payments are made on a monthly basis. There are two modes of payments: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - By cash: beneficiaries are paid by paying officers from eh Department of Social Services or over the counter at the post office - By bank credit: the cash transfer is deposited into the beneficiary's bank account.
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	In 2005, beneficiaries of the programme received, on average, P.61 along with in-kind benefits amounting P.181 to P.256 (Garcia and Moore 2012) In 2006, the transfer amount increased to P.81 (Barrientos et al. 2010; Government of Botswana 2009). In addition to the cash transfer, needy students are also supported with shelters, school uniforms, toiletry, private clothing and other educational needs. Furthermore, all categories of destitute persons are exempted from

	payment of publicly provided services. These include medical fees, school fees, water charges, service levy and electricity charges.
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAP
Transfer guaranteed period	The transfers are based upon conditions attached to the programme. In the event of death all assistance except funeral expenses will cease to be issued in the deceased's name. The re-assessment will be taken to determine the new head of household as well as the level of assistance.
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes
Transfer conditions – work	Yes
G. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Department of Labour and Social Security, Ministry of Local Government
Agency type	Public Agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Although beneficiaries are registered at the local level, there is little evidence of local government discretion in decision-making.
Intermediation	Beneficiaries are entitled to receive psychological support
Legal framework	NAC
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities (Social and Community Development)
Appeals procedure	NAC
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of of social accountability or community participation in decision-making or execution of the programme
Budgetary arrangements	Budgetary arrangements are made in a formal way and through the national budget
Website	<p>http://www.gov.bw/en/Ministries--Authorities/Ministries/Ministry-of-Local-Government-MLG1/Services/Destitute-allowance/</p>  <p>The screenshot shows the official website of the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) of Botswana. The page title is 'Ministry of Local Government (MLG)'. The main heading is 'Who is a destitute?'. Below this, it states: 'A destitute is a person who is socio-economically disadvantaged. The destitute persons are characterised into two types:'. The website has a blue header with the Botswana coat of arms and the text 'www.gov.bw'. There is a search bar and navigation links for Home, Citizens, Business, Visitors, and Ministries & Authorities. The page also features a sidebar with links for Home, About MLG, Projects, Acts, Bills & Policies, FAQ, Publications, and Tools and Services. There are two dark grey boxes on the left side of the page, one titled 'THE USE OF KGOTLA FOR CONSULTATION AND DECISION MAKING' and another titled 'APPLICATION FOR DOMESTIC WATER CONSTRUCTION'.</p>
H. Country-level Institutionalisation	


Poverty strategy	From 1996 to 2011, social protection and poverty reduction strategy were integrated in National Development Plan of Botswana. In 2011, the government enacted and adopted the country's first social development framework.
National coordination	Yes
I. Programme Budget	
Budget	According to the (Barrientos et al. 2010), the program budget is estimated at 40 million per year. This amount is carried forward for all the years after 2010
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	NAc
J. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>Government of Botswana (2009) <i>Fact-Sheet: Elderly & Benefits Services (2009)</i>, <http://www.gov.bw/Global/MLG/ELDERLY%202009.pdf?epslanguage=en%20/> accessed 4 Jan 2016</p> <p>Government of Botswana (2015a) <i>Destitute Allowance (2016)</i>, <http://www.gov.bw/en/Ministries--Authorities/Ministries/Ministry-of-Local-Government-MLG1/Services/Destitute-allowance/> accessed 4 Jan 2016</p>

Variable	Description
Programme title	Old Age Pension (OAP)
Country	Botswana
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 1996.
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure-Income transfer
Programme function	Old age pension
Main programme objectives	The program aims to support vulnerable group of individuals.
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets all citizen of Botswana aged between 65 and over
Beneficiary selection	To participate in this program, one should be a citizen of Botswana; Have attained the age of 65; Have a valid Omand; Have registered with the department of Social Services
Coverage – individual level	The program had 70,000 in 2000 (Garcia and Moore 2012), reached 90,000 in 2009 (World Bank 2014) and 91,466 in 2010 (World Bank 2015)
Coverage – household level	NAp
Entitlement requisites	Applicants are required to register at the Social Services Department and have a valid Omang. A beneficiary who receives the allowance through bank credit or through a proxy is required to make a life declaration once in every three months, failing which the name is automatically suspended until they show up, in which case they would be entitled to arrears.
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	NAp
Means test – treatment of work	Yes
Recipient of transfer	The recipient of the transfer is the beneficiary. In case s/he is confined to bed due to Old Age or physically disabled, s/he may appoint any person of his/her choice, preferably a relative to receive the allowance.
Payment regularity	The payment is made on a monthly basis.
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	In 1996, beneficiaries of the program received on average of P.100. This amount was raised to 2009 in 2009 (Barrientos et al. 2010; Government of Botswana 2009; Stewart and Yermo 2009)
Transfer guaranteed period	The transfer is for the rest of the beneficiary's natural lifetime. However, if an old Age Pensioner is serving a prison term or is on extra-mural sentence, payments are stopped up to the month he/she is released from prison or complete his/her sentence and s/he is not entitled to arrears for that period.

Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Department of Labor and Social Security / Ministry of Local Government
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	None. Although beneficiaries are registered at the local level, there is little evidence of local government discretion in decision-making.
Intermediation	No evidence of intermediation
Legal framework	NAC
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local or district authorities.
Appeals procedure	Yes. Arrears can only be claimed within a continuous period of twenty three months from date of application. Arrears beyond twenty three months is forfeited.
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of of social accountability or community participation in decision-making or execution of the programme
Budgetary arrangements	Budgetary arrangements are made in a formal way.
Website	<p>http://www.gov.bw/en/Ministries--Authorities/Ministries/Ministry-of-Local-Government-MLG1/Tools-and-Services/Services1/Old-Age-Pension-/</p>  <p>The screenshot shows the official website of the Ministry of Local Government (MLG) of Botswana. The page is titled 'Ministry of Local Government (MLG)' and features a navigation menu with options like Home, About MLG, Projects, Act, Bill & Policies, FAQ, Publications, and Tools and Services. A 'Services & Forms' dropdown menu is open, showing 'DIVISION OF PROPERTY/REGISTRATION OF ESTATE (DORERS)' and a 'Service Description' for 'Old age pension is meant for Botswana citizens only who are 65 years old or above'.</p>
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	From 1996 to 2011, social protection and poverty reduction strategy were integrated in National Development Plan of Botswana. In 2011, the government enacted and adopted the country's first social development framework.
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	According to Barrientos et al. (2010), the programme budget is P. 110 million per month (US\$ 15 million). The amount is converted to calendar year (110*12) which gives approximately 1320 million per year. The estimated budget is carried forward for all years after 2010. No information could be retraced for earlier period.
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	NAC
Government financing	NAC
E. Programme outcome	

Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK.</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank.</p> <p>Government of Botswana (2009) <i>Fact-Sheet: Elderly & Benefits Services</i> (2009), http://www.gov.bw/Global/MLG/ELDERLY%202009.pdf?epslanguage=en%20/ accessed 4 Jan 2016.</p> <p>Stewart, F. and Yermo, J. (2009) <i>OECD Working Papers on Insurance and Private Pensions</i>. Paris, France.</p> <p>World Bank (2014) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2014</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank. — (2015) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2015</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank.</p> <p>World Food Programme (2012) <i>Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) - Factsheet</i>. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia</p>

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Orphan Care Program
Country	Botswana
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 1999.
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing.
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Integrated anti-poverty programs
Programme function	Unconditional cash and food transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to relieve poverty of destitute and orphans
Pilot	No
Target population	The program targeted households in poverty with children under 18 years old
Beneficiary selection	The beneficiary selection is categorical (households with orphans or abandoned children younger than age 18)
Coverage – individual level	According to Barrientos et al. (2010), the programme had a total of 52537 beneficiaries by December 2005. this amount has increased to 53395 by March 2007 (Barrientos et al. 2010; Government of Botswana 2015b)
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	NAp
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Head of household or mandated person
Payment regularity	The transfers are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	According to Barrientos et al. (2010), the transfer amount was P61 (US\$ 8.3) and monthly food rations (equal to P172 = US\$ 23,5) (SADC) in 1999. According to International Social Security Association (2011), this amount was raised to P. 90 by 2011
Transfer guaranteed period	NAc
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Department of Labor and Social Security / Ministry of Local Government

Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Although beneficiaries are registered at the local level, there is little evidence of local government discretion in decision-making.
Intermediation	Beneficiaries are supposed to receive psychosocial support.
Legal framework	NAC
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	The Orphan Care Program was evaluated in 2006, and a national situation analysis is currently on-going to provide data for an evidence based national policy on orphans and vulnerable children
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local/district Authorities
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of of social accountability or community participation in decision-making or execution of the programme
Budgetary arrangements	Budgetary arrangements are formal.
Website	<p>http://www.gov.bw/en/Citizens/Sub-Audiences/Children--Youth1/Orphan-Care-Program/#a445ebe10e8d4a5392d1fd4c6c607655</p> 

C. Country-level Institutionalisation

Poverty strategy	From 1996 to 2011, social protection and poverty reduction strategy were integrated in National Development Plan of Botswana. In 2011, the government enacted and adopted the country's first social development framework.
National coordination	Yes

D. Programme Budget


Budget	NAC
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	NAC
Government financing	NAC

E. Programme outcome

Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending

Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK.</p> <p>Government of Botswana (2015b) National Orphan Care Program accessed 23 Dec 2015.</p> <p>International Social Security Association (ISSA) (2011) <i>Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Africa 2011</i>. Geneva, Switzerland.</p>


<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	World War II veterans (WWVA)
Country	Botswana
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The programme started in 1998.
End date of programme	The programme is still ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfers and pensions for war veterans
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to support vulnerable individuals who have been participated in the World War II.
Pilot	No
Target population	Citizen of Botswana, have participated in the first or World War II; Spouse of a deceased veteran who participated in the war or veteran's child younger than 21 years of age whose mother is also deceased.
Beneficiary selection	The beneficiary selection is categorical: Be a citizen of Botswana; Have participated (or husband) in the first or second World War; have a valid Omang; be younger than 21 years old and whose father was a veteran and mother is also deceased; be a veteran who participated in World Wars but have never been married.
Coverage – individual level	N/A
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	Registration at the Social Services Department with the Pension Officers in all the Districts. Have a valid Omang. A beneficiary who receives the allowance through bank credit or through a proxy is required to make a life declaration once in every three months, failing which the name is automatically suspended until they show up, in which case they would be entitled to arrears.
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	The pensioner (veteran), the head of household (e.g. wife) or an appointee. A beneficiary confined to bed due to Old Age or physically disabled may appoint any person of his/her choice, preferably a relative to receive the allowance on their behalf
Payment regularity	The payment is made on a monthly basis.
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	According to Barrientos et al. (2010) and Government of Botswana (2009), beneficiaries received P. 359.00 per month. The same amount has been carried forward for years after 2010 as stated on the website.
Transfer guaranteed period	The transfers are subject to the conditions attached to the program (such as age of veterans' children).

Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Department of Labor and Social Security / Ministry of Local Government
Agency type	Public
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making.
Local government discretion	Although beneficiaries are registered at the local level, there is little evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	NAC
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local/district Authorities
Appeals procedure	Yes. A beneficiary who is unable to collect his/her allowance during payments is entitled to arrears which they have to apply for through the pension officer. Arrears can only be claimed within a continuous period of twenty three months from date of application. Arrears beyond twenty three months is forfeited
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of social accountability or community participation in decision-making or execution of the programme
Budgetary arrangements	Budgetary arrangements are made based on a formal/budgetary setting.
Website	<p>http://www.gov.bw/en/Ministries--Authorities/Ministries/Ministry-of-Local-Government-MLG1/Services/World-War--II-WWII-Veterans-Allowance/</p>  <p>Home Page > ... > Ministry of Local Government (MLG) > Services > World War II (WWII) Veterans Allowance Local time: Saturday, 27 February 2016 17:12:32hrs</p> <p>Ministry of Local Government (MLG) Republic of Botswana</p> <p>Home About MLG Projects Acts, Bills & Policies FAQ Publications Tools and Services</p> <p>THE USE OF KGOTLA FOR CONSULTATION AND DECISION MAKING</p> <p>APPLICATION FOR BENEFICIARIES</p> <p>Ministry of Local Government (MLG) This provision of allowance which currently stands at P359.00 per month is given to people who participated in the first or second world war. This is subject to constant review.</p>
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	From 1996 to 2011, social protection and poverty reduction strategy were integrated in National Development Plan of Botswana. In 2011, the government enacted and adopted the country's first social development framework.
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	NAC

Government financing	NAC
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK.</p> <p>Government of Botswana (2009) <i>Fact-Sheet: Elderly & Benefits Services (2009)</i>, <http://www.gov.bw/Global/MLG/ELDERLY%202009.pdf?epslanguage=en%20/> accessed 4 Jan 2016.</p>

Burkina Faso


<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Orphans and Vulnerable Children
Country	Burkina Faso
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2008
End date of programme	The program ended in 2010
Replace	Orphans and Vulnerable Children in AIDS affected areas in Burkina Faso (by Axios).
Programme type	Integrated anti-poverty programmes
Programme function	Conditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The program aimed to relieve poverty in households-affected by HIV/AIDS in selected regions.
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The program targeted poor households with HIV/AIDS in villages of the Nahouri region
Beneficiary selection	Orphans and Vulnerable Children aged 0 to 15 (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Coverage – individual level	NAC
Coverage – household level	According to Garcia and Moore (2012) , by 2009, 75 villages with approximately 3,250 households benefited from the programme
Entitlement requisites	Geographic targeting, categorical targeting and proxy means testing.
Means test – treatment of income	NAP
Means test – treatment of assets	NAC
Means test – treatment of work	0
Recipient of transfer	Head of households. Eligible children are given a booklet that is color coded by whether the mother or father should receive the transfers.
Payment regularity	Payments are made on a quarterly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	1000. Depending on the age of the beneficiaries the cash transfer will vary: Children aged 0-6: CFAD 1,000 / quarter (4000/year) (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	4000. Depending on the age of the beneficiaries the cash transfer will vary: Children aged 0-6: CFAD 1,000 / quarter (4000/year) Children aged 7-10: CFAD 2,000/ quarter (8,000/year) Children aged 11-15: CFAD 4,000 / quarter (16,000/year) (Garcia and Moore 2012).
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer guaranteed period	Transfers are subject to continuation of the programme or other related conditions
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes. Children 0-6 : must attend health centres at a rate determined by local health providers, and that children ages 7 through 15 enrol in school and attend at least 90 percent of the time.

	Health service workers record when the child visits the clinic. Likewise, education workers help verify fulfilment of educational conditions
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Conseil National de Lutte contre le SIDA
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Although beneficiaries are registered at the local level, there is little evidence of local government discretion in decision-making.
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	NAC
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local/district Authorities
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	No evidence of social accountability or community participation in decision-making
Budgetary arrangements	NAC
Website	<p>http://www.cnls.bf/</p> 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	During the implementation the Orphans and Vulnerable Children, Burkina Faso had a Poverty Reduction Strategy plan.
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	According to Barrientos et al. (2010), the programme annual budget is estimated at 1.4 million US dollars.
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	NAC
Government financing	NAC
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending

Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p>

Cameroon


Variable	Description
Programme title	Projet de Filet de Protection Sociale - Social Safety Net Project (English)
Country	Cameroon
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2003
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	The programme had a pilot phase in 2013
Programme type	Income transfers plus community assets
Programme function	Employment guarantee and cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to alleviate poverty in targeted groups
Pilot	The programme had a pilot phase in 2013
Target population	The program targets all vulnerable and households in poverty
Beneficiary selection	The programme uses geographical and community targeting. In 2013 the beneficiaries were the residents of Soulede-Roua. By 2014 the residents of 5 regions in Cameroon: Adamaoua, Est, North, Extreme North, North-West started to be a part of the program.
Coverage – individual level	No information on yearly number of beneficiaires could be found. Yet, according to the MINEPAT (Ministere de l'Economie, de la Planification et de l'Amenagement du Territoire 2014), the project is likely to reach a total of 420,000 beneficiaries
Coverage – household level	No information on yearly number of beneficiary households could be found. Yet, according to the MINEPAT (Ministere de l'Economie, de la Planification et de l'Amenagement du Territoire 2014), the project is likely to reach a total of 70,000 households
Entitlement requisites	NAC
Means test – treatment of income	NAC
Means test – treatment of assets	NAC
Means test – treatment of work	Yes
Recipient of transfer	The worker, the head of households or a mandated person
Payment regularity	It was on a monthly basis when they started in 2013 but changed to bimonthly in the following year, 2014.
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	According to the MINEPAT ((Ministere de l'Economie, de la Planification et de l'Amenagement du Territoire 2014) the beneficiaires received on average 15,000 CFA monthly. In 2014, the transfer amount increased to 720,000 CFA bimonthly
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAP
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject on the conditions attached to the programme. According to MINEPAT, transfers are made during a period of 2 years
Transfer conditions – human capital	No

Transfer conditions – work	Yes
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministere de l'Economie, de la Planification et de l'Aménagement du Territoire
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Medium centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Although beneficiaries are registered at the local level, there is little evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations according to presidential decree N° 2014/094
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local/district Authorities
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Yes. Beneficiary selection is partly based on community targeting
Budgetary arrangements	Budgetary is formal
Website	http://www.minepat.gov.cm/index.php/fr/2011-06-30-23-44-4/item/99-financement-du-projet-de-filets-sociaux-au-cameroun
	
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Cameroon has a poverty reduction strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	According to the MINEPAT (Ministere de l'Economie, de la Planification et de l'Aménagement du Territoire 2012), the budget of programme is estimated at US\$36.3 million.
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	Yes. Starting from fiscal year of 2013, the entire social safety net project (including this programme) is financed by an IDA credit of US\$ 50 million. No specific information is however available on the total donor contribution to this specific component
Government financing	NAC
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending

Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Ministere de l'Economie, de la Planification et de l'Amenagement du Territoire (2012) <i>Plan Cadre de Reinstallation (PCR) du Projet Filets Sociaux: Rapport Final</i>. Yaounde, Cameroon;</p> <p>Ministere de l'Economie, de la Planification et de l'Amenagement du Territoire (2014) <i>Coopération Banque Mondiale Cameroun: financement des filets de protection sociale</i> (Yaounde, Cameroon), <http://www.minepat.gov.cm/index.php/fr/2011-06-30-23-44-4/item/115-coop%C3%A9ration-banque-mondiale-cameroun-financement-des-filets-de-protection-sociale> accessed 21 Dec 2015</p>

Cape Verde

Variable	Description
Programme title	Pensão de Solidariedade Social (Minimum Social Pension)
Country	Cape Verde
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2006
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	In 2012 the Minimum Social Protection Program was merged with the Social Solidarity Pension
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Old age and disability pension
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to support disabled people and the elderly
Pilot	No
Target population	The program provides aid to the elderly over 60 years old, the disabled, and children with disabilities living in poor families
Beneficiary selection	Beneficiary selection is based on income targeting, proxy-means test and categorical targeting (labour-incapacitated individuals and elderly are the ones participating in the programme)
Coverage – individual level	According to Garcia and Moore (2012), the project covered 21,000 beneficiaries in 2006, of which a little more than 8,000 were non-military recipients. according to a recent fact-sheet from the ILO (ILO 2015), the percentage of the population over 60 covered by a non-contributory pension reached 46 per cent in 2010, among the highest levels in sub-Saharan Africa. In rural areas nearly 74 per cent of people over 60 years of age are protected by social pensions. The performance of CNPS is efficient with administrative costs estimated to be only 1.4 per cent of benefits.
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	Applicants to the social pensions must complete a form for identification and selection of beneficiaries, as well as provide some basic documentation. Conditions for selection are verified by a social worker through a visit to the domicile of the applicant.
Means test – treatment of income	Income must be below the poverty line (4,123 CVE in 2007) (ILO 2015)
Means test – treatment of assets	NAc
Means test – treatment of work	Yes. Labor incapacitated are targeted by the programme
Recipient of transfer	The Beneficiary or head of household or an appointee
Payment regularity	The transfers are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	In 2008, beneficiaries of the program received on average CVE 3,500 (Garcia and Moore 2012). This amount has increased to CVE 5,000 (US\$65) in 2015 (ILO 2015). The pensioners also benefit from the Mutual Health Fund which was established to subsidize the purchase of

	medicines from private pharmacies, up to an annual ceiling of 2,500 CVE. The Mutual Health Fund also provides a funeral allowance of 7,000 CVE (ILO 2015).
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	National Centre of Social Pensions
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	From 2006 to 2011 even though beneficiaries were registered at the local level, there is little evidence of local government discretion in decision-making but started from 2012 some local government discretion was put into place.
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NACC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local/district Authorities
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is limited evidence of community participation in decision-making or execution of the programme
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	http://www.gateway-caboverde.org.cv/index.php/solidariedade-social 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Cabo Verde has Strategy for the Development of Social Protection of Cabo Verde
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NACC
Cost	The total annual cost of the Minimum Social Pension was reported to exceed CVEsc 289 million (US\$3.6 million) (Government of Cape Verde 2011, cited in Garcia and Moore (2012)).

Donor Financing	Yes. According to the programme website, Portugal supports this program with an estimated 1.2 million euros annually
Government financing	Yes. The social pensions cost nearly 0.4 per cent of GDP and is financed from the general state budget (ILO 2015). but no further information on the total amount could be found.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
	Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i> . Washington, DC: World Bank; ILO (2015) <i>Universal pensions for older persons: Cabo Verde</i> . Geneva, Switzerland

Chad

Variable	Description
Programme title	Food Security Project
Country	Chad
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2001.
End date of programme	The program ended in 2010.
Replace	Projet de sécurité alimentaire au Nord Guera Phase I
Programme type	Integrated anti-poverty programme
Programme function	Food transfer and complementary services
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to improve food security and the nutritional status of the rural population in the northern Guéra Region.
Pilot	No
Target population	All poor and vulnerable households of 400 villages in the Northern Guéra Region, especially women and children. A total of 7500 households was targeted, representing 23% of the total population of the region, with 50% representation of women
Beneficiary selection	The programme used geographical and categorical targeting methods
Coverage – individual level	NAC. The effective coverage has not been found.
Coverage – household level	NAC. The effective coverage has not been found.
Entitlement requisites	NAC
Means test – treatment of income	NAP
Means test – treatment of assets	NAP
Means test – treatment of work	0
Recipient of transfer	Head of household or the beneficiary
Payment regularity	NAC
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer guaranteed period	NAC
Transfer conditions – human capital	NAC
Transfer conditions – work	NAC
B. Programme Institutionalisation	

Implementing agency	Ministry of Agriculture
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	None. There is no evidence of local government discretion
Intermediation	Yes
Legal framework	NAv
Legal framework changes	NAv
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the province level (Northern Guera)
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	No
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Chad has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	According to the IFAD (2011), the programme cost is at USD 17.63 million. An estimate is created for each calendar year.
Donor Financing	According to IFAD (2011), the project is financed through a IFAD loan of USD 11.67 million, and co-financing from USD 4.01 million (Belgian Survival Fund/ BSF: USD 3.68 million; World Food Programme/ WFP: USD 0.33 million), making a total of USD 15.68 million. An equal estimation is considered for each year of the program
Government financing	Based on information provided by IFAD (2011), we deduced that government financing constituted a total of USD 0.195 million for the entire project. An estimation is made for each year
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	IFAD (2011) <i>Chad: Food Security Project in the Northern Guera Region</i>

Comoros

Variable	Description
Programme title	Community Development Support Fund
Country	Comoros
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2010.
End date of programme	The program ended in 2011.
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Income transfers plus community assets
Programme function	Employment guarantee
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to provide work to seasonally unemployed individuals.
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targets food insecure individuals, notably women
Beneficiary selection	The programme uses community driven and beneficiary ranking as targeting methods.
Coverage – individual level	According to the World Bank, the programme covers 3750 individuals, of which 1875 male and 1875 female (representing 0.70% of the population)(World Bank 2010)
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	Yes
Recipient of transfer	The worker
Payment regularity	The payment is made daily
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	The daily wage is set at US\$6.47 in 2010 (World Bank 2010)
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to the programme duration and conditions
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	Yes
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Malawi Social Action Fund under Ministry of Local Government

Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Although beneficiaries are registered at the local level, there is little evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAcc
Evaluation protocols	Yes. Targeting assessment and impact evaluation was planned for 2010 (World Bank 2010)
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the local level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Yes. Beneficiaries selection community-driven
Budgetary arrangements	Formal. The programme is financed by the world bank in accordance with the government.
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Comoros has a poverty reduction strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	
Cost	According to the World Bank, the programme annual cost is estimated at US\$ 809,000 million (World Bank 2010)
Donor Financing	Yes. The program was entirely financed by the World Bank (US\$ 809,000 million) (World Bank 2010)
Government financing	No
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	World Bank (2010) <i>Making Public Works Work: Public Works Database</i> (Washington, DC)

Eritrea

Variable	Description
Programme title	Public Works Program
Country	Eritrea
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2012
End date of programme	The program ended in 2015
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Income transfers plus community assets (World Bank 2014, 2015)
Programme function	Employment Guarantee
Main programme objectives	NACc
Pilot	Yes
Target population	NAC
Beneficiary selection	NAC
Coverage - individual level	NAC
Coverage - household level	NAC
Entitlement requisites	NAC
Means test - treatment of income	NAC
Means test - treatment of assets	NAC
Means test - treatment of work	NAC
Recipient of transfer	NAC
Payment regularity	NAC
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer guaranteed period	NAC
Transfer conditions - human capital	NAC
Transfer conditions - work	NAC
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	NAC

Agency type	NAc
Centralisation of decision making	NAc
Local government discretion	NAc
Intermediation	NAc
Legal framework	NAc
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	NAc
Appeals procedure	NAc
Social accountability and participation	NAc
Budgetary arrangements	NAc
Website	0
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	NAc
National coordination	NAc
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	NAc
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	World Bank (2014) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2014</i> . Washington, DC: World Bank World Bank (2015) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2015</i> . Washington, DC: World Bank

Ethiopia

Variable	Description
Programme title	Meket Livelihoods Development Project
Country	Ethiopia
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2003
End date of programme	The program ended in 2008
Replace	The programme had a pilot phase in 2003 and 2004
Programme type	Integrated anti-poverty programmes
Programme function	Employment guarantee and unconditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to help vulnerable households meet essential food expenditure in bad years, and to invest in assets in better years. The longer-term goals are to contribute to the diversification of livelihood options, to enhance community-level assets, and to stimulate the rural economy, in the project area
Pilot	In year 1 and 2.
Target population	All poor households, most importantly food insecure rural households, pregnant mothers, older people, disabled in the poorest sections of the population in the Meket woreda of North Wollo (Amhara Region)
Beneficiary selection	The programme uses a combination of proxy-test, geographical, categorical and community targeting methods.
Coverage – individual level	According to Barrientos et al. (2010), the project benefited a total of 46,600 (40,000 who operate in the meher season harvest, and 6,600 in belg season) with approximately 5000 receiving cash relief. Half of Meket woreda (district) is covered. From 2004 to 2007, 19 to 22 rural and two urban kebeles of Meket woreda. The remaining 25 kebeles of the woreda were supported by the Government Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP) through a Cash for Work strategy, which started in 2005 (JARCO Consulting 2008)
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	Associations and officials using a number of criteria, including livestock ownership, access to land and performance in the previous harvest (Adams and Kebede 2005; Barrientos et al. 2010).
Means test – treatment of work	Labour incapacity is considered during assessment. Those who could not or should not work are designated as recipients of the unconditional cash transfer, including pregnant and lactating mothers, older people, and children, those with disabilities.
Recipient of transfer	Worker or head of households
Payment regularity	Transfers payments are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	Recipients receive on average 30BIRR per month depending on whether they work in meher season or belg season (therefore not all beneficiaries receive cash at the same time of year as it depends on which harvest they rely on). The amount of cash transferred increases with

	household size: a five-person household, for instance, should receive 150 Birr (about US\$ 17.50)(Devereux and Pelham 2005)
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAP
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	Yes
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Save the Children
Agency type	Non-profit agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Local authorities are highly involved in selecting participants
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Yes, communities are involved in selection process
Budgetary arrangements	NAC
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Ethiopia has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	According an evaluation report (JARCO Consulting 2008), the project has distributed approximately USD 34 million to beneficiaries since 2004. An indicative cost is estimated on yearly basis
Donor Financing	Yes. The project is entirely financed by the government of the Netherlands and Save the Children UK (Barrientos et al. 2010; JARCO Consulting 2008)
Government financing	No
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending

Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Adams, L. and Kebede, E. (2005) <i>Breaking the poverty cycle: A case study of cash interventions in Ethiopia</i>. London, UK</p> <p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Devereux, S. and Pelham, L. (2005) <i>Making Cash Count: Lessons from Cash Transfer Schemes in East and Southern Africa for supporting the most vulnerable children and households</i>. London, UK</p> <p>JARCO Consulting (2008) <i>Meket Livelihood Development Project: Evaluation Report</i>. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia</p>

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Productive Safety Net Program
Country	Ethiopia
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2005
End date of programme	The program appears to have ended in 2012
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Income transfers plus community assets
Programme function	Employment guarantee and unconditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to (i) provide transfers to the food insecure population in a way that prevents asset depletion at the household level and creates community assets, and (ii) improve conditions in the community and enlarge the capacity of the individual as a sustainable measure to prevent food insecurity in the household. For those chronically food insecure households without labour: disabled, elderly etc., the project provides direct support.
Pilot	N/A - it is not clear if the programme had a pilot phase
Target population	The programme targets households in poverty, notably chronically food-insecure people
Beneficiary selection	The programme uses community and administrative targeting methods: community committee is set up by the PA to select beneficiaries; general assembly reviews list, amends and endorses it; a review mechanism is in place to consider other beneficiaries for exceptional conditions; appeal committees exist at PA and at district level to handle targeting complaints (World Bank 2007).
Coverage – individual level	In 2005, the programme reached approximately 5 million food-insecure people (14.6% of the economically active population). In 2006, the number increased to 7.2 million people (20.4% economically active population) and 2009, 8.2 million people were covered, beneficiaries 6 months out of the year (covers 11% population) (Barrientos et al. 2010). Yet, according to IFPR and WFP, the project reached a total of 7 million in 2008 and 7.64million by the end of the programme in 2012 (Gilligan et al. 2008; World Food Programme 2012)
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	Unemployment and labour incapacity are considered during assessment. Eligibility for public work is based on this and on the presence of adult able bodied labour. (World Bank 2007)
Recipient of transfer	Worker or head of households
Payment regularity	Transfers are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	The value of the cash transfer amounts to about 30 Birr per person per month. Timing of payment disbursement according to seasons (Barrientos et al. 2010). According to the World Bank (2007), each household member is eligible to receive a transfer equivalent to 15kg of cereal (in cash/food)


Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	Yes. Labour requirement of each member of the household who was on the beneficiary list (6 days per month per beneficiary)
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Government of Ethiopia and a joint donor group CIDA, DFID, the EC, USAID and the World Bank.
Agency type	Hybrid agency
Centralisation of decision making	Relatively centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Small scope for local discretion (local administration support targeting methods)
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Yes. Community intervenes in selection methods.
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Ethiopia has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	The Annual budget was 500 million (Andersson et al. 2009; Gilligan et al. 2008)
Cost	According to Barrientos et al. (2010), the project costed US\$ 225 million in 2005/2006 (2% of GDP)
Donor Financing	Yes. The project is financed by the Ethiopian government and a consortium of donors including the World Bank, USAID, Canadian International Development Agency and several other European donors. The contribution of donors has however not been specified (Andersson et al. 2009; Gilligan et al. 2008)
Government financing	Yes (Andersson et al. 2009; Gilligan et al. 2008)
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending

Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Andersson, C., Mekonnen, A. and Stage, J. (2009) <i>Impacts of the Productive Safety Net Program in Ethiopia on Livestock and Tree Holdings of Rural Households</i>. Washington DC, USA</p> <p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Gilligan, D. O., Hoddinott, J. and Taffesse, A. S. (2008) <i>The Impact of Ethiopia's Productive Safety Net Programme and its Linkages</i>. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia</p> <p>World Food Programme (2012) <i>Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) - Factsheet</i>. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia</p> <p>World Bank (2007) <i>The Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia: The Public Works Component</i> (Washington, DC), http://info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/library/207058/The%20Productive%20Safety%20Net%20Programme%20in%20Ethiopia.pdf</p>

Ghana

Variable	Description
Programme title	Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty Program
Country	Ghana
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2008
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	The programme had a pilot phase in 2008
Programme type	Income transfer – transfer for human development
Programme function	Conditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to supplement the incomes of ‘dangerously poor households’ through the provision of cash transfers and to link them up with complementary services so that they can, over time, ‘leap out of poverty’. To link beneficiaries to complementary services and also promote community awareness. To secure birth registration for children
Pilot	During the first year
Target population	The programme targets extreme poor within five years, highly vulnerable elderly and disabled. : i) caregivers of OVC; ii) pregnant and lactating women; iii) impoverished elderly; iv) severely disabled; and v) fisher folk and subsistence food crop farmers. OVC were initially defined as children who were infected or affected by HIV/AIDS, but this concept has been broadened to include other categories of extremely vulnerable children.
Beneficiary selection	LEAP eligibility is based on poverty and having a household member in at least one of three demographic categories: having orphans or vulnerable children, elderly poor, or person with extreme disability unable to work. Proxy means testing and community-based selection is adopted. Districts are selected based on four criteria: poverty incidence; HIV/AIDS prevalence; rates of child labour; and access to social services (DSW, 2008), although the relative weights accorded to each of these criteria remain unclear. Within a district, community LEAP implementation committees (CLICs), consisting of traditional leaders, district assembly members, representatives of teachers and nurses, religious leaders and other community leaders, do an initial identification of the most vulnerable households in their communities. Local social welfare officers of the DSW then administer a means-testing questionnaire to the identified households. Data are fed into a computerised information management system, known as the ‘single register’, and analysed based on weights accorded to the proxy variables that make up the eligibility formula. A list of proposed beneficiaries is then generated, within a resource limit previously set for each community. (Jones et al. 2009)
Coverage – individual level	In March 2008 and by mid- 2009 had been implemented in 74 of 178 districts and reached over 131,000 individuals (Gbedemah et al. 2010). The FAO reported a total coverage of 177,500 beneficiaries in 2013. (FAO 2014a)
Coverage – household level	The programme reached 26,200 and 55,000 households respectively in 2009 and 2010 (Barrientos et al. 2010). The FAO reported that the programmed reached over 71,000 households by 2013 (FAO 2014a). According to the project website, the programmes covers a total of 90,785 households.
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	NAc
Means test – treatment of assets	NAc. Proxy variables are used to make up the eligibility formula. Yet, no information on these variables could be retrieved.
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Head of household
Payment regularity	While transfers amounts are calculated on a monthly basis, payments are made bimonthly

Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	The beneficiaries used to receive a minimum of GHS 8 per month (paid bimonthly) (FAO 2014a). This amount has increased to GHS 24 in 2012 (Thome et al. 2014). According to programme website, the LEAD currently pays a minimum of GHS 48.00 to one member households (Government of Ghana 2016). A unique feature of LEAP is that beneficiaries are also provided free health insurance through the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS).
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	The beneficiaries used to receive a maximum of GHS 15 per month (paid bimonthly) (FAO 2014). This amount has increased to GHS 45 in 2012 (Thome et al. 2014). According to programme website, the LEAD currently pays a maximum of GHS 90.00 to a family of four eligible beneficiaries or more. A unique feature of LEAP is that beneficiaries are also provided free health insurance through the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS).
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes. Like other conditional cash transfer programmes, LEAP sets positive conditionalities which promote synergies with complementary social services – including advancing children’s school enrolment and retention, registration at birth, uptake of post-natal care and immunisations for young children. It also includes a number of conditionalities aimed at eliminating certain behaviours, such as ensuring children are neither trafficked nor engaged in the worst forms of child labour, for example as domestic workers, to which girls are especially vulnerable. However, in Ghana, these remain ‘quasi’-conditions, as there are few means and resources to assess compliance (Gbedemah et al. 2010; Jones et al. 2009)
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Protection / Ministry of Employment and Social Welfare
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Relatively high decision-making at the central level
Local government discretion	Local authorities are highly involved in beneficiary selection process
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities at the district level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	The programme is community-driven; local authorities and communities are highly involved in selection and implementation.
Budgetary arrangements	Formal.
Website	http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/media-center/features/1641-leap-as-a-tool-to-alleviate-poverty

	 <p>The screenshot shows the Government of Ghana website. At the top, there is a search bar and the Ghana flag. Below that is a navigation menu with links: HOME, ABOUT GHANA, GOVERNANCE, GOV'T PROJECTS, MEDIA CENTER, PHOTO GALLERY, and CONTACTS. The main content area is titled 'LEAP AS A TOOL TO ALLEVIATING POVERTY'. It describes the LEAP program as a social cash transfer programme that provides cash and health insurance to the extremely poor households across the country. It also mentions that the program's main aim is to alleviate short-term poverty and encourage long-term human capital development, and that it was launched in 2008 as Ghana's flagship programme of the National Social Protection Strategy. The text further states that the program is funded by the government of Ghana and supported by the World Bank and DFID, and that it receives technical support from UNICEF's social protection unit. A section titled 'Why Leap' explains that in recent years, the government adopted a number of initiatives, including the launch of the National Social Protection Strategy (NSPS) in 2007, which represents the government's vision of creating an all-inclusive society through the provision of sustainable mechanisms for the protection of persons living in situations of extreme poverty, vulnerability and exclusion.</p>
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Ghana has a Poverty Reduction Strategy. In 2012 the country also adopted a National Social Protection Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	The budgetary allocation was GH¢7.5 million in 2009 and GH¢12 million in 2010 (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Cost	The annual expenditure of the program is estimated at USD 20 million annually (Handa et al. 2015)
Donor Financing	Yes. The programme is financed through donations from DFID, and a loan from the World Bank, and is the flagship program of its National Social Protection Strategy (Handa et al. 2015)
Government financing	Yes. The program is funded from general revenues of the Government of Ghana with 50 percent of the funding coming from the government (approximately USD10 million annually) (Handa et al. 2015)
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>FAO (2014a) <i>The Broad Range of Impacts of the LEAP Programme in Ghana</i> (Rome, Italy; publ online 2014), <http://www.fao.org/docrep/019/as244e/as244e.pdf></p> <p>Gbedemah, C., Jones, N. and Perezniето, P. (2010) <i>Gendered risks, poverty and vulnerability in Ghana: is the LEAP cash transfer programme making a difference?</i> London, UK</p>

	<p>Government of Ghana (2016) <i>LEAP as a tool to alleviate poverty</i>, <http://www.ghana.gov.gh/index.php/media-center/features/1641-leap-as-a-tool-to-alleviate-poverty> accessed February 2016</p> <p>Handa, S., Park, M., Osei, R. D. and Osei-Akoto, I. <i>et al.</i> (2015) <i>Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty Program Impact Evaluation</i>. Chapel Hill, USA</p> <p>Jones, N., Ahadzie, W. and Doh, D. (2009) <i>Social protection and children: Opportunities and challenges in Ghana</i>. London, UK</p> <p>Thome, K., Taylor, E., Kagin, J. and Davis, B. <i>et al.</i> (2014) <i>Local Economy-wide Impact Evaluation (LEWIE) of Ghana's Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme</i>. Rome, Italy</p>
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Guinea

Variable	Description
Programme title	Productive Social Safety Net program - Cash Transfer Program
Country	Guinea
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2012
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure Income transfers
Programme function	Conditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The program aims to support vulnerable groups and malnourished children by providing cash transfers to households in selected communities.
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targets all vulnerable groups, notably malnourished children
Beneficiary selection	The project appears to use proxy-mean tests. The world bank reports that the amount to be transferred would be proportional to the number of children who are below 14 while differentiated amounts would be tested (World Bank August 2014)
Coverage – individual level	N/A. According to the world bank, the entire Social Safety net program targets 200,000 people (World Bank June 19, 2012)
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	Registration at the sensitization campaigns.
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	N/A
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Payments are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme.
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes. The amount to be transferred would be proportional to the number of children who are below 14 while differentiated amounts would be tested. Future transfers would be conditional upon children's health being regularly checked up at health centers (for children under 6 years of age) and school attendance (for children between 6 and 14). The National Institute for Statistics would be recruited for data collection, beneficiary identification and the production of beneficiary cards. The Safety Net Unit would contract payment agencies to transfer cash to the

	beneficiaries, and consultants or NGOs to supervise compliance with the conditionality (World Bank August 2014)
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Government of Guinea, World Bank
Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local discretion in planning or implementation
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register in their respective jurisdictions
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation in decision-making or execution of the programme
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Guinea has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	According to the World Bank, the total budget of this component is estimated at USD 4.5 million (World Bank August 2014) . An estimation is made for each year covered in the dataset.
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	According to the World Bank, this component is entirely financed by the Bank for a total of USD 4.5 million (World Bank August 2014). An estimation is made for each year covered in the dataset.
Government financing	No
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending


References	<p>World Bank (2012) <i>World Bank to Provide Safety Net Protection for 200,000 Poor People in Guinea</i> (Conakry, Guinea; pubd online 19 Jun 2012), http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2012/06/19/world-bank-to-provide-safety-net-protection-for-200000-poor-people-in-guinea accessed 28-Feb-16</p> <p>World Bank (2014) <i>Productive Social Safety Net Project (P123900): ISDS</i>. Washington DC, USA</p>
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<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Productive Social Safety Net program – Component 1
Country	Guinea
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2012
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Income transfers plus community assets
Programme function	Employment guarantee and conditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programs provides income for vulnerable groups, including women and youth in selected urban and peri-urban areas in Guinea through labor-intensive public works
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targets vulnerable groups notably women and youth. At least 40 percent of beneficiaries would be women.
Beneficiary selection	The beneficiary targeting process would combine a self-selection approach and community targeting. A committee would be created in each community to select beneficiaries among all those who would have registered after the sensitization campaigns.
Coverage – individual level	NAc. According to the world bank, the entire Social Safety net program targets 200,000 people (World Bank June 19, 2012) (World Bank August 2014)
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	Registration at the sensitization campaigns.
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	NAc
Means test – treatment of work	NAc
Recipient of transfer	Worker
Payment regularity	Payment are made on monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	Daily remuneration is set at FGNG 35,000 since 2012 for 30 days of work. The total salary is paid monthly (World Bank August 2014)
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	Yes
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Government of Guinea, World Bank

Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	The programme is relatively decentralized
Local government discretion	Local communities and authorities participate in selection process
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register in their jurisdictions
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Yes. Communities are involved in beneficiaries selection process.
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Guinea has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	According to the World Bank, the total budget is estimated at USD 18.15 million (World Bank August 2014). An estimation is made for each year covered in the dataset.
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	Yes. The project has received USD 16.5 million co-financing from the World Bank. An equal amount is estimated for each year covered in the database
Government financing	Yes but no information on total government contribution could be found.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	World Bank (2012) <i>World Bank to Provide Safety Net Protection for 200,000 Poor People in Guinea</i> (Conakry, Guinea; pubd online 19 Jun 2012), < http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2012/06/19/world-bank-to-provide-safety-net-protection-for-200000-poor-people-in-guinea > accessed 28-Feb-16 World Bank (2014) <i>Productive Social Safety Net Project (P123900): ISDS</i> . Washington DC, USA

Guinea Bissau

Variable	Description
Programme title	Disability Allowance
Country	Guinea-Bissau
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	There is no official information about when the program started.
End date of programme	There is no official information about when the program has ended or whether it is ongoing
Replace	NAC
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Disability pensions
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to support disabled
Pilot	NAC
Target population	The programme targets citizen aged 18 years or older suffering from physical or mental disability
Beneficiary selection	Categorical targeting
Coverage – individual level	NAC
Coverage – household level	NAC
Entitlement requisites	Verification by the Disability Commission (CVI) (Instituto Nacional de Seguranca Social 2016)
Means test – treatment of income	NAC
Means test – treatment of assets	NAC
Means test – treatment of work	NAC
Recipient of transfer	NAC
Payment regularity	NAC
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to verification of disabilities and conditions attached to the programme.
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Instituto Nacional de Seguranca Social (National Institute of Social Security)

Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	NAc
Local government discretion	NAc
Intermediation	NAc
Legal framework	NAc
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	NAc
Appeals procedure	NAc
Social accountability and participation	NAc
Budgetary arrangements	NAc
Website	http://www.inpsgb.com/index.php/beneficios/subsidios 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Guinea-Bissau has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	NAc
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending

Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	Instituto Nacional de Seguranca Social (National Institute of Social Security) (2016) <i>Subsidios</i> (2012), < http://www.inpsgb.com/index.php/beneficios/subsidios > accessed 28-Feb-16

Kenya

Variable	Description
Programme title	Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CT-OVC)
Country	Kenya
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2004
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing.
Replace	The program had a pilot phase until 2010 (OVC Cash transfers Pilot)
Programme type	Income transfers plus human capital investment
Programme function	Conditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The program aims to provide a social protection system through regular and predictable cash transfers to households living with OVC in order to encourage fostering and retention of OVC within their families and communities and to promote their human capital development.
Pilot	The pilot phase run from 2004 to approximately 2009
Target population	Poor households fostering with OVCs aged 0-17
Beneficiary selection	The CT-OVC program selects beneficiary households using a combination of community targeting mechanism and data collection and analysis on various social economic indicators (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Coverage – individual level	The program's initial districts were Nairobi, Kwale, and Garissa. A total coverage of 500 OVC reported 2004 (Garcia and Moore 2012). The coverage reached 75,000 OVCs by 2009 (Barrientos et al. 2010). According to the ILO, the programme has reached 400 000 in 2009 (ILO 2014) while the world bank reports 412,000 (World Bank August 2014). According to the latest information from the World Bank, the programme has already reached more than 1 million individuals (World Bank 2015)
Coverage – household level	In 2009 the number reached 25 000 household with 75,000 OVCs (only 9% of eligible households) (Barrientos et al. 2010). The ILO reports 82,000 households by 2009 (ILO 2014). The programmed planned and appeared to have reached 100, 000 households by 2012(Barrientos et al. 2010).
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	NAc
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Head of households. Beneficiary households are informed that the care and protection of the resident OVC is their responsibility for receiving the cash payment.
Payment regularity	Payments are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	In 2010, the transfer cash amount was reported to be at least Ksh 1000 (US\$13.50) for 1-2 OVCs (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	In 2010, the transfer cash amount was reported to be at most Ksh 3000 (US\$27.40) for 5 OVCs (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	The World Bank reported that beneficiaries received on average KSh 500 (US\$6.25) per child on a monthly basis monthly (Garcia and Moore 2012).

Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to conditions attached to the programme.
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes. Kenya’s CT for OVC beneficiaries have responsibilities related to child health and education: children under 1 year old must attend a local clinic six times within their first year to be immunized, receive vitamin A supplements, and have their growth monitored; children between 1 and 3 years must have a growth-monitoring check-ups and receive vitamin A supplements twice a year; children between 6 and 17 years must enrol in school and maintain attendance for 80 percent of school days; and caretakers must attend educational seminars at least once annually. All the children in the household are supposed to fulfil the relevant conditions, even if they are not the designated beneficiary. Conditions are not intended to be used to punish households but to encourage households to invest in human capital. Households that do not comply with conditions are supposed to receive warnings before any payments are reduced (Garcia and Moore 2012).
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Home Affairs Children's Department, UNICEF, Swedish International Development Cooperation
Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Local authorities may intervene as selection methods involve community participation.
Intermediation	NAC
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register in their jurisdictions
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Communities intervene in beneficiary selection process
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Kenya has a poverty reduction strategy. In 2011, the country also adopted a National Social Protection Policy (Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Development 2011)
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	According to NGEN Kenya, the program was allocated a total budget of USD 0.8 million in 2005. By 2009, the government funding to the program increased to US \$9 million. Every year since then, the program has received increased budget allocations from the government. For example in 2011/2012 the program was allocated Kshs. 2.8 billion, and in 2012/2013 Kshs 4.4 billion. In 2013/2014, the program received a lion share of Kshs 8 billion (these amounts are converted in USD using exchange rates of corresponding years in order to facilitate consistency in the panel database) (National Gender and Equality Commission 2014)
Cost	The programme cost is estimated at USD 2.2 million in 2006 with an estimated cost of US\$ 31.6million when the programme will have reached 100 000 households (as in 2015).
Donor Financing	Yes. The programme is jointly financed by the government of Kenya and donor such as UNICEF/ Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA) in 2004 and 2005.

	According to Ikiara (2009), the programme has received a credit of approximately USD 50 million covering the years 2009 to 2016. The programme has also received the contribution of the UNICEF and Swedish International although the specific amount has not been specified.
Government financing	Yes. It is however unclear whether the budget reported by National Gender and Equality Commission (2014) also include donors contribution
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Alviar, C. and Pearson, R. (2009) <i>Cash Transfers for Vulnerable Children in Kenya: From political choice to scale-up</i>. New York, USA</p> <p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>Ikiara, G. (2009) <i>The Political Economy of Cash Transfers in Kenya: A Report prepared for the Overseas Development Institute</i>. London, UK</p> <p>ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Development (2011) <i>Kenya National Social Protection Policy</i>. Nairobi, Kenya</p> <p>National Gender and Equality Commission (2014) <i>Participation of Vulnerable Populations in their Own Programmes: The Cash Transfers in Kenya</i>. Nairobi, Kenya</p> <p>World Bank (2014) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2014</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>World Bank (2014) <i>Productive Social Safety Net Project (P123900): ISDS</i>. Washington DC, USA</p>

Variable	Description
Programme title	Older Persons Cash Transfer
Country	Kenya
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2006
End date of programme	The Program is still ongoing
Replace	The programme had a pilot phase until 2009
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Old age pension
Main programme objectives	The program aims to support the elderly
Pilot	Pilot phase until 2009. The programme was expended in 2010
Target population	The programme targets poor households with elderly aged 65 or more who have attained additional criteria.
Beneficiary selection	The selection is based on income status, age (above 65 years) geographical criteria (targeted districts), and that those selected should not be beneficiaries of another CT programme (Ikiara 2009; National Gender and Equality Commission 2014)
Coverage – individual level	In 2006/2007, the programme only covered 200 beneficiaries 2 districts. In 2009/2010, it was expanded and reached 44 districts for a total of 32,115 beneficiaries. this number has been increasing and in 2013, the programme reached 36,000 beneficiaries in more than 44 districts (National Gender and Equality Commission 2014)
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	NAc
Means test – treatment of assets	NAp
Means test – treatment of work	Yes
Recipient of transfer	Household heads or appointee
Payment regularity	Transfers are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	The monthly transfer is set at Ksh 1065 per household per month
Transfer guaranteed period	NAc
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	

Implementing agency	OPTC committee
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is wide representation of local authorities and community based organisations both in the implementation of the programme
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with district authorities
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is evidence of community participation in decision-making or execution of the programme
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Kenya has a poverty reduction strategy. In 2011, the country also adopted a National Social Protection Policy (Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Development 2011)
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	The program started with a budget of Ksh 4 million in 2006. The program was expanded in 2009 after receipt of Ksh 550 million from the government in 2009/2010 financial year and further to Kshs 1 Billion in 2011/2012 financial year. The program was allocated Kshs. 1.5 billion in 2012/13 financial year and Kshs. 3.2 billion in the 2013/14.(National Gender and Equality Commission 2014)
Cost	According to the ODI report, the annual allocation (cost) to households is estimated at 3 billion from 2009 to 2012 (Ikiara 2009)
Donor Financing	NAC
Government financing	Yes. It is however unclear whether the total budget allocated by the government as stated in NEGC also include government financing.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
	Ikiara, G. (2009) <i>The Political Economy of Cash Transfers in Kenya: A Report prepared for the Overseas Development Institute</i> . London, UK

	<p>Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Development (2011) <i>Kenya National Social Protection Policy</i>. Nairobi, Kenya</p> <p>National Gender and Equality Commission (2014) <i>Participation of Vulnerable Populations in their Own Programmes: The Cash Transfers in Kenya</i>. Nairobi, Kenya</p>
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<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Persons with Severe Disabilities Cash Transfer Program (PWSD-CT)
Country	Kenya
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2012
End date of programme	The programme is ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Income transfer
Programme function	Cash transfer
Main programme objectives	The program aims to support disabled children and adults
Pilot	Yes
Target population	Households with persons with disability; extremely poor households, non-recipients of pension or reasonable regular income, and non-receipts of other cash transfer services.
Beneficiary selection	Selection is based on poverty assessment, geographical, categorical and community targeting. Eligibility is often increased with presence or more of the following attributes: Poverty level of the household is high, number of persons with severe disabilities in a household, number of chronically ill persons in a household with a person with severe disabilities, number of persons in a household with other forms of disabilities other than the one with severe disabilities.
Coverage – individual level	N/A.
Coverage – household level	N/A.
Entitlement requisites	Beneficiaries must be non-recipient of other cash transfers programs
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	N/A
Recipient of transfer	Head of households, direct beneficiaries or appointee
Payment regularity	N/A
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to compliance with pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	

Implementing agency	Ministry of Home Affairs
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Decision-making is centralized
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of community participation in implementation process
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation. Kenya adopted a national disability policy in 2006
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register within their constituencies
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	0
Budgetary arrangements	Discretionary
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Kenya has a poverty reduction strategy. In 2011, the country also adopted a National Social Protection Policy (Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Development 2011)
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	According to NGEC Kenya, the programme has been allocated a total budget of Kshs 770 million in 2013/2014. . This amount increased to Kshs 770 Million in 2013/2014 (National Gender and Equality Commission 2014) (An equal estimate is calculated for each year in the dataset)
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	NAC
Government financing	Yes. Government financing is taken as reported by NGEC. However, it is unclear whether the budget amount also includes donor financing.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
	Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Development (2011) <i>Kenya National Social Protection Policy</i> . Nairobi, Kenya National Gender and Equality Commission (2014) <i>Participation of Vulnerable Populations in their Own Programmes: The Cash Transfers in Kenya</i> . Nairobi, Kenya

Variable	Description
Programme title	The Hunger Safety Net Pilot Programme (HSNP)
Country	Kenya
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2009
End date of programme	The program ended in 2012 (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Family transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aimed to develop a mechanism for regularly transferring cash to the most vulnerable in Kenya and to alleviate extreme hunger and poverty in Kenya.
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targeted families in poverty, those households that would chronically lack food irrespective of environmental conditions, notably elderly aged 55 years and above. (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Beneficiary selection	The HSNP uses dependency ratio and community targeting. This approach helps selecting households with many underage children and older people and disabled. Studies have shown that families with larger families consisting of underage children, older persons and disabled are the poorest in the country. The programme used sub-locations as the basic unit of operations. In each sub-location targeted, the programme will aim to reach between 30 and 40% of the poorest (36% in social pension and 50% in both community based targeting and dependency ratio.
Coverage – individual level	The World Bank reported a total coverage 290,000 beneficiaries in 2012 (World Bank 2014)
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	N/A
Recipient of transfer	Head of household, beneficiary or appointee
Payment regularity	Payments are made bi-monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	KSh 2,150 per household every two months
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions of the programme

Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry for the Development of Northern Kenya, DFID
Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Limited evidence of local discretion although operations in sub-locations
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register within sub-locations
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	The programme uses community participation in selection process
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Kenya has a poverty reduction strategy. In 2011, the country also adopted a National Social Protection Policy (Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Development 2011)
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	Yes. According to Barrientos et al. (2010), DFID has committed KSh 14 million (GBP 122 million to the program). An equal estimation is made for each of the 4 years.
Government financing	
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
	Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i> . Manchester, UK

	<p>Ministry of Gender, Children, and Social Development (2011) <i>Kenya National Social Protection Policy</i>. Nairobi, Kenya</p> <p>World Bank (2014) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2014</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p>
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Lesotho

Variable	Description
Programme title	Child Grants Programme - Pilot
Country	Lesotho
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2009
End date of programme	The programme is ongoing
Replace	The programme had a pilot phase from 2009 to 2011
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to enhance income in poor households with OVC through predictable cash grant to supplement the income of poor households caring for OVC, including child-headed households. The grant is to be used for the high-priority needs of beneficiary children, such as to improve access to health care and nutritious food, increase school enrollment and attendance, and protect children from abuse and exploitation.
Pilot	Pilot phase from 2009 to 2011
Target population	Poor households with OVC children
Beneficiary selection	The targeting exercise is based on a ranking score on selected wealth criteria and based on target categories
Coverage – individual level	As of March 2014, the CGP provided benefits for approximately 65,000 children across 10 districts in Lesotho (Kingdom of Lesotho May 2014)
Coverage – household level	In April 2009, the CGP pilot began disbursing cash transfers in three community councils: the Matelile, Semonkong, and Lebakeng councils (Garcia and Moore 2012). As of March 2014, the CGP reached ultra-poor households in 21,800 households (Kingdom of Lesotho May 2014)
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	NAc
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Quarterly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	From 2013, households receive quarterly a transfer indexed to their number of children starting from M360 for households with 1-2 children (Kingdom of Lesotho May 2014)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	From 2013, households receive quarterly a transfer indexed to their number of children up to a maximum of M750 for households with 5 children or more. (Kingdom of Lesotho May 2014)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	The programme started with a flat rate of M360. The amount was indexed to the number of children in 2013.
Transfer guaranteed period	Based on pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No

Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Minister of Social Development
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	NAC
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes.
Beneficiary registration	NAC
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is limited evidence of community participation in programme implementation
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. The country has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	According to the UNICEF, the Government of Lesotho took over the responsibility of paying all beneficiaries of the Child Grants Programmes. Approximately USD4 million from the national recurrent budget has been ear-marked this.(UNICEF 2014)
Cost	According to the FAO, the programme cost is estimated at M50-M58 million in 2014/15, which represent 0.2 % of the country GDP. A estimation is made for each year based on the average amount (M 54 million)(Kingdom of Lesotho May 2014)
Donor Financing	Yes. The programme receives the financial support of the EU and UNICEF. However, total donors contribution has not been found
Government financing	Yes
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending

References	<p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>Kingdom of Lesotho (2014) <i>Policy options for the Lesotho Child Grant Programme</i>. Rome, Italy</p> <p>UNICEF (2014) <i>Findings of the Child Grants Programme Impact Evaluation welcomed by Policy makers</i> (14 Apr 2014), <http://www.unicef.org/esaro/5440_lesotho2014_child-grants.html> accessed 28-Feb-16</p>
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<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Cash and Food Transfers Pilot Project
Country	Lesotho
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2007
End date of programme	The programme ended in 2008 (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	Improve the living standards of Orphans and other Vulnerable Children (OVC) so as to reduce malnutrition, improve health status, and increase school enrolment among OVCs.
Pilot	Yes
Target population	Poor households with OVC children
Beneficiary selection	The targeting exercise itself is based on a ranking score on selected wealth criteria
Coverage – individual level	
Coverage – household level	In all, 9,172 households were identified using these criteria in the 6 participating constituencies. Of these, 6,500 received assistance directly under the CFTPP, while the rest received assistance from the PRRO (Devereux and Mhlanga 2008)
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	0
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	N/A
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer guaranteed period	
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	World Vision
Agency type	Non-profit agency

Centralisation of decision making	Decisions are relatively decentralised
Local government discretion	Local authorities are highly involved in beneficiary selection. Selection criteria were applied by chiefs and local communities in their respective constituencies to compile lists of drought-affected and vulnerable households.
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	Yes. The program was evaluated in 2008. (Devereux and Mhlanga 2008)
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the local district
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Yes. communities and local authorities are involved in implementation
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Lesotho has a poverty reduction strategy. The country also adopted a National Social Protection Strategy in 2015 (Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho 2015)
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	Yes. The programme is entirely financed by World Vision
Government financing	No
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Devereux, S. and Mhlanga, M. (2008) <i>Cash Transfers in Lesotho: An evaluation of World Vision's Cash and Food Transfers Pilot Project</i>. Maseru, Lesotho</p> <p>Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho (2015) <i>National Social Protection Strategy</i>. Maseru, Lesotho</p>

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Lesotho Old Age Pension (OAP)
Country	Lesotho
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2004
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Old age pension (social pension)
Main programme objectives	The program aims to support the elderly.
Pilot	0
Target population	The programme targets all citizen older than 70. The age threshold has been lowered to 65.
Beneficiary selection	Pension-tested / categorical
Coverage – individual level	The scheme reached 69.046 individuals (3.8% population) in 2005 (Barrientos et al. 2010) In 2012, it reached 83,000 (World Bank 2014)
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	Registration of recipients has largely relied on voter registration cards distributed during the 2002 elections. The Ministry of Finance registers pension recipients with the help of local chiefs, who identify and verify the ages of potential recipients. Recently organized community councils may now take a stronger role in the process
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	NAp
Means test – treatment of work	0
Recipient of transfer	Elderly
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	The programme initially transferred 150 M to beneficiaries. The amount rose to 300 in 2009, to reach 500 by 2012
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	The transfer was equal to M 150 (US\$25) monthly until May 2007, when it was increased to M 200 (US\$29) per month. In April 2009, the pension was increased once again to M 300 (US\$35). According to latest data from Pension Watch, the current amount is 500 M (Barrientos et al. 2010; Garcia and Moore 2012; Pension Watch 2015).
Transfer guaranteed period	Lifetime
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	

Implementing agency	Government of Lesotho
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Medium centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Considerable involvement of local authorities. According to the World Bank, The Ministry of Finance registers pension recipients with the help of local chiefs, who identify and verify the ages of potential recipients. Recently organized community councils may now take a stronger role in the process (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities
Appeals procedure	0
Social accountability and participation	No. Aside from local authorities, there is little evidence of community participation in the programme.
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Lesotho has a poverty reduction strategy. The country also adopted a National Social Protection Strategy in 2015 (Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho 2015)
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	Nac
Cost	According to Barrientos et al. (2010) the programme costed USD 21 million in 2005, the equivalent of 1.37% of the country's GDP
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	Yes
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	
Inequality	
Work	
Enrollment	
Attendance	
Health utilization	
Immunization	
Nutrition	
Community / Local Economy outcome	
Others	Reference: Barrientos 2013 / SSP 2013 / Pension watch
	Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i> . Manchester, UK Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i> . Washington, DC: World Bank

	<p>Government of the Kingdom of Lesotho (2015) <i>National Social Protection Strategy</i>. Maseru, Lesotho</p> <p>Pension Watch (2015) <i>Comprehensive online resource on non-contributory (social) pensions: Country Fact File</i> accessed 25 Feb 2016</p> <p>World Bank (2014) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2014</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p>
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Liberia

Variable	Description
Programme title	Social Cash Transfer Program
Country	Liberia
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2009
End date of programme	The program ended in 2014
Replace	The programme had a pilot phase from 2009 to 2012
Programme type	Pure income transfer
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to support the need of the most vulnerable and food insecure residents and thereby preventing the inheritance of intergenerational poverty
Pilot	Pilot 2009-2014
Target population	The programme targets families that are both extremely poor and have no one available to work outside the home most notably children and elderly, people living with chronic illnesses and disabilities and those with many dependents
Beneficiary selection	The programme uses community and categorical targeting (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Coverage – individual level	NAc
Coverage – household level	According to the UNICEF, the programme covered 1900 families (approximately 10% of households in the county) around 2011 (UNICEF et al. 2012) . The World Bank reports a total coverage of 2,000 households in 2012 (World Bank 2014)
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	For the programme, extreme poverty is determined by a household's access to food, level of material assets, and alternative means of support. (UNICEF et al. 2012)
Means test – treatment of work	Yes. Labour incapacity is considered during assessment
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Payments are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	LD700 for 1 person household. Additional LD 150 is provided for each child in primary school. Additional LD300 provided for each child in secondary school. The transfer size was designed to be the amount necessary to fill the gap between the national per capita gross domestic product (211 USD) and the annual per capita spending of extremely poor individuals. (UNICEF et al. 2012)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	LD1750 for 4 or more person households. Additional LD 150 is provided for each child in primary school. Additional LD300 provided for each child in secondary school
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to beneficiary selection
Transfer conditions – human capital	No

Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Gender and Development, European Union, UNICEF
Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Relatively high degree of local discretion. For instance, beneficiary selections are reviewed by community leaders who verify the lists and provide any necessary corrections based on their local knowledge. After a training session for chiefs, community members, and beneficiaries, the payment process begins. (UNICEF et al. 2012)
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the community level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Yes. Local communities participate in decision regarding beneficiary selections.
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Liberia has a Poverty Reduction Strategy.
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	Yes. The European Union reported to have contributed 8 million euros to the programme in 2010/2011. (European Commission 2012)
Government financing	NAc
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i> . Manchester, UK

	<p>European Commission (2012) <i>Food security: Building a Social Safety Net through Cash Transfers in Bomi County, Liberia</i>. Liberia</p> <p>UNICEF, European Union and Government of Liberia (2012) <i>Transformative Transfers: Evidence from Liberia's Social Cash Transfer Programme</i>. Monrovia, Liberia; World Bank (2014) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2014</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p>
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Madagascar

Variable	Description
Programme title	Vatsin'ankohonana
Country	Madagascar
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2014
End date of programme	The program appears to be ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfers, Conditional cash transfers and employment guarantee
Main programme objectives	The program aims to provide extremely poor families with short term income support while encouraging their children's school enrollment and attendance, and promote the use of nutritious food and child-suitable feeding practices. The project also includes a short term employment program for disaster affected households so that they don't have to sell their assets to cope with the crisis
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The program aims to support extremely poor households
Beneficiary selection	N/A
Coverage – individual level	N/A
Coverage – household level	Currently there are 5,000 households from Betafo (in the Vakinankaratra region) benefiting from a pilot program launched by the President Hery Rajaonarimampianina on September 29, 2014. In total, 16,000 students will benefit from an operation called « Vatsin'Ankohonana » (Family Grant), implemented by the Development Intervention Fund (FID), in collaboration with the Ministry of Population, Social Protection, and Women's Promotion, the Ministry of Education, and the National Nutrition Office (ONN).(Rajaonarivelo 2014)
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	N/A
Recipient of transfer	N/A
Payment regularity	N/A
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer guaranteed period	

Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes. For families with children aged 6-10, cash transfers are linked to maintaining regular school attendance. For families with children aged 0-5, support is unconditional. However, improvements in family health and nutrition practices, early childhood development and parenting feature prominently in accompanying trainings and informational aids (Vermehren 2015)
Transfer conditions – work	Yes. The project also includes a short term employment program for disaster affected households so that they don't have to sell their assets to cope with the crisis (Rajaonarivelo 2014)
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Government of Madagascar, World Bank
Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion
Intermediation	0
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the local level (Befato)
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is evidence of community participation in execution of the programme. Women are elected among the beneficiaries to serve as leaders, facilitators and catalysers of a small group of beneficiaries (Vermehren 2015)
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/10/28/a-new-approach-to-social-protection-in-madagascar-empowers-the-poor-to-help-themselves http://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/madagascar-expanding-bandwidth-extreme-poor http://www.connectinternational.nl/files/FOLDER%20CCT%20research%20English.pdf
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Madagascar has a Poverty Reduction Strategy. In addition, the country adopted a Social Protection Policy in 2015 (Southern African Social Protection Experts Network 2015).
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	
Cost	USD 56 million in 2010 (social protection cost)
Donor Financing	Yes. In addition to the World Bank, the programme also receives the support of the DFID (Rajaonarivelo 2014)
Government financing	NAC
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending

Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
	<p>Rajaonarivelo, F. (2014) <i>A New Approach to Social Protection in Madagascar Empowers the Poor to Help Themselves</i> (October 2014), <http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/feature/2014/10/28/a-new-approach-to-social-protection-in-madagascar-empowers-the-poor-to-help-themselves> accessed 29-Feb-16</p> <p>Southern African Social Protection Experts Network (2015) <i>Madagascar: New Social Protection Policy</i> (24 Sep 2015), <http://www.saspen.org/home/en/madagascar-new-social-protection-policy/> accessed 29-Feb-16</p> <p>Vermehren, A. (2015) <i>Madagascar: Expanding the bandwidth of the extreme poor</i> (10 Oct 2015), <http://blogs.worldbank.org/voices/madagascar-expanding-bandwidth-extreme-poor> accessed 29-Feb-16</p>

Malawi

Variable	Description
Programme title	Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot Scheme / Social Cash Transfer Program
Country	Malawi
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2006 and was expanded in 2008
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot Scheme
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to reduce poverty, hunger and starvation in all households living in the pilot area which are ultra-poor and at the same time labour constrained. It also looks to increase school enrolment and attendance of children living in target group households and generate lessons learned (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Pilot	Yes, 2006-2008
Target population	The programme targets ultra-poor households, meaning those with lowest expenditure quintile and below the national ultra-poverty line (only one meal per day, no valuable assets..) and labour constrained household: a household is labour-constrained when it has no able bodied household (HH) member in the age group 19-64 who is fit for work, all are chronically sick or disabled or elderly or children) or when one HH member who is fit for work has to care for more than 3 dependents.
Beneficiary selection	Community-based targeting : Community Social protection Committee (CSPC)
Coverage – individual level	The programmes reached 51 410 individuals in November 2008, including 33, 700 children (25, 780 orphans).(Barrientos et al. 2010)
Coverage – household level	The programme covered approximately 3000 households during the pilot phase. It projected to reach 32,000 after the first extension in 2008 and 144000 after the 3 rd extension (Miller and Tsoka 2007). Yet, according to Barrientos et al. (2010), the programme reached 13, 045 households in November 2008 and it planned to expand to 300,000 households by 2012. A combination of information from the two sources is provided in the dataset, with effective coverage - whenever available - being retained in lieu of projection.
Entitlement requisites	NAC
Means test – treatment of income	Beneficiary households must be below the ultra-poverty line (only one meal per day, no valuable assets.
Means test – treatment of assets	
Means test – treatment of work	Yes. Labor constrained: no able bodied household member in the age group 19 to 64 who is fit for work; or when one household member in the same age group has to care for more than 3 dependents
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Payments are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	MK 600 (approximately US\$ 4) for one person household (Barrientos et al. 2010; Miller and Tsoka 2007)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	MK 1800 (approximately US\$ 13) for 4 or more in a household. In addition, child bonus is provided if the child attends primary MK200 (US\$ 1.4) or secondary school MK400(US\$2.80)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC

Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAP
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Government of Malawi, UNICEF, DFID, World Bank (Schubert and Huijbregts 2006; UNICEF 2007)
Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	NGOs and community based organisations play an important role (UNICEF 2007) however there is no evidence of a significant implication of local governments
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Medium: there is evidence of community participation in decision-making and implementation of the programme (UNICEF 2007)
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Malawi has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	The cost of pilot scheme for one year was expected to be US\$ 371,000. (Barrientos et al. 2010). Miller and Tsoka (2007) however reported a total cost of US\$ 540,000 for the first year of the programme. The cost has considerably increased during the 2 nd and 3 rd extension of the project, respectively US\$ 5.56 million and US\$ 13.8 million. In the 4 th extension, it rose to US\$ 42.72 million. When all districts are covered, the estimated cost is US\$ 42 million annually and an additional 250,000 cost of replacement (Miller and Tsoka 2007)
Donor Financing	Schubert and Huijbregts (2006) reported that UNICEF has provided USD 275,000 for for TA to design the methodology for the Scheme as well as the funds for the cash transfers and operational cost up to December 2006. The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria under Round 1also reserved USD 372,000 for the pilot during year 1 and was awaiting GoM endorsement. GFTAM Round 5 has US\$8.8m in support of the Scheme starting from July 2007 (Schubert and Huijbregts 2006). An equivalent estimate is therefore calculated for all the following years. The EU has committed itself to fund the external M&E component up to a ceiling of EURO 200,000. (Schubert and Huijbregts 2006)

Government financing	NAp. According to Barrientos et al. (2010), the programme pilot scheme was financed by the UNICEF (no government contribution). No additional information could be found for later years.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Miller, C. and Tsoka, M. (2007) <i>Evaluating the Mchinji Social Cash Transfer Pilot</i> (July 2007), <http://www.unicef.org/socialpolicy/files/REvised_Presentation_Evaluating_the_Mchinji_Social_Cash_Transfer_Pilot_2_July_07.pdf> accessed 29-Feb-16</p> <p>Schubert, B. and Huijbregts, M. (2006) <i>The Malawi Social Cash Transfer Pilot Scheme: Preliminary Lessons Learned</i>. New York, USA</p> <p>UNICEF (2007) <i>Social Cash Transfer Pilot: Project Profile</i>, <https://www.crin.org/en/docs/CashTransfer_FS5.pdf> accessed 29-Feb-16</p>

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Zomba Cash Transfer Program (ZCTP)
Country	Malawi
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2008
End date of programme	The program ended in 2009
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Conditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aimed to improve outcomes for young women in Malawi in terms of educational attainment, labor market outcomes, HIV/STD risk and empowerment
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targets households with young women aged 13 to 22 (in and out-of-school)
Beneficiary selection	Eligibility into the program was defined as follows: (i) Eligible dropouts: unmarried girls 13-22, out of school for less than 3 years, and (ii) Eligible schoolgirls: unmarried girls 13-22, who can return to Standard 7-Form 4, enrolled in school at the time of their first interview.
Coverage – individual level	The programme covered 4,000 young women from the Zomba district of Malawi (Özler January 2008)
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	Fill in a standard 7-form 4 if girls are aged 13-22 and unmarried
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	NAc
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Household heads or beneficiaries
Payment regularity	Payments are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	Parents received a minimum of US\$ 4 while girls received a minimum of US\$ 1 (Özler January 2008)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	Parents received a maximum of US\$10 while girls received a maximum of US\$5 (Özler January 2008)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to the duration of the project and conditions attached to the transfers
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes: School enrolment and attendance
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	World Bank
Agency type	Multilateral Donor Agency

Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision (experimental evaluation)
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	0
Evaluation protocols	Yes. (Özler January 2008)
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required at the local level (Zomba district)
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal. The experiment was financed by the World Bank
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Malawi has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	Yes, The randomized evaluation was supported by the World Bank
Government financing	NAc
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	Özler, B. (2008) <i>Schooling, Income and HIV Risk: Experimental Evidence from Malawi</i> . Washington DC, USA

Mali

Variable	Description
Programme title	Bourses Maman
Country	Mali
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2002
End date of programme	The program ended in 2007 (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Income transfers plus human capital investments
Programme function	Conditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to encourage school attendance and reduce drop-out rates. Modelled on Brazil's Bolsa Família program, it promotes gender equity by providing the grant to mothers and benefiting more girls than boys it.
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targets households in villages and areas with high poverty level and where drop-out rates are high.
Beneficiary selection	A combination of targeting methods was used including a community-driven approach (by local council, women groups, school directors, and local authorities). The number of children within households and the presence of girls are determinant criteria (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Coverage – individual level	N/A
Coverage – household level	According to Garcia and Moore (2012), the programme covered 430-500 households annually. The World Bank later reported a total coverage of 5424 in 2007 (World Bank 2015)
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Mother – female household head
Payment regularity	Transfers are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	The monthly transfer was CFAF 5,000 (approximately US\$10~12) in 2002 (Barrientos et al. 2010; Garcia and Moore 2012)
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme.
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes. Children must be enrolled in and attend school at least 80% of the school year (Barrientos et al. 2010). The beneficiary mothers committed themselves to enroll all of their school-age children in school, to keep them in school for the whole school year, to ensure that they attended school every day, except when sick, to ease learning conditions at home, especially for

	girls, by not overloading them with housework, to encourage their children's learning, and to take part in parents association's meetings. School directors and teachers were responsible for monitoring the pupils' attendance. Any unjustified absence of more than two days a month of one of the mother's children would lead to the suspension of the scholarship. Very few cases of suspensions were reported (Cherrier et al. 2011)
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Government of Mali / UNICEF
Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Medium-centralized decision making
Local government discretion	There is a large scope for local government discretion during implementation and beneficiary selection
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	No
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are registered at the local/villages level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Yes. There is evidence of community participation in execution of the programme
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Mali has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	The World Bank has reported that the programme cost was approximately USD 36,800 annually (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Donor Financing	Yes. The programme was entirely financed by UNICEF (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Government financing	NAC
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending

Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Cherrier, C., del Ninno, C. and Razmara, S. (2011) <i>Mali: Social Safety Nets</i>. Washington DC, USA</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>ODI, UNICEF and République du Mali (2009) <i>La protection sociale et les enfants en Afrique de l'Ouest et du Centre: Le cas du Mali</i>. Bamako, Mali</p>

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Fighting/Controlling malnutrition in food-insecure areas in Mali
Country	Mali
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2009
End date of programme	The program ended in 2010
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Integrated anti-poverty programmes
Programme function	Food transfer
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to alleviate food insecurity in poorest region of Mali
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targeted Targets four groups of beneficiaries: i) children aged 6–59 months; ii) pregnant and lactating women; iii) PLHIV; and iv) TB patients. These beneficiaries are assisted according to criteria developed during implementation of the strategy.
Beneficiary selection	Beneficiary selection is based on a number of criteria depending on the four above-described groups: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Children aged 6–59 months with a weight/height index of 70 percent and <85 percent of the average will be regarded as moderately malnourished. Testing will be conducted at health centres under the advanced strategy. • Malnourished women will be identified at pre-natal and post-natal visits and at medical checks of children at health centres and through the advanced strategy by community health volunteers. Women will receive food assistance for six months. • The criterion for lactating women will be a body mass index (BMI) of 18.5; the criterion for pregnant women will be defined as underweight of children at birth.
Coverage – individual level	The programme aimed to cover 896,324 beneficiaries by 2010. No information on effective coverage has been found (Eldis Unknown)
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	Medical test conducted by health centres
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	NAp
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	NAcc
Payment regularity	NAp
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp.
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp. The beneficiaries receive food transfer. To reduce the risk of relapse, such children will receive food assistance for a further three months. As a further and separate intervention during lean seasons, food supplements will be distributed to all children aged 6–24months in

	at-risk areas, irrespective of their nutritional status. Food assistance for women will target pregnant and lactating women with a MUAC of <210 mm (Eldis Unknown)
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and duration of the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	World Food Programme / Government of Mali
Agency type	Non-profit agency
Centralisation of decision making	Centralized decision-making (in the agency)
Local government discretion	There is limited evidence of government discretion in decision-making regarding the planning or execution of the programme
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	No
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the local level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Yes. Communities, notably women, are involved in food distribution.
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Mali has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	
Cost	According to Eldis, the programme costed approximately US\$32,748,374. An estimation is made for each calendar year (Eldis Unknown)
Donor Financing	The programme was entirely financed by the World Food programme (Eldis Unknown)
Government financing	NAp
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending


Others	Pending
References	Eldis (Unknown) <i>Country Profile: Mali</i> (unknown), < http://interactions.eldis.org/sites/interactions.eldis.org/files/database_sp/Mali/Bourses%20Maman/30-Mali.pdf > accessed 4 Mar 2016

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Programme d'Appui au Secteur Agricole du Mali (PASAM) (English: Agricultural Sector Support Program)
Country	Mali
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2008
End date of programme	The program ended in 2012
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Integrated anti-poverty programs
Programme function	Employment guarantee
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to alleviate poverty and develop infrastructure
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets poor households, notably food insecure households, women, youth, seasonally unemployed
Beneficiary selection	The programme uses administrative, household/beneficiary ranking and community-driven selection method.
Coverage – individual level	N/A
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	Yes. The selection process takes into account labour conditions (seasonally unemployed)
Recipient of transfer	Worker
Payment regularity	Transfers are made on daily
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	Beneficiaries receive a minimum of US\$2.7 per day (World Bank 2010)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	Beneficiaries receive a maximum of US\$3.8 per day (World Bank 2010)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to the duration and conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	Yes
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Agriculture / Ministry of Fisheries and Livestock
Agency type	Public agency

Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Local authorities intervene in the implementation of the projects
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	NAC
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaires are registered at the local level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Yes. Beneficiary selection is community-driven and local authorities are involved in the entire process
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Mali has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	According to the programme document, a total budget of CFA 13.9 billion has been allocated to the programme with contribution from both the government and DANIDA . (République du Mali 2007). An estimation is made for each year covered by the programme.
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	Yes. According to the programme document, DANIDA has contributed CFA 13.2 billion over 5 years. An estimation is made for each calendar year covered by the programme (République du Mali 2007)
Government financing	Yes. According to the programme document, the state contribution is equivalent to CFA 693million over 5 years (République du Mali 2007)
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	République du Mali (2007) <i>Programme d'Appui au Secteur Agricole au Mali: PASAM 2008 - 2012</i> . Bamako, Mali World Bank (2010) <i>Making Public Works Work: Public Works Database</i> (Washington, DC)


Mauritius

Variable	Description
Programme title	Basic Invalid's Pension
Country	Mauritius
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	N/A. There is no official information about when the program has started. The database considers information from 2000 onwards.
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Disability pensions
Main programme objectives	The program aims to support disabled and invalid individuals
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets poor households with disabled or invalid members
Beneficiary selection	The beneficiaries of the program are selected based on three criteria: (i) between 15 to 60 years (ii) certified by a Medical Board to be incapacitated to a degree of at least 60 per cent and for a period of at least 12 months (iii) a residence qualification applies to an invalid person who is a non-citizen (Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions 2015)
Coverage – individual level	According to the ILO, the programme covered a total of 19,958 in 2000. This amount rose to 27,638 individuals in 2006 (ILO 2014). According to Statistics Mauritius (2012), the programme covered 27363 beneficiaries in 2007. this number has continued to increase and in 2014, the number of beneficiaries was reported to be 30715(Statistics Mauritius 2014)
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	Listed below are the documents a beneficiary should bring to be a part of the program: (i) Birth Certificate (ii) National Identity Card (iii) Medical Certificate/Report, if any (iv) Bank Account Number and Name of Bank
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	Beneficiaries must be certified by a medical board of incapacity of 60%
Recipient of transfer	The disabled or any mandated person
Payment regularity	Transfers are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	According to the ILO, beneficiaries received on average RS 2,130.00 up to 2006(ILO 2014)

Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	The ILO reported a transfer amount of RS 2130 from 2000 to 2006 (ILO 2014). The government of Mauritius and the Office of statistics reported the transfer amount as RS 2315 in 2008. This amount continued to increase and reached RS 3,267 in 2014. (Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014)
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes - medical proof must attest the invalidity of the beneficiaries of at least the 12 previous months.
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Senior Citizens Welfare & Reform Institutions
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	NAC
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	No. There is no evidence of social accountability or community participation
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	http://socialsecurity.govmu.org/English/ServicesMenu/Pages/Benefits-Section.aspx  <p>The screenshot shows the website for the Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions. The page title is 'Benefits Section'. The navigation menu includes 'About Us', 'Act', 'Services', 'Employers', 'Department', 'News', 'Events', 'FAQs', and 'Media Library'. The breadcrumb trail is 'Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions > Services > Benefits Section'. There are links for 'Send To Friend' and 'Print'.</p>
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	No Poverty Reduction Strategy nor Social Protection Policy could be found
National coordination	NAC
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	According to the ILO, the cost of the programme was RS 485 million in 2000. This amount also included a share of Carer's Allowance and Child's Allowance. In 2008, the cost increased to RS 1125.9 million and according to the latest information from the government, the cost of 20214 was estimated at RS 1678.7 million.
Donor Financing	NAP


Government financing	Yes. There is no evidence that the programme was partly financed by donors. It is therefore assumed that the total cost is borne by the government.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
	<p>ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions (2015) <i>Benefits Section</i> (2015), <http://socialsecurity.govmu.org/English/ServicesMenu/Pages/Benefits-Section.aspx> accessed 04-Mar-16</p> <p>Statistics Mauritius (2012) <i>Social Security Statistics 2012</i> (2012), <http://statsmauritius.govmu.org/English/Publications/Pages/Social-Security-Statistics-Year-2012.aspx> accessed 4 Mar 2016</p> <p>Statistics Mauritius (2014) <i>Social Security Statistics: 2010-2014</i> (2014), <http://statsmauritius.govmu.org/English/StatsbySubj/Pages/Social-Security-Stats-Year-2014.aspx> accessed 4 Mar 2016</p>

Variable	Description
Programme title	Basic Orphan's Pension
Country	Mauritius
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	NAC. There is no official information about when the program has started. The database considers information from 2000 onwards.
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	NAP
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional cash and family transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to support orphans
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets households with orphans
Beneficiary selection	The beneficiary selection criteria are defined as follows: (i) up to the age of 15 (or 20 if in full-time education) (ii) parents' death certificate (iii) for a non-citizen one of the parents should have resided in Mauritius for at least five years in aggregate in the ten years preceding the claim, one of those five years being immediately before the claim (Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions 2015)
Coverage – individual level	Statistics Mauritius reported the total coverage of 396 orphans in 2008. This number has dropped to 353 in 2009 but rose again and reached 372 in 2014 (Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014)
Coverage – household level	NAC
Entitlement requisites	To be a part of the program two documents were required: (i) Birth Certificate (ii) Death Certificate of parents
Means test – treatment of income	NAP
Means test – treatment of assets	NAP
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Transfers are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	Beneficiaries received a minimum of Rs 1283 in 2008. This amount continued to increase and reached RS 1810 in 2014. The transfer amount depends on whether the beneficiary is in full education or not (Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	Beneficiaries received a maximum of Rs 2360 in 2008. This amount continued to increase and reached RS 3330 in 2014. The transfer amount depends on whether the beneficiary is in full education or not (Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	According to the ILO, beneficiaries received an average of RS 1180 from 2000 to 2007 (ILO 2014).
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAP
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites (age)
Transfer conditions – human capital	No

Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Senior Citizens Welfare & Reform Institutions
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	NAc
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	No. There is no evidence of community participation or social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	http://socialsecurity.govmu.org/English/ServicesMenu/Pages/Benefits-Section.aspx  <p>The screenshot shows the website interface for the Benefits Section. At the top, there is a navigation bar with a 'Back to Republic of Mauritius portal' link and a 'Sign in' button. Below this is a banner image of a building with the text 'Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions'. A search bar is present with the text 'Looking for'. A main navigation menu includes 'About Us', 'Act', 'Services', 'Employers', 'Department', 'News', 'Events', 'FAQs', and 'Media Library'. The breadcrumb trail reads 'Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions > Services > Benefits Section'. The main heading is 'Benefits Section' with 'Send To Friend' and 'Print' options. A link for 'Services for Benefits Section' is visible at the bottom of the screenshot.</p>
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	No Poverty Reduction Strategy nor Social Protection Policy could be found
National coordination	NAc
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	The ILO reported a total cost of RS 10.22 million for 2000 and 14.9 in 2007 (ILO 2014). Statistics Mauritius reported a total cost of RS 20.7 million in 2008. These amounts also included a share of the Guardian Allowance. The total cost continued to increase and reached RS 27,74 in 2014. (Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014)
Donor Financing	NAp.
Government financing	There is no evidence of donors' contribution to the programme. It is therefore assumed that the total cost is borne by the government.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending


Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions (2015) <i>Benefits Section</i> (2015), <http://socialsecurity.govmu.org/English/ServicesMenu/Pages/Benefits-Section.aspx> accessed 04-Mar-16</p> <p>Statistics Mauritius (2012) <i>Social Security Statistics 2012</i> (2012), <http://statsmauritius.govmu.org/English/Publications/Pages/Social-Security-Statistics-Year-2012.aspx> accessed 4 Mar 2016</p> <p>Statistics Mauritius (2014) <i>Social Security Statistics: 2010-2014</i> (2014), <http://statsmauritius.govmu.org/English/StatsbySubj/Pages/Social-Security-Stats-Year-2014.aspx> accessed 4 Mar 2016</p>

Variable	Description
Programme title	Basic Retirement Pension
Country	Mauritius
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	According to Garcia and Moore (2012), the Old Age Pension was created in 1951 and is paid to all citizens 60 years and older. The pension transitioned to a universal pension in 1958(<i>date which was reported by Barrientos et al. (2010) as the starting date of the programme</i>). Later, it transitioned back to a means-tested program, until the pension once again became a universal transfer in 1977. It has remained a universal transfer since 1977, except during a brief six-month period from 2004 through 2005 (Garcia and Moore 2012). The database covers information from 2000 onwards
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Old age pension
Main programme objectives	The program aims to provide cash transfer to elderly.
Pilot	NAp
Target population	The programme covers all old persons aged 60 years or over
Beneficiary selection	Eligibility takes into account the following: (i) be a Mauritius citizen aged 60 or over (ii) the person should have resided in Mauritius for an aggregate period of 12 years since attaining the age of 18 (iii) the residence qualification does not apply to a Mauritian citizen aged 70 or over (iv) Non-citizens must have resided in Mauritius for at least 15 years in aggregate since attaining the age of 40, three of those fifteen years being immediately before the claim is made (Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions 2015)
Coverage – individual level	The ILO reported a total coverage of 111,885 pensions for 2000. This number continued to increase and reached 136,408 according to Statistics Mauritius. Latest estimate, also by Statistics Mauritius, indicates a total coverage of 184,487 pensioners (ILO 2014; Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014)
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	The following documents are requested (i) Birth Certificate (ii) National Identity Card (iii) One photo for bus pass (iv) Marriage Certificate (for married women) (v) Bank Account Number (Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions 2015)
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	NAp
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Pensioners or head of the household
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	Transfer amount depends on the age of the pensioner. According to Willmore (2003), the minimum transfer was set to RS 1000 per beneficiary (carried forward to 2000 and 2001). According to the ILO, the minimum amount rose to RS 1575 in 2002 and 1700 in 2003 (Barrientos et al. 2010; ILO 2014). It continued to increase and reached RS 2802 in 2009 and RS 3623 in 2014 (Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014).

Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	Transfer amount depends on the age of the pensioner. According to Willmore (2003), the maximum transfer was set to RS 4000 per beneficiary (carried forward to 2000 and 2001). According to the ILO, the maximum amount rose to RS 6825 in 2002 and 7300 in 2003 (Barrientos et al. 2010; ILO 2014). It continued to increase and reached RS 9461 in 2009 and RS 12300 in 2014 (Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014).
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer guaranteed period	For the rest of a lifetime
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Senior Citizens Welfare & Reform Institutions / Ministry of Finance and Economic Development
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	NAcc
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation or social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	http://socialsecurity.govmu.org/English/ServicesMenu/Pages/Benefits-Section.aspx  <p>The screenshot shows the website for the Benefits Section of the Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions. The page features a header with the ministry's name and logo, a search bar, and a navigation menu with options like 'About Us', 'Act', 'Services', 'Employers', 'Department', 'News', 'Events', 'FAQs', and 'Media Library'. The main content area is titled 'Benefits Section' and includes a 'Services for Benefits Section' link. There are also 'Send To Friend' and 'Print' buttons.</p>
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	No Poverty Reduction Strategy nor Social Protection Policy could be found
National coordination	NAc
D. Programme Budget	


Budget	NAc
Cost	According to ILO Social Security Database the cost was RS 2,484 Million in 2000. It rose to RS 4459 million in 2007. Statistics Mauritius reported a total cost of RS 9,959.64 million in 2014 (ILO 2014; Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014). According to Soto et al. (2015), the programme is financed through grants from the National Pension Fund (NFP) which administers the program .
Donor Financing	No
Government financing	According to Soto et al. (2015), the programme is financed by the government through grants from the national pension fund (NFP). There is no evidence of donors' support to the programme
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Becceea, N. (2010) <i>Service in Public Sector: The pension system in Mauritius and Superannuation</i>. Port Louis, Mauritius</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions (2015) <i>Benefits Section</i> (2015), <http://socialsecurity.govmu.org/English/ServicesMenu/Pages/Benefits-Section.aspx> accessed 04-Mar-16</p> <p>Soto, M., Thakoor, V. and Petri, M. (2015) <i>Pension Reforms in Mauritius: Fair and Fast—Balancing Social Protection and Fiscal Sustainability</i>. Washington DC, USA</p> <p>Statistics Mauritius (2012) <i>Social Security Statistics 2012</i> (2012), <http://statsmauritius.govmu.org/English/Publications/Pages/Social-Security-Statistics-Year-2012.aspx> accessed 4 Mar 2016; Statistics Mauritius (2014) <i>Social Security Statistics: 2010-2014</i> (2014), <http://statsmauritius.govmu.org/English/StatsbySubj/Pages/Social-Security-Stats-Year-2014.aspx> accessed 4 Mar 2016</p>

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Basic Widow's Pension
Country	Mauritius
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	NAC. There is no official information about when the program has started. The database considers information from 2000 onwards.
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	NAP
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional cash and family transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to support widows and their families
Pilot	NAP
Target population	The programme targets widows and their families
Beneficiary selection	The beneficiaries are selected based on three criteria: (i) widows under the age of 60 (ii) these persons should have been civilly or religiously married (iii) a non-citizen widow must have resided in Mauritius for at least 5 years in aggregate in the ten years preceding the claim, one of those five years being immediately before the claim (Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions 2015)
Coverage – individual level	The ILO reported a total coverage of 21323 for 2000. This number increased to 22810 in 2007 (ILO 2014). According to Statistics Mauritius, the programme had a total of 22611 beneficiaries in 2008; that number decreased to 21503 in 2012 and 20302 beneficiaries in 2014 (Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014).
Coverage – household level	NAC
Entitlement requisites	Listed below are the documents a potential beneficiary should bring to be a part of the program: (i) Birth Certificate (ii) National Identity Card (iii) Marriage Certificate (iv) Death Certificate of Spouse (v) Bank Account Number and Name of Bank
Means test – treatment of income	NAP
Means test – treatment of assets	NAP
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	The pensioner
Payment regularity	Transfers are made on a monthly basis
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAP
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAP
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	ILO reported a transfer amount of RS 1575 for 2002 (ILO 2014). This number continued to increase and has reached RS 2315 in 2008 and most recently RS 3267 in 2014 (Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014)

Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites (age)
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Senior Citizens Welfare & Reform Institutions
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	NAC
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	No. There no evidence of community participation or social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	http://socialsecurity.govmu.org/English/ServicesMenu/Pages/Benefits-Section.aspx 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	No Poverty Reduction Strategy nor Social Protection Policy could be found
National coordination	NAC
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	The ILO reported a total cost of 451 million for 2000 (ILO 2014). The cost continued to increase, reached 778.8 million in 2008 and most recently, it was reported by Statistics Mauritius that the total cost has reached 1039.55 million (Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014)
Donor Financing	NAP
Government financing	There is no evidence of donors' contribution to the programme. It is therefore assumed that the total cost is borne by the government.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending

Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>ILO (2014) Social Security Inquiry: Database (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions (2015) Benefits Section (2015), <http://socialsecurity.govmu.org/English/ServicesMenu/Pages/Benefits-Section.aspx> accessed 04-Mar-16</p> <p>Statistics Mauritius (2012) Social Security Statistics 2012 (2012), <http://statsmauritius.govmu.org/English/Publications/Pages/Social-Security-Statistics-Year-2012.aspx> accessed 4 Mar 2016</p> <p>Statistics Mauritius (2014) Social Security Statistics: 2010-2014 (2014), <http://statsmauritius.govmu.org/English/StatsbySubj/Pages/Social-Security-Stats-Year-2014.aspx> accessed 4 Mar 2016</p>

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Child Allowance
Country	Mauritius
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	NAC. There is no official information about when the program has started. The database considers information from 2000 onwards.
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	NAP
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Conditional cash and family transfers
Main programme objectives	The program aims to support vulnerable groups
Pilot	NAP
Target population	The programme targets vulnerable families with children.
Beneficiary selection	The beneficiary selection takes into account the following criteria: (a) Children of beneficiary of a Basic Widow's Pension or Basic Invalid's Pension (b) the child should be under the age of 15 (or 20 if in full-time education) (c) payable in respect of not more than 3 children (Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions 2015)
Coverage – individual level	The ILO reported a total coverage of 17910 beneficiaries for 2003 (ILO 2014). This number continued to increase and reached 19515 in 2006. It has however decreased to 18451 in 2008 according to Statistics Mauritius and dropped again to 16311 in 2014 (Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014)
Coverage – household level	NAP
Entitlement requisites	To be a part of the program two documents were required: (i) Birth Certificate (ii) Attendance certificate from colleges
Means test – treatment of income	NAP
Means test – treatment of assets	NAP
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	The transfer amount depends on the age of the child beneficiary. Under 10 years old, the beneficiaries received RS 555 in 2003 (ILO 2014). This number continued to increase and reached and lately reached RS 1059 in 2014.
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	The transfer amount depends on the age of the child beneficiary. Between 10 and under 20 years old, the beneficiaries received a maximum of RS 595 in 2003 (ILO 2014). This number continued to increase and reached and lately reached RS 1133 in 2014 (Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014).
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAP
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisite (age). In case the parent is a widow, the payment of the allowance continues for the benefit of the children even after remarriage of the widow.

Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes. Transfers are conditioned on college attendance.
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Senior Citizens Welfare & Reform Institutions
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	NAC
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	No. There no evidence of community participation or social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	http://socialsecurity.govmu.org/English/ServicesMenu/Pages/Benefits-Section.aspx  <p>The screenshot shows the website for the Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions. The page title is 'Benefits Section'. The navigation menu includes 'About Us', 'Act', 'Services', 'Employers', 'Department', 'News', 'Events', 'FAQs', and 'Media Library'. The breadcrumb trail is 'Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions > Services > Benefits Section'. There are links for 'Send To Friend' and 'Print'.</p>
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	No Poverty Reduction Strategy nor Social Protection Policy could be found
National coordination	NAC
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	According to the ILO and Statistics Mauritius, the total cost of the child allowance fall under the Basic Widow Pension, the Basic Invalid Pension or the Old Age Pension (ILO 2014; Statistics Mauritius 2012, 2014)
Donor Financing	NAP
Government financing	There is no evidence of donors' contribution to the programme. It is therefore assumed that the total cost is borne by the government.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending

Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>ILO (2014) Social Security Inquiry: Database (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>Ministry of Social Security, National Solidarity and Reform Institutions (2015) Benefits Section (2015), <http://socialsecurity.govmu.org/English/ServicesMenu/Pages/Benefits-Section.aspx> accessed 04-Mar-16</p> <p>Statistics Mauritius (2012) Social Security Statistics 2012 (2012), <http://statsmauritius.govmu.org/English/Publications/Pages/Social-Security-Statistics-Year-2012.aspx> accessed 4 Mar 2016</p> <p>Statistics Mauritius (2014) Social Security Statistics: 2010-2014 (2014), <http://statsmauritius.govmu.org/English/StatsbySubj/Pages/Social-Security-Stats-Year-2014.aspx> accessed 4 Mar 2016</p>

Mozambique


Variable	Description
Programme title	Programa de Subsídio de Alimentos (PSA: Food Subsidy Programme in English)
Country	Mozambique
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 1997
End date of programme	The programme appears to be ongoing
Replace	Gabinete de Apoio à População Vulnerável(GAPVU) (ILO 2014)
Programme type	Pure income transfer
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to reduce extreme vulnerability and supports entitlements to food through raising household income.
Pilot	N/A
Target population	The programme targets all households in poverty. The scheme includes a combination of old-age, disability and child pension.
Beneficiary selection	<p>Categorical and mean tested. There is multiple eligibility criteria which make targeting complex - eligibility is determined by a combination of proxy indicators (age, disability), means testing (per capita monthly income below Mzm 70,000), and health status ("chronically sick" or malnourished) (ILO 2014)</p> <p>Elderly aged 55 and over for women and 60 and over for men, who are recognised as being permanently unable to work and who live alone, or are heads of destitute households; disabled aged 18 and above, who are recognised as being permanently unable to work and who live alone or are heads of destitute households; chronically sick aged 18 and above, who suffer from one of five chronic diseases recognised by the medical services, are unable to work and who live alone or are heads of destitute households (it should be noted that neither tuberculosis nor HIV/AIDS are included in the list of chronic diseases, but some instances occur in practice of people living with HIV/AIDS who do receive the food subsidy); Pregnant women with nutritional problems associated with social risk factors (Barrientos et al. 2010)</p>
Coverage – individual level	In 2005 it aimed to reach 92,300 direct beneficiaries, and actually reached 69,095 direct beneficiaries and 91,411 indirect beneficiaries (ILO 2014). In 2008 the programme reached 143, 455 direct beneficiaries (+ 200, 000 estimated indirect beneficiaries), 90% of them elderly persons (Barrientos et al. 2010). The World Bank reported 217,000 and 291,604 beneficiaries respectively in 2010 and 2013 (World Bank 2014, 2015). Limited information on each component of the programme is available. for more, see the ILO Social Inquiry Database (ILO 2014)
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	Per capita monthly income below Mzm 70,000 (ILO 2014).
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	Yes Labour capacity is considered during assessment
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	According to the ILO, the INAS provides a minimum of MZm 70,000 for a one-person household (ILO 2014). Barrientos et al. (2010) reported a minimum of MZm 150,000 in 2010.

Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	According to the ILO, the INAS provides a maximum of MZm 140,000 for a households for 6 or more members (ILO 2014). Barrientos et al. (2010) reported a minimum of MZm 3000,000 in 2010
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAP
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to the pre-requisites continuity of the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	National Institute for Social Action
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	NAC
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	NAC
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation or social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Poverty Reduction Strategy / National Strategy for Social Protection
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	According to (Barrientos et al. 2010)the programme costed 164.2m Mtn (US\$6.3m) in 2006 and 188.6m Mtn (US\$7.3m) in 2007.
Donor Financing	No
Government financing	According to the ILO, the programme is entirely financed through state budget (ILO 2014)
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending

Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p>


Namibia

Variable	Description
Programme title	Child Maintenance Grant (MG)
Country	Namibia
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 1977. Like the social pensions, the child grants are rooted in the pre-Independence legislation adopted from South Africa, notably the Children's Act 33 of 1960, which was made applicable in Namibia with effect from 1 January 1977 by Act 74 of 1973 (Levine et al. 2009)
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Conditional Cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to support maintenance of disabled children under 16 years old
Pilot	No
Target population	The program targets disabled children under 16
Beneficiary selection	Categorical and mean-test methods: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Biological parent with child under the age of 18, whose gross-income is not more than N\$1000 per month and Whose spouse (mother/father of the child) is receiving an old age or disability grant or has passed away or is serving a prison sentence of 3 months or longer. If child is older than 7 years, he/she needs to attend school - Namibian citizens and permanent residents (Government of Namibia)
Coverage – individual level	The ILO has reported a total coverage of 20,707 beneficiaries in 2004; 34, 707 beneficiaries in 2005 (ILO 2014). By 2008 the scheme reached 86,086 beneficiaries (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Certified copies of the applicant's birth certificate and Identity document - Certified copies of the child or children's full birth certificates/ confirmation of birth or baptism card - A certified copy of the applicant's marriage certificate where applicable - The latest school report of each school-going child - A certified copy of the spouse's death certificate in case of death - If the spouse is in prison, a letter from the prison and a declaration from him/her confirming this - Proof of the spouse receiving a disability grant or an old age pension. - If the applicant is employed, a pay slip with the name, phone number and address of the employer, if not employed a police declaration (Government of Namibia)
Means test – treatment of income	Income lower than N\$1000 per month (Barrientos et al. 2010; Government of Namibia)
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N\$200 = US\$ 26 / month for first child (Barrientos et al. 2010)

Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	In addition to the basic amount for 1 child, beneficiary households receive an additional N\$100 for every child up to a maximum of 6 children in total (thus N\$700) (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes. If child is above 7 years old, s/he needs to be enrolled at school
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Gender Equality and Child Welfare
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation.
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation or social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	<p>http://www.gov.na/maintenance-grant</p> 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: National Poverty Action Programme
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	

Cost	According to Levine et al. (2009), the programme costed N\$ 57 million in 2001, 2002 and 2003. This amount has increased to N\$ 100 million in 2006 (also reported by the ILO). According to most recent data, the total cost is estimated at N\$ 348 million in 2012 (ILO 2014; Levine et al. 2009)
Donor Financing	No
Government financing	Yes. There is no evidence of donor financing. Therefore, it is assumed that the total cost is borne by the government
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Government of Namibia <i>Maintenance Grant</i>, <http://www.gov.na/maintenance-grant></p> <p>Levine, S., van der Berg, S. and Yu, D. (2009) <i>Measuring the impact of social cash transfers on poverty and inequality in Namibia</i>. Matieland, South Africa</p> <p>ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p>

Variable	Description
Programme title	Old Age Grant (OAG) and Disability Grant (DG)
Country	Namibia
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 1949 (Barrientos et al. 2010)
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Old Age and disability pension
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to prevent poverty among older people and disabled people.
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets Namibian citizens or permanent residents who attained the age of 60 years, Disabled aged 16 or above and medically certified by a State doctor as being temporarily or permanently disabled (blind people included), persons with AIDS as certified by a medical doctor. Must be Namibian citizenship or be permanent residents if not born in Namibia.
Beneficiary selection	Categorical: Namibian citizens or permanent residents who fulfil the conditions described in the target
Coverage – individual level	According to the ILO, there were 916,767 beneficiaries in the programme in 2001 (ILO 2014). In 2008 the old age scheme reached 130,455 pensioners while the disability grant reached 20,400 beneficiaries, totalizing 150,855 beneficiaries for both schemes (Barrientos et al. 2010). The world bank reported a total coverage of 141,000 for 2013 (World Bank 2014)
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	<p>Applicants are required to bring the following documents:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - An ID Document - Birth Certificate - If Married a Marriage Certificate (woman only) - Non-Namibians <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Permanent Residence Certificate o Citizenship Certificate <p>At the office, an Official will attest your application in your presence. Applicants are issued a receipt of acknowledgement (Section 11(a) of the National Pension Act). Applicants receive an approval letter or notice through NBC radio. (Government of Namibia)</p>
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	NAp
Means test – treatment of work	NAc
Recipient of transfer	The pensioner or appointee
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc

Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	According to Barrientos et al. (2010) and Garcia and Moore (2012), beneficiaries received N\$450 in 2009. This amount has been carried forward for all the years between 2009 and 2015. Recipients of the Old Age and Disability Pensions are required to purchase a life insurance policy as an additional mandatory benefit. The policy covers funeral costs of up to N\$2,200. The policy not only helps households after a member has died, but also reduces the likelihood that benefits will continue to be collected for deceased individuals (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Transfer guaranteed period	For lifetime
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Health and Social Welfare (Cash Dividend)
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation. The Ministry of Labour and Social Welfare is Mandated under the National Pension Act (Act 10 of 1992) to pay-out pension grants.
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register in their jurisdiction
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation or social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	<p>http://www.gov.na/old-age-and-disability-grant</p> 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: National Poverty Action Programme
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC

Cost	The programme cost was estimated at US\$158.7 million (under 2% of GDP.) in 2008 (Barrientos et al. 2010). The cost increased to N 232 million in 2001 (Levine et al. 2009). It further increased to 880 in 2009. The ILO most recently reported a cost of N 960 million for 2012 (ILO 2014)
Donor Financing	No
Government financing	Yes. There is no evidence of donors' contribution to the programme. it is therefore assumed that the total cost is borne by the government
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>Government of Namibia <i>Old Age and Disability Grants</i>, <http://www.gov.na/old-age-and-disability-grant></p> <p>ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>Levine, S., van der Berg, S. and Yu, D. (2009) <i>Measuring the impact of social cash transfers on poverty and inequality in Namibia</i>. Matieland, South Africa</p>

Niger

Variable	Description
Programme title	Tessaoua Cash Transfer Pilot
Country	Niger
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2008
End date of programme	The program ended in 2010
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfer
Main programme objectives	The programme aimed to build a hunger reduction strategy that tackles the root causes of malnutrition, rather than just treating the symptoms
Pilot	Yes
Target population	1500 of the poorest households in Tessaoua district, Maradi region, Niger.
Beneficiary selection	A combination of targeting methods were used to select the very poor households such as the use of Household Economy Approach (HEA) analysis and wealth ranking. Households with widows and people with disabilities, mothers and carers of children under five were given the priorities. Cash transfers were only distributed in areas declared by the government as severely food insecure.
Coverage – individual level	NAc. The programme covered approximately one-third of the population
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	NAc
Means test – treatment of assets	NAc. Beneficiary selection was based on wealth ranking but no information is provided on the threshold of assets
Means test – treatment of work	NAc
Recipient of transfer	Head of households of female household member
Payment regularity	NAp. The total cash payment was split into three distributions and not on a regular basis as for other cash transfer programmes.
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	A total of 60,000 CFA francs, split into three distributions, during the 'hunger gap', of 20,000 each (about \$40)per household, regardless of size of household (average household size of the targeted population is seven). The cash was distributed to women
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to the continuity of the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes. Households benefiting from the project were required to take part in awareness sessions on malnutrition and other public health activities (including setting up community health committees).

Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Comité sous regional de prévention et de gestion des crises alimentaires (Sub-regional committee for prevention and management of food crisis) / Save the Children
Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Medium centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	No
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the local level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Local communities would be involved in the setting up of health committees and awareness sessions on malnutrition and other public health activities
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Niger has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	Yes. The project was entirely financed by European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department (ECHO): 100% (Save the Children UK 2009)
Government financing	No
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	Save the Children UK (2009) <i>How cash transfers can improve the nutrition of the poorest children: Evaluation of a pilot safety net project in southern Niger</i> . London, UK

Nigeria

Variable	Description
Programme title	Care of Poor (COPE)
Country	Nigeria
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2007 (Holmes et al. 2012)
End date of programme	It is unclear whether the programme has ended or not
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Integrated anti-poverty programme
Programme function	Conditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The objective of COPE is to break the intergenerational transfer of poverty, to reduce the vulnerability of the core poor in society against existing socioeconomic risks and to improve their capacity to contribute to economic development in the community, state and nation. To increase school attendance among children; antenatal care for pregnant women; life vocational, health, and sanitation skills for head of households. The program not only provides cash transfers, but also skills training and micro-enterprise start-up funds to households in exchange for enrolling and keeping their children in school and providing for their basic health care needs.
Pilot	Yes
Target population	Female households with OVCs; Aged parent-headed households; Physically challenged people-headed households; Transient-poor-headed households (seasonal farmers); VVF (vesico vaginal fistula) patients, HIV affected households (Holmes et al. 2012)
Beneficiary selection	Targeting is guided by national policy and initially included a combination of geographical, community-based and household targeting (Barrientos et al. 2010; Holmes et al. 2012)
Coverage – individual level	NAc
Coverage – household level	Pilot to reach 3,000 households each in 12 states and the programme reached 8,850 households nationwide by 2009 (Barrientos et al. 2010). 18,750 households appear to have been covered in 2011 while an estimate of 22,000 household is reported in 2012 (Holmes et al. 2012).
Entitlement requisites	Monthly verification of compliance
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	NAp
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NGN 1500 for household with 1 child. A compulsory saving of NGN 7,000 monthly in favour of the participants to be disbursed as a lump sum after a year for the establishment of viable microenterprises after undergoing training (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NGN 5000 for households with 5 children or more. A compulsory saving of NGN 7,000 monthly in favour of the participants to be disbursed as a lump sum after a year for the establishment of viable microenterprises after undergoing training (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp

Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and compliance with the conditions of the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes. Payments are based on households meeting two key conditions: the enrolment and retention of children of basic school age in basic education (Primary 1 to junior secondary education), where a child must maintain at least 80% school attendance, and participation in all free health care programmes (Holmes et al. 2012)
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	National Programme for Poverty Eradication (NAPEP)
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Low centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	High involvement of state governments, especially in the financing. The programme started as a pilot in 12 states and became compulsory across all states in the second phase. It is currently in its third phase, with state governments required to match funding. In this third phase, the programme is subject to state commitment to its implementation. A total of 12 states have committed funding: Katsina and Kebbi (North West); Bauchi and Adamawa (North East); Kogi and Niger (North Central); Bayelsa and Cross River (South South); Anambra and Abia (South East); and Osun and Lagos (South West) (Holmes et al. 2012).
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries at registered at the local/district level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Communities are involved in beneficiary selection process.
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes. Nigeria has a Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	Holmes et al. (2012) reported that the programme costed N1 billion in Phase 1 (2007-2009), with N2.4 million allocated to each of the 12 states. An estimation is made for each of these three years.
Donor Financing	Yes. The World Bank has provided some technical assistance to the program. The World Bank, DFID, UNICEF, and the UNDP International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth are expected to provide funding and technical support to COPE. No information on total donors contribution could be found (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Government financing	Yes. The programme is funded from the MDGs Debt Relief Gains fund (MDGs-DRG) and state counterparts. A total of 12 states have committed funding: Katsina and Kebbi (North West); Bauchi and Adamawa (North East); Kogi and Niger (North Central); Bayelsa and Cross River (South South); Anambra and Abia (South East); and Osun and Lagos (South West) (Holmes et al. 2012)
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending

Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>Holmes, R., Samson, M., Magoronga, W. and Akinrimisi, B. <i>et al.</i> (2012) <i>The potential for cash transfers in Nigeria</i>. London, UK</p>

Rwanda

Variable	Description
Programme title	VUP social transfer programme (Vision Umerenge Program)
Country	Rwanda
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2008 (Barrientos et al. 2010)
End date of programme	2010 indicates the end of the program but there is no official information about whether the program has stopped or not.
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Income transfers plus community assets
Programme function	Employment guarantee scheme
Main programme objectives	The stated goal of the VUP is to eradicate extreme poverty by 2020, with a mid-term target to reduce the share of people living in extreme poverty from 37% in 2005 to 24% in 2012 (Garcia and Moore 2012; Nyhus and Gibson 2009).
Pilot	Yes
Target population	August 2008: started cash transfer pilot in each of the 30 districts in the country expected to reach 18,000 households.
Beneficiary selection	<p>Community targeting methods. The poorest sector in each district was identified by community development committees at the district level based on various criteria including sector infrastructure, level of poverty, dispersion of households (ruralness being an indicator of poverty in the sector), education levels, numbers of cars, bikes, health centres, etc. Eligibility is determined through a community-based participatory approach that ranks poor households by labour and land criteria. The ubedehe is a community-led process which allows communities to create social maps at the village level. According to some district officials, even though only certain community designates develop the ubedehe ranking lists, they are made public to the community for review. These ranking lists of poor households are then used to offer social programmes to households according to the following classification: poor household without any available labour qualify for social assistance schemes including direct support, and poor households without land but with available labour can engage in public works programmes.</p> <p>Although there is no specific policy on distribution of transfers to females versus males, the VUP Manual does specifically state that 50% of all VUP beneficiaries are supposed to be women (Nyhus and Gibson 2009)</p>
Coverage – individual level	By January 2009 the programme reached 6 800 households in 30 pilot districts (Barrientos et al. 2010).
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	Eligibility is determined through a community-based participatory approach that ranks poor households by labour and land criteria.
Means test – treatment of work	Yes.
Recipient of transfer	Worker
Payment regularity	Daily
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	For direct support beneficiaries, there is a calculation of benefits based on number of children in the household. Through direct support a household can earn a minimum of 250 RwF per day (Nyhus and Gibson 2009)

Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	For direct support beneficiaries, there is a calculation of benefits based on number of children in the household. Through direct support a household can earn a maximum of 700 RwF per day (Nyhus and Gibson 2009)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	On average a beneficiary collects 833 RwF per day worked up to a maximum of 20 days per month (Nyhus and Gibson 2009)
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	Yes
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Local Government, Good Governance, Community Development and Social Affairs
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly decentralized decision making
Local government discretion	Local authorities are highly involved in the execution of the programme
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	N/A
Evaluation protocols	Yes (for baseline survey, see Republic of Rwanda (2008))
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the local level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is a high level of community participation
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	For the mini budget period from January to June 2009, the VUP has a Government funded budget of 2.74 billion RwF (approximately \$5 million) to cover the costs of continuing the programme in the same 30 pilot sectors. (Nyhus and Gibson 2009)
Cost	
Donor Financing	Yes. The two major international funders for the VUP programme are DFID and the World Bank, however, the World Food Programme, UNICEF, and UNDP also support the programme. The World Bank has committed to \$15 million over three years (Nyhus and Gibson 2009).
Government financing	Yes. Apart from the budget, no information on effective expenditure of the government could be found.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending

Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>Nyhus, C. and Gibson, J. (2009) <i>Joint SCUUK/UNICEF STUDY: Rwanda Country Report - Final Draft</i>. Kigali, Rwanda</p> <p>Republic of Rwanda (2008) <i>Vision 2020 Umurenge Program (VUP): Baseline Survey - Final report</i>. Kigali, Rwanda</p>

Sao Tome and Principe

Variable	Description
Programme title	Bolsa Escola
Country	Sao Tome and Principe
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2002
End date of programme	The program ended in 2005
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Conditional Cash Transfers
Main programme objectives	Support educational achievement of young people
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targets poor households with at-school children
Beneficiary selection	N/A
Coverage – individual level	The program reached 2,000 individuals but was subsequently closed because of a lack of funds (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Coverage – household level	The program reached 400 households but was subsequently closed because of a lack of funds (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	N/A
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	N/A
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer guaranteed period	N/A
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes. School enrolment and attendance
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Government of Sao Tome and Principe

Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	NAc
Local government discretion	NAc
Intermediation	NAc
Legal framework	NAc
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	NAc
Appeals procedure	NAc
Social accountability and participation	NAc
Budgetary arrangements	NAc
Website	0
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	NAc
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i> . Washington, DC: World Bank

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Maes Carenciadas
Country	Sao Tome and Principe
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	There is no official information about when the program started.
End date of programme	There is no official information about when the program has stopped or whether it is ongoing
Replace	NAC
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Conditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to support vulnerable groups by providing subsidies for children of mothers who are heads of household to attend school until age 15.
Pilot	NAC
Target population	The programme targets vulnerable households with children
Beneficiary selection	NAC
Coverage - individual level	NAC
Coverage - household level	The programme has reached 1200 households in 2014 and 6120 households in 2015 (World Bank 2014, 2015)
Entitlement requisites	NAC
Means test - treatment of income	NAC
Means test - treatment of assets	NAC
Means test - treatment of work	NAC
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	NAC
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions - human capital	School enrolment and attendance
Transfer conditions - work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Government of Sao Tome and Principe / UNICEF (Bureau of International Labor Affairs 2014)
Agency type	Hybrid

Centralisation of decision making	NAc
Local government discretion	NAc
Intermediation	NAc
Legal framework	NAc
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	NAc
Appeals procedure	NAc
Social accountability and participation	NAc
Budgetary arrangements	NAc
Website	0
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	NAc
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Bureau of International Labor Affairs (2014) <i>Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor</i> (São Tomé and Príncipe; pubd online 29-Sep-15), <http://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/sao_tome_principe.htm#programs> accessed 05-Mar-16</p> <p>World Bank (2014) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2014</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>World Bank (2015) <i>The State of Social Safety Nets 2015</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p>

Senegal

Variable	Description
Programme title	Conditional Cash Transfer for Orphans and Vulnerable Children
Country	Senegal
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2008 (school year 2008/2009) (Garcia and Moore 2012)
End date of programme	The program appears to be ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Conditional cash Transfers
Main programme objectives	Its general objective is to support education and vocational training of 5,000 OVC. The specific program objectives are to ensure access to education and vocational training; to support OVC's financial needs (for transportation, uniforms, and so forth); and to support OVC's psychosocial, family, educational, and professional sustenance; address vulnerabilities and developmental needs related to all stages of the childhood life cycle; ensure access to education and vocational training (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets families with children aged 2 through 18 affected by HIV/AIDS, children living in households affected by HIV/AIDS, and other poor orphans who need schooling or vocational training or who are at risk of dropping out of school
Beneficiary selection	The selection process makes use of NGOs and other groups that normally are in contact with OVC, such as district level social service delivery organizations and associations for people living with HIV/AIDS. Once a potential beneficiary is identified, a home visit is conducted to evaluate the child's eligibility and schooling-related risks. Visits to classrooms may also identify children vulnerable to school dropout. Children sometimes are not identified or do not enrol immediately because of stigma associated with HIV/AIDS; therefore, continuous registration will be practiced so that OVC who are not immediately located can be registered in the future (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Coverage – individual level	The World Bank reported a total of 5000 beneficiaries in 2010 (World Bank 2014, 2015)
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	Proof that the child has been enrolled in a vocational training, that parents have paid the tuition fees and that the child has been attending school or vocational training on regular basis (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Quarterly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	Six transfer levels were created. They vary depending on the costs of the different levels of schooling and training. Total annual transfers are CFAF 108,000 (US\$225), for children in kindergarten, 38 CFAF 125,000 (US\$260) for those in first-level primary school, CFAF 135,000 (US\$281) for those in second level primary school, CFAF 145,000 (US\$302) for children in the first level of secondary school, and CFAF 165,000 (US\$343) for those in the second level of secondary school (Garcia and Moore 2012)

Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	For beneficiaries in professional training courses, CFAF 280,000 (US\$582) is provided for a two-year course. The transfer amount per household depends on the number of eligible children in the household (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAP
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and compliance to conditions attached to the programme. OVC will continue to receive transfers for the following year if they have fulfilled the program's conditions.
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes Before the project makes any payments, a responsible adult must sign a commitment form stating that he or she will provide proof that the beneficiary has fulfilled the CCT conditions. The adult in charge of the child must provide proof that the child has been enrolled in school or training, has paid school or vocational fees, has attended school or vocational training regularly, and has received adequate medical care. The schools also must provide proof of the student's enrolment and payment of fees. NGOs may also be contracted to support monitoring activities. Any continual failures to fulfil conditions could lead to expulsion from the program. OVC will continue to receive transfers for the following year if they have fulfilled the program's conditions (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Education / National Committee against AIDS / USAID / World Bank /UNICEF
Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Low centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Although local NGOs and communities are highly involved, there is limited evidence of discretion of local governments.
Intermediation	Yes. The project also aims to provide psychosocial supports to OVC and their families
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are registered at the local level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	High: there is evidence of community participation in decision-making or execution of the programme. Operations are decentralized to the lower levels of the educational system and to the community level for social services. Regional pilot committees will provide additional support (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	Yes but no information on their total contribution

Government financing	Yes but no information on government's total contribution
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i> . Washington, DC: World Bank


<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Rapid response Child-focused social transfer
Country	Senegal
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2009
End date of programme	The program ended in 2012
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The CF-SCT's goal is to decrease food and nutritional insecurity in children under age five living in poor areas by providing transfers to their mothers (Garcia and Moore 2012).
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targets poor households with children under five in poor rural and urban areas
Beneficiary selection	Beneficiaries were identified through geographical, categorical and community-based targeting. Geographical targeting was used to identify districts with high poverty, malnutrition and food insecurity levels. Categorical targeting limited the eligibility to mothers with children 0-5 years old. Community-based targeting criteria for eligibility of vulnerable mothers with at least one child 0-5 years were used to select mothers living in households with inadequate levels of food consumption and limited household possessions. Monitoring Committees were established to monitor the targeting, selection and validation process of beneficiaries (e.g., Local Selection Committees, Regional Monitoring Committees). In addition, the contracted CEAs (for the activities in component 1), were verifying the eligibility of beneficiaries and conducted quality controls of sub-samples of the selected beneficiaries.
Coverage – individual level	NAC. It was however estimated that the number of children reached would increase from 320,000 to 710,000 in rural areas. Distribution of micronutrients and deworming medication was carried out in primary schools estimated to reach around 300,000 children (older than five years)
Coverage – household level	NAC
Entitlement requisites	The woman is identified at the paypoint using her identification card or fingerprint. If the transfer is not retrieved within a 15-day window, the payment is forfeited.
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	Community-based targeting criteria for eligibility of vulnerable mothers with at least one child 0-5 years were used to select mothers living in households with inadequate levels of food consumption and limited household possessions.
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Head of household
Payment regularity	Bimonthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp

Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	FCFA 14,000 (Garcia and Moore 2012; World Bank 2013)
Transfer guaranteed period	Six months. This design feature was created to increase food consumption but not dependency (World Bank 2013)
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes Health outcomes
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Cellule de Lutte Contre la Malnutrition, Government of Senegal
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Medium centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Local Government participated in verification of the targeting mechanism and execution of the programme
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the local level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	High. There is evidence of community participation in decision-making or execution of the programme
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	No
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	NAC
Donor Financing	Yes. IDA US\$1.4 million; MDTF US\$4.9 million (World Bank 2013). An estimate is calculated for each year
Government financing	No. There is no evidence of government direct contribution
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrolment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending

Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>World Bank (2013) <i>Implementation, Completion and Results Report on a Credit of the Amount of SDR 6.8 million and a grant from the global food crisis response multi-donor trust fund in the amount of US\$ 8 million: To the Republic of Senegal for a Rapid Response Child-Focused Social Cash Transfer and Nutrition Security Project</i>. Washington DC, USA</p> <p>World Bank (2009) <i>Emergency Project Paper under the Global Food Crisis Response Program on a Proposed Grant from the Multi-Donor Trust Fund in the amount of US\$ 8 million and a proposed credit in the amount of SDR 6.8 million (US\$ 10 million equivalent): To the Republic of Senegal for a Rapid Response Child-Focused Social Cash Transfer and Nutrition Security Project</i>. Washington DC, USA</p>

Seychelles

Variable	Description
Programme title	Old Age Pension
Country	Seychelles
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 1979 (Pension Watch 2015)
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Old age pension
Main programme objectives	The program aims to support the elderly
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets all citizens aged 63 years or older residing in Seychelles (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Beneficiary selection	Categorical targeting: based on age
Coverage – individual level	N/A. According to Pension Watch, the programme covers 88% of the population over 60 years old
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	Birth Certificate; National Identity Card (NIN); Marriage Certificate if claimant is the spouse; An affidavit if claimant is the dependent or claiming for post or pre migration allowance in addition to a copy of the passport and resident certificate (Seychelles Pension Fund 11-Jan-12)
Means test – treatment of income	No
Means test – treatment of assets	No
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Beneficiary or appointee
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer guaranteed period	For a lifetime
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	

Implementing agency	Seychelles Pension Fund
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	High centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered in their jurisdictions
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation
Budgetary arrangements	NAc
Website	http://www.pensionfund.sc/pages/sps.html
	

C. Country-level Institutionalisation

Poverty strategy	NAc
National coordination	NAc

D. Programme Budget

Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	Yes but there is no information on total contribution

E. Programme outcome

Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending

Others	Pending
References	<p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>Pension Watch (2015) <i>Comprehensive online resource on non-contributory (social) pensions: Country Fact File</i> accessed 25 Feb 2016</p> <p>Seychelles Pension Fund (11-Jan-12) <i>Benefits</i> (11-Jan-12), <http://www.pensionfund.sc/pages/benefits.html_old> accessed 06-Mar-16</p>

Sierra Leone

Variable	Description
Programme title	Unconditional Cash Transfer for the Old and Needy / Social Safety Net program (SSN)
Country	Sierra Leone
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2007
End date of programme	The program appears to be ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Income transfer
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfer
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to reduce extreme poverty and vulnerability, assist specific categories of vulnerable groups including disabled people, widows and abandoned children.
Pilot	Yes
Target population	Vulnerable communities. Beneficiaries are typically elderly and lack a stable income source. They should be incapable of work and lack the support of a family or community
Beneficiary selection	Community-based targeting methods through SSN committees. For the selection process, Communities organize social safety net chiefdom committees, which are composed of representatives from civil society and the Ministries of Health and of Employment, a designated leader of youth, a leader of women, and a religious leader. The committees select beneficiaries. Program officials must verify the committee's selection, through either a visual inspection or a short survey of about 15 questions (Barrientos et al. 2010; Garcia and Moore 2012)
Coverage – individual level	In 2007, the program had 38,000 applicants, but only 16,890 people were registered after the verification process (Garcia and Moore 2012). Barrientos et al. (2010) reported a coverage of 16,000 in 2010. It was expected to reach 35,000 beneficiaries in 2009 (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	Transfers are distributed publicly at a community meeting. The entire community is involved to ensure that the beneficiary receives the money safely. Identity is verified through a photo
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	Yes
Recipient of transfer	Head of household, caretakers or appointee.
Payment regularity	Yearly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	US\$ 18(Barrientos et al. 2010)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	US\$ 125 (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	Around Le 200,000 (approximately US\$ 68) is transferred every six months (Barrientos et al. 2010; Garcia and Moore 2012).
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme


Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Employment and Social Security / Ministry of Health
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Medium centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Relatively high discretion. Local authorities are involved in beneficiary selection
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the local level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is evidence of community participation
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	Yes. The program's original funding came through food aid from China and Italy but no information could be found on total donors' contribution
Government financing	Yes, but no information could be found on government total contribution.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrolment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i> . Manchester, UK

	Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i> . Washington, DC: World Bank
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South Africa

Variable	Description
Programme title	Care Dependency Grant
Country	South Africa
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	There is no clear information on the starting date of the programme. The database considers information from 2000 onwards.
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Family transfers and disability pension
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to support households with children with special needs. The grant can assist caregivers to care for children who are very sick with AIDS-related illnesses, children between 1 and 18 with physical or mental disabilities who are cared for at home
Pilot	0
Target population	The programme targets households with children with severe disabilities, chronic illnesses are eligible for the grant once the illness becomes disabling. It excludes those children who are cared for in state institutions, because the purpose of the grant is to replace lost earnings of the caregiver looking after the child. It also excludes infants under one year because young babies have full-time care needs, whether or not they have disabilities. (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Beneficiary selection	The applicant must be South African citizen, permanent resident or refugee; the applicant and child must be resident in South Africa; The child must: be younger than 18 years; not be cared for permanently in a state institution; have a severe disability and need full-time and special care. The child on whose behalf application for a grant is made needs to undergo a medical examination that forms the basis for eligibility. The applicant must submit a medical / assessment report confirming permanent, severe disability. The applicant and spouse must meet the requirements of the means test (except for foster parents); the care-dependent child/children must not be permanently cared for in a State Institution. (Barrientos et al. 2010; South African Government 05-Mar-16; South African Social Security Agency several years)
Coverage – individual level	The ILO reported a total coverage of 58,140 for 2003 and 107,065 for 2009 although Barrientos et al. (2010) reported 100,029 for that same year. Recent statistics from the Social Security Agency indicates a total coverage of 129,296 by the end of 2015 (Barrientos et al. 2010; ILO 2014; South African Social Security Agency several years)
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	Go to the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) office nearest to where you live and bring the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Your 13-digit bar-coded identity document (ID) and birth certificate. If you don't have an ID or birth certificate: - Complete an affidavit on a standard SASSA format in the presence of a Commissioner of Oaths who is not a SASSA official. - Bring a sworn statement signed by a reputable person (such as a councillor, traditional leader, social worker, minister of religion or school principal) who can verify your name and age. - The SASSA official will take your fingerprints and refer you to the Department of Home Affairs to apply for the ID while your application is processed. If you don't get an ID, your grant will be suspended. - Proof that you have applied for an ID and/or birth certificate at the Department of Home Affairs - A temporary ID issued by the Department of Home Affairs (if applicable). - Baptismal certificate if available. - Road to health clinic card if available. - School report if available.


	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - A medical/assessment report that confirms the child's disability. - Proof of your marital status. - Your salary slip, bank statements for the previous three months, or pension slips, and any other proof of income. (Note: this does not apply to refugee foster parents.) <p>If you are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - not the child's parent, proof that you are the child's primary caregiver through an affidavit from a police official, a social worker's report, an affidavit from the biological parent or a letter from the school principal from the school attended by the child - the biological parent of the child and the sole provider and caregiver, proof that you have tried to get the other parent to pay maintenance - unemployed, proof from the Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) or a discharge certificate from your previous employer - a refugee foster parent, refugee status permit and refugee ID - the child's foster parent, the court order placing the child in your care. - Please note: If you are too old or sick to travel to the office to apply, a family member or friend can apply on your behalf. The person should take a letter from you and/or a doctor's note saying why you cannot visit the office. <p>SASSA will refer the child will be referred for a state medical officer's assessment before the application is made. Complete an application form in the presence of the SASSA officer (note that only you as the applicant or a SASSA official can complete the application form). You will be given a receipt. Keep it as proof that you applied (South African Government 05-Mar-16)</p>
Means test – treatment of income	The Social Security Agency reported the mean test of income to be R 144,000 for single person and R 288,000 for couple in 2009. These thresholds increased to R 169,200 for single person and R 338,400 for couples in 2015 (South African Social Security Agency several years)
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Head of household or appointee
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	The transfer amount appears to be adjusted every month. For 2013, beneficiaries have received a minimum of R 1260 (South African Social Security Agency several years)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	The transfer amount appears to be adjusted every month. For 2013, beneficiaries have received a maximum of 1270 (South African Social Security Agency several years)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	According to the ILO, beneficiaries received on average R 700 in 2003; amount which has been increased to R 1010 in 2009 (Barrientos et al. 2010). By April 2015, beneficiaries were receiving R 1,350 (South African Social Security Agency several years)
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer guaranteed period	<p>Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme. SASSA can decide if your grant must be reviewed. Your income as declared when you apply for the grant will form the basis for this decision. You will be notified three months in advance of the date when the review will take place or the date on which the life certificate (document to prove that you are still alive) is due. If you receive your money through the bank, an institution or procurator, you are required to fill in a life certificate at the SASSA offices every year. The following may result in the suspension of the grant:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - when the child's circumstances change - the outcome of a review - if you fail to co-operate when the child's grant is reviewed - when you commit fraud or misrepresent the child - if there was a mistake when the child's grant was approved. <p>The grant will lapse when the: child passes away; child is admitted to a state institution; beneficiary who is the caregiver does not claim the grant for three consecutive months; child is absent from the country; child turns 19.(South African Government 05-Mar-16)</p>

Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	South African Social Security Agency (SASSA)
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are registered with local authorities
Appeals procedure	Yes. If your application is not approved, SASSA will inform you in writing why your application was unsuccessful. If you disagree with the decision, you can appeal to the Minister of Social Development at the national office of the Department of Social Development. You must appeal within 90 days of being notified that your application was unsuccessful (South African Government 05-Mar-16)
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of social accountability or community participation
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/social-grants 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: White Paper for Social Welfare
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	According to the ILO, the programme costed R 27,273 Million in 2002 and approximately R 1,356 million in 2010. More details on the cost are yet to be retrieved from statistical documents of the SASSA (ILO 2014; Southern African Social Protection Experts Network 2015)
Donor Financing	No
Government financing	There is no evidence of donors' contribution to the programme. The total cost is therefore assumed to be borne by the government.
E. Programme outcome	

Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>South African Government (05-Mar-16) <i>Care dependency grant</i> (05-Mar-16), <http://www.gov.za/services/services-residents/parenting/child-care/care-dependency-grant> accessed 05-Mar-16</p> <p>South African Social Security Agency (several years) <i>Statistical Reports</i> (February 2016), <http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/knowledge-centre/statistical-reports> accessed 05-Mar-16</p>

Variable	Description
Programme title	Child Support Grant
Country	South Africa
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 1998
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	State Maintenance Grant (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Family transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to reduce poverty and vulnerability among children, and extend social assistance to children.
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets poor households with children under 18 years old. It initially targeted poor children up until the age of seven, but has progressively been extended to poor children up until the age of 17 (Barrientos et al. 2010).
Beneficiary selection	<p>The programme is mean-tested and beneficiaries must have a per capita household incomes below a threshold. Selection criteria include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Be the child's primary caregiver (e.g. parent, grandparent or a child over 16 heading a family). Note: If you are not the child's parent, you must provide proof that you are the child's primary caregiver through an affidavit from a police official, a social worker's report, an affidavit from the biological parent or a letter from the principal of the school attended by the child. - Be a South African citizen or permanent resident. - Not earn more than R39 600 per year (R3 300 per month) if you are single. If you are married, your combined income should not be above R79 200 per year (R6 600 per month). The threshold is subject to change. <p>The child must: be under the age of 18 years not be cared for in a state institution live with the primary caregiver who is not paid to look after the child.(South African Government)</p>
Coverage – individual level	The World Bank reported a total of 974,724 beneficiaries in 2001 and 7044901 in 2006. The ILO reported 8.2 million while Barrientos et al. (2010) indicates 7.7 million for 2008. The ILO also reported a total coverage of 10,047,986 in 2010. Most recent data from SASSA indicate a total coverage of 11,907,798 by the end of 2015 (Barrientos et al. 2010; Garcia and Moore 2012; ILO 2014; South African Social Security Agency several years).
Coverage – household level	NAp
Entitlement requisites	<p>Go to the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) office nearest to where you live and bring the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - your 13 digit-bar-coded identity document (ID) and the child's birth certificate. If you don't have an ID or the child's birth certificate: - you must complete an affidavit on a standard SASSA format in the presence of a Commissioner of Oaths who is not a SASSA official. - Bring the following documents: - a sworn statement by a reputable person (e.g. councillor, traditional leader, social worker, minister of religion) who knows the applicant and child - proof that you have applied for an ID and/or birth certificate at the Department of Home Affairs - a temporary ID issued by the Department of Home Affairs (if applicable) - baptismal certificate if available - road to health clinic card if available - school report if available. - Proof of any maintenance you receive for the child. - Proof of your earnings. - Your marriage certificate (if applicable).


	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - If you are divorced, the court order saying that you have custody of the child. - If one or both parents are dead or missing, the death certificate of the deceased or proof that the parent is missing, e.g. a missing person's report from the police. <p>Complete the application form in the presence of the SASSA officer (note that only you as the applicant or a SASSA official may complete the application form). You will be given a receipt. Keep it as proof that you applied. (South African Government)</p>
Means test – treatment of income	Garcia and Moore (2012) and Barrientos et al. (2010) reported an annual income threshold of R 28800 for single person and R 57600 for couples in 2009. According to latest information, this threshold has increased to R39 600 per year (R3 300 per month) if you are single. If you are married, your combined income should not be above R79 200 per year (South African Social Security Agency several years)
Means test – treatment of assets	NAp
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Head of household or appointee. If you are unable to collect the money yourself, you can appoint a procurator at the SASSA office, or give someone power of attorney to collect the grant on your behalf. The South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) will pay the grant to you through one of the following methods: cash at a specific pay point on a particular day electronic deposit into your bank or Postbank account (the bank may charge you for the service) an institution acting as administrator of the grant. (South African Government)
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	Citizens of South Africa are eligible to receive only one benefit at a time. Beneficiaries receive R100 in 2000 and R 190 in 2006 (Garcia and Moore 2012). The transfer amount increased to R 240 in 2009 (ILO 2014) and it was recently reported that beneficiaries received R 330 per child in 2015(South African Social Security Agency several years)
Transfer guaranteed period	<p>Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme. SASSA can decide if the child's grant must be reviewed. Your income as declared when you apply for the grant will form the basis for this decision. You will be notified three months in advance of the date on which the review will take place or the date on which the life certificate (proof that you are still alive) is due. If you receive your money through the bank, an institution or procurator, you are required to fill in a life certificate for the child at the SASSA offices every year. The following may result in the suspension of the child's grant:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a change in your circumstances change - the outcome of a review - if you fail to co-operate when the child's grant is reviewed - when you commit fraud or misrepresent the child - if there was a mistake when the child's grant was approved - if the child is no longer in your care. <p>The grant will lapse: if the child passes away; if the child is admitted to a state institution; if the caregiver doesn't claim it for three consecutive months; if the child is absent from the country; at the end of the month in which the child turns 18 (South African Government)</p>
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	

Implementing agency	South African Social Security Agency (SASSA)
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities
Appeals procedure	Yes. If your application is not approved, SASSA will inform you in writing why your application was unsuccessful. If you disagree with the decision, you can appeal to the Minister of Social Development at the national office of the Department of Social Development. You must appeal within 90 days of being notified that your application was unsuccessful (South African Government)
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation or social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Yes
Website	http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/social-grants 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: White Paper for Social Welfare
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	According to Garcia and Moore (2012), the programme budget was approximately US\$173 million in 2003/04 and US\$1 billion in 2005/06. More details are yet to be retrieved from the SASSA statistical reports.
Cost	According to the ILO, the programme costed R 2,400 million in 2002. The cost increased to more than R 1 billion in 2005 which represented approximately 0.7% GDP (Barrientos et al. 2010; ILO 2014). According to the ILO, the total cost was R 27 billion in 2010. More information are yet to be retrieved from SASSA statistical reports.
Donor Financing	No
Government financing	There is no evidence of donors' contribution to the programme. The total cost is therefore assumed to be borne by the government.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending

Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>South African Government <i>Child Support Grant</i>, <http://www.gov.za/services/child-care-social-benefits/child-support-grant></p> <p>South African Social Security Agency (several years) <i>Statistical Reports</i> (February 2016), <http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/knowledge-centre/statistical-reports> accessed 05-Mar-16</p>

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Disability Grant
Country	South Africa
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The Disability Grant, established in 1946, is also means and asset tested, with thresholds varying by marital status (Garcia and Moore 2012). The database covers information from 2000 onwards
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Disability pension
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to supported the disabled
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets adults who are unable to work because of a mental or physical disability and are in need of financial support
Beneficiary selection	The programme is mean-tested (income and assets). Eligibility is defined by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - be a South African citizen or permanent resident or refugee and living in South Africa at the time of application - be between 18 and 59 years old. - not be cared for in a state institution - have a 13-digit, bar-coded identity document (ID) - meet the income and asset requirements - undergo a medical examination where a doctor appointed by the state will assess the degree of your disability - bring along any previous medical records and reports when you make the application and when the assessment is done (South African Government)
Coverage – individual level	In 1997, about 750,000 beneficiaries received the Disability Grant (Garcia and Moore 2012). According to the ILO, the programme had a total coverage of 608,761 in 2000. This number continued to increase and reached 1,408,456 Units in 2008. By March 2008, the programme reached 1.5 million beneficiaries (Barrientos et al. 2010) and the latest statistics indicate a total coverage of 11.023. 54 in 2015 (South African Social Security Agency several years)
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	Complete a disability grant application form at your nearest South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) office in the presence of a SASSA officer and submit the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Your 13-digit bar-coded identity document (ID). If you don't have an ID: You must complete an affidavit on a standard SASSA format in the presence of a Commissioner of Oaths who is not a SASSA official. - You must bring a sworn statement signed by a reputable person (like a councillor, traditional leader, social worker, minister of religion or school principal) who can verify your name and age. - The SASSA official will take your fingerprints. - You will be referred to the Department of Home Affairs to apply for the ID while your application is processed. If you don't get an ID, your grant will be suspended. - A medical report and functional assessment report confirming your disability. - Proof of marital status (if applicable). - Proof of residence. - Proof of income or dividends (if any). - Proof of assets, including the municipal value of your property. - Proof of private pension (if any). - Your bank statements for the past three months. - Refugee status permit and 13-digit refugee ID.

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) document ('blue book') or discharge certificate from your previous employer if you were employed. - A copy of the will and the first and final liquidation and distribution accounts, if your spouse died within the last five years. - After submitting your application you will be given a receipt to keep as proof of application. <p>All applicants must undergo a medical examination where a doctor appointed by the state will assess the degree of your disability. They should also bring along any previous medical records and reports when you make the application and when the assessment is done. The doctor will complete a medical report and will forward the report to South African Social Security Agency (Barrientos et al. 2010; South African Government)</p>
Means test – treatment of income	The income thresholds varies across the year. Before 2010, it was reported that the means test requires that recipients earn less than R 29,112 (US\$3,358) annually if they are single or R 58,224 (US\$6,716) if they are married (Barrientos et al. 2010; Garcia and Moore 2012). More recent information from the government website indicates potential beneficiaries should not earn more than R64 680 (R5 390 per month) if you are single or R 129 360 (R10 780 per month) if married (South African Government). Yearly details on the threshold are yet to be found.
Means test – treatment of assets	Barrientos et al. (2010) reported the assets thresholds to be R484,800.00 or less for a single person (the value of the home is not taken into account) and R969,600.00 or less if for a married couple (the value of the home is not taken into account). Recent details from the government website indicate a threshold of no more than R930 600 if you are single or R1 861 200 if you are married. Yearly details on assets thresholds are yet to be found.
Means test – treatment of work	Yes. A medical examination assess the degree of your disability
Recipient of transfer	Head of household, caregiver or appointee
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	The transfer amount changes on yearly and even monthly basis. According to the ILO, beneficiaries received R700 in 2003 (ILO 2014). This has continued to increase and reached R940 in 2008. In April 2009, the Disability Grant was R1,010 (Barrientos et al. 2010; Garcia and Moore 2012). According to recent statistics, approved disabled received R1410 in April 2015 (South African Social Security Agency several years). More details on yearly transfers are yet to be retrieve from SASSA statistical reports
Transfer guaranteed period	<p>Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme. You get a permanent disability grant if your disability will continue for more than a year and a temporary disability grant if your disability will last for a continuous period of not less than six months and not more than 12 months. A permanent disability grant does not mean you will receive the grant for life, but that it will continue for longer than 12 months. The following may result in the suspension of your grant:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - when your circumstances change - the outcome of a review - if you fail to co-operate when your grant is reviewed - when you commit fraud or misrepresent yourself - if there was a mistake when your grant was approved. - When may your grant lapse? <p>The grant will lapse when you: pass away; are admitted to a state institution; do not claim for three consecutive months; are absent from the country.</p>
Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes. Re-assessment and continuity of disability

Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	South African Social Security Agency (SASSA)
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation. Section 9 of the Social Assistance Act of 2004 (Act No 13 of 2004) (ILO 2014)
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities
Appeals procedure	Yes. The social security office will inform you in writing whether or not your application was successful. If your grant is not approved, the social security office will state the reasons why your application was unsuccessful. You can then appeal to the Minister of Social Development in writing, explaining why you disagree. Appeal within 90 days of receiving notification about the outcome of your application.(South African Government)
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/social-grants 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: White Paper for Social Welfare
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	
Cost	According to the ILO, the programme has costed R 4,585 Millions in 2002. This amount has increased to R 16,853 million by 2010. More details on annual total cost are yet to be retrieved from the SASSA statistical reports
Donor Financing	No
Government financing	There is no evidence of donors' contribution to the programme. The total cost is therefore assumed to be borne by the government.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending

Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>ILO (2014) Social Security Inquiry: Database (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>South African Government <i>Disability Grant</i>, <http://www.gov.za/services/social-benefits/disability-grant></p> <p>South African Social Security Agency (several years) Statistical Reports (February 2016), <http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/knowledge-centre/statistical-reports> accessed 05-Mar-16</p>

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Expanded Public Works Programme
Country	South Africa
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2004
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Income transfers plus community assets
Programme function	Employment Guarantee schemes
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to draw significant numbers of unemployed into productive work, accompanied by training, so that they increase their capacity to earn an income. It provides short term employment opportunities for the unemployed coupled with training. The second phase of the EPWP aims: To create employment equal to two million full-time equivalents (FTEs), namely 4.5 million short and ongoing work opportunities with an average duration of 100 days, for poor and unemployed people in South Africa, so as to contribute to halving unemployment by 2014 through the delivery of public and community services.
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets poor and vulnerable with people in working age.
Beneficiary selection	Categorical selection. Labour is recruited on the basis of the Special Public Works Programme targeting objectives and conditions of employment.
Coverage – individual level	According to Barrientos et al. (2010), 210,000 FTE jobs were created in 2009/2010. This number increased to 610,000 by 2013/2014. By the end of March 2015 1,24 million work opportunities had been created, against a target of 1,04 million. In other words, a 119% achievement (South African Government 2015)
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	Yes
Recipient of transfer	Worker
Payment regularity	N/A
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No

Transfer conditions – work	Yes
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Department of Public Works
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	NAC
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	No evidence of community participation in decision-making
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	http://www.epwp.gov.za/ 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: White Paper for Social Welfare
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	According to Barrientos et al. (2010), R 52498.3 million (US\$6.88 million) was allocated to the first round of the project. An estimate is calculated for up to 2009. According to the government website, R150 billion have been allocated to the implementation of the EPWP over the next 5 years (2014/15-2018/19). An estimation is therefore made for the years 2014 and 2015.
Cost	The program costs R 50 million
Donor Financing	
Government financing	
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending

Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Republic of South Africa Department of Public Works (2010) <i>Expanded Public Works Programme: Five Year Report</i></p> <p>South African Government (2015) <i>Expanded Public Works Programme (2015)</i>, <http://www.gov.za/about-government/government-programmes/expanded-public-works-programme> accessed 5 Mar 2016</p>

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Foster Child Grant
Country	South Africa
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	There is no clear information on the starting of the programme. The database includes information from 2000 onwards
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Family transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to support foster children who have been placed in custody.
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets parents with a foster child is a child who has been placed in custody by a court as a result of being: orphaned, abandoned, at risk, abused, neglected.
Beneficiary selection	Parent must be South African citizen, permanent resident or refugee, the child must live in South Africa, the foster child must be legally placed in his/her care and the child must remain in his/her care, the child must be younger than 18 (South African Government 2016)
Coverage – individual level	According to the ILO, the programme covered 138763 beneficiaries in 2002 and 478781 in 2012. This number continued to increase and the SASSA reported a total coverage of 533301 beneficiaries by 2014/2015 (South African Social Security Agency several years)
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	<p>Go to the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA) office nearest to where you live and bring the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Your 13 digit-bar-coded identity document (ID) and the birth certificate for the child. - If you are a refugee, your status permit and refugee ID. - If you don't have your ID or the child's birth certificate: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o Complete an affidavit on a standard SASSA format in the presence of a Commissioner of Oaths who is not a SASSA official. o Bring a sworn statement signed by a reputable person (like a councillor, traditional leader, social worker, minister of religion or school principal) who knows you and the child. o The SASSA official will take your fingerprints. You will be referred to the Department of Home Affairs to apply for the ID even as your application is processed. If you don't get an ID, your grant will be suspended. o Submit proof that you have applied for an ID and/or birth certificate at the Department of Home Affairs. o Submit a temporary ID issued by the Department of Home Affairs (if applicable). o Present a baptismal certificate if available. o Submit a road to health clinic card if available o if the child is at school, the child's school certificate. - Birth certificate/s of the child/ children, or their identity documents from their country of origin - Court order that placed the child in your care - Proof of your marital status. <p>Complete the application form in the presence of the SASSA officer (note that only you as the applicant or a SASSA official can complete the application form). You will be given a receipt. Keep it as proof that you applied.</p>
Means test – treatment of income	NAp. According to the ILO, the applicant must have annual income of less than R 12,720 (ILO 2014). Garcia and Moore (2012) also reported that a means test is applied to the child's annual


	income, limiting it to R 14,880 (US\$1,716) in 2009. However, the government data indicates that the programme is not income-tested (South African Government 2016).
Means test – treatment of assets	NAp
Means test – treatment of work	N0
Recipient of transfer	Head of household or appointee
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	According to the ILO, beneficiaries received R500 in 2003. This amount increased to R 650 in 2008. The SASSA statistics reports indicate a transfer of R 860 in 2015 (ILO 2014; South African Social Security Agency several years)
Transfer guaranteed period	<p>Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme. The grant will be reviewed on expiry of the court order. Currently this is every two years. You will be advised three months in advance of the need to review the grant. If you receive your money through the bank, an institution or procurator, you are required to fill in a life certificate (a document to prove that you are still alive) at a SASSA office every year.</p> <p>The following may result in the suspension of your grant:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a change in your circumstances - the outcome of a review - if you fail to co-operate when your grant is reviewed - when you commit fraud or misrepresent yourself - if there was a mistake when your grant was approved. - When will your grant lapse? <p>The grant will lapse:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - in the case of death of the child or the last living foster parent - in the case of admission of the child to a state institution - if the grant is not claimed for three consecutive months - when you are absent from the country - if the child is no longer in your foster care - if you are not a refugee any more (South African Government 2016)
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	South African Social Security Agency (SASSA)
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAc

Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities
Appeals procedure	Yes. If application is not approved, SASSA will inform you in writing why the application was unsuccessful. If you disagree with the decision, you can appeal to the Minister of Social Development at the national office of the Department of Social Development. You must appeal within 90 days of being notified that your application was unsuccessful.
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation or social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/social-grants 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: White Paper for Social Welfare
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	According to the ILO, the programme had a total cost of R 364 Million in 2001. The cost increased to R 2,044 million in 2006 and to R 4,362 million in 2010. More details on annual cost are yet to be retrieved from SASSA statistical reports. (ILO 2014; South African Social Security Agency several years)
Donor Financing	No
Government financing	There is no evidence of donors' contribution to the programme. It is therefore assumed that the total cost is borne by the government.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank

	<p>ILO (2014) Social Security Inquiry: Database (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>South African Government (2016) <i>Foster Child Grant</i> (2016), <http://www.gov.za/services/child-care-social-benefits/foster-child-grant> accessed 5 Mar 2016</p> <p>South African Social Security Agency (several years) Statistical Reports (February 2016), <http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/knowledge-centre/statistical-reports> accessed 05-Mar-16</p>
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Variable	Description
Programme title	Old Age Pension / State Old Age Pension (SOAP)
Country	South Africa
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 1928 (Garcia and Moore 2012). The programme extended to black majority population gradually over 1980s and 1990s (Barrientos et al. 2010)
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	NAP
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Old Age Pension
Main programme objectives	The program aims to prevent poverty in old age
Pilot	NAP
Target population	The programme cover all men and women above 60 (the qualifying age for men used to be 65 but it has been gradually brought into line with women's qualifying age at 60. In 2010 the eligibility age will be equal between men and women.) (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Beneficiary selection	Categorical and Means-tested: be a South African citizen or permanent resident, live in South Africa not receive any other social grant for yourself, not be cared for in a state institution, complying with the asset and income thresholds. (Barrientos et al. 2010; South African Government)
Coverage – individual level	The ILO reported a total coverage of 1,877,538 in 2001. This number increased to 2,623,719 in 2009. Most recent statistics indicate a coverage of 3,138,940 by in 2015. More details on total coverage are yet to be retrieved from statistical reports of SASSA (ILO 2014; South African Social Security Agency several years)
Coverage – household level	NAC
Entitlement requisites	<p>Go to the South African Social Security Agency(SASSA) office nearest to where you live and bring the following:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Your 13-digit bar-coded identity document (ID). If you don't have an ID: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> o you must complete an affidavit on a standard SASSA format in the presence of a Commissioner of Oaths who is not a SASSA official o you must bring a sworn statement signed by a reputable person (like a councillor, traditional leader, social worker, minister of religion or school principal) who can verify your name and age o The SASSA official will take your fingerprints. You will be referred to the Department of Home Affairs to apply for the ID while your application is processed. If you don't get an ID, your grant will be suspended. - Proof of your marital status (if applicable). - Proof of residence. - Proof of your income and/or dividends (if any). - Proof of your assets, including the value of the property you own. - Proof of your private pension (if any). - Your bank statements of the previous three months. - If you were employed, your Unemployment Insurance Fund (UIF) ('blue book') or discharge certificate from your previous employer. - If your spouse died within the last five years, a copy of the will and the first and final liquidation and distribution accounts where applicable. - Please note: If you are too old or sick to travel to the office to apply, a family member or friend can apply on your behalf. The person should take a letter from you and/or a doctor's note saying why you cannot visit the office. <p>Complete the application form in the presence of the SASSA officer (note that only you as the applicant or a SASSA official may complete the application form). The officer will interview you and tell you if you qualify for the grant. You will be given a receipt. Keep it as proof that you applied (South African Government)</p>

Means test – treatment of income	The income threshold varies across the years. Barrientos et al. (2010) reported the income threshold as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Single: Earnings of not more than R26,928.00 per year (US\$3,528) (or R2,200 per month or less, US\$288) - Joint earnings: not more than R53,856.00 per year (US\$7,058.64)(or R4,400per month or less, US\$576) Recent information from the government website indicates the following threshold: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Single: not earn more than R64 680 per year - Joint earnings: not earn more than R 129,360 per year (South African Government)
Means test – treatment of assets	The asset threshold varies across the years. Barrientos et al. (2010) reported the income threshold as follows: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Single : Assets up to the value of R451,200 or less (US\$ 59,140) (the value of your home is not taken into account, as long as you are living in the dwelling); - Married couples: Assets up to the value of R902,400 or less (US\$118,286)(the value of a person’s home, is not taken into account). Recent information from the government website indicates the following threshold: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Single: assets up to a value of R930 600 - Married couples: Assets up to the value of R 1,861,200 (South African Government)
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Beneficiary or Appointee (by a procurator at the SASSA office or an attorney)
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	The SASSA report a minimum of R 1200 in 2012, R 1,410 in 2015. (South African Social Security Agency several years)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	According to the SASSA, beneficiaries above 75 years old receive an additional R20 on top of the minimum described above. (South African Social Security Agency several years)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	The ILO reported a transfer amount of R700 in 2002, R870 in 2006 and R1080 in 2010 (ILO 2014).
Transfer guaranteed period	Yes. SASSA can decide if your grant must be reviewed. Your income as declared when you apply for the grant will form the basis for this decision. You will be notified three months in advance of the date when the review will take place or the date on which the life certificate (proof that you are still alive) is due. If you receive your money through the bank, an institution or procurator, you are required to fill in a life certificate at the SASSA offices every year. The following may result in the suspension of your grant: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - when your circumstances change - the outcome of a review - if you fail to co-operate when your grant is reviewed - when you commit fraud or misrepresent yourself - if there was a mistake when your grant was approved. When will your grant lapse? The grant will lapse when you: pass away; are admitted to a state institution; do not claim for three consecutive months; are absent from the country.
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	South African Social Security Agency (SASSA)
Agency type	Public agency

Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities
Appeals procedure	Yes. If your application is not approved, SASSA will inform you in writing why your application was unsuccessful. If you disagree with the decision, you can appeal to the Minister of Social Development at the national Department of Social Development. You must appeal within 90 days of being notified that your application was unsuccessful. (South African Government)
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/social-grants 

C. Country-level Institutionalisation

Poverty strategy	Yes: White Paper for Social Welfare
National coordination	Yes

D. Programme Budget

Budget	NAC
Cost	The ILO reported a total budget R 12,9 billion in 2002. This amount has increased to 27,656 in 2008 and to 29,29 million in 2010. More details regarding the cost are yet to be retrieved from SASSA statistical reports.
Donor Financing	No
Government financing	There is no evidence of donor financing. The total cost is therefore assumed to be borne by the government.

E. Programme outcome

Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending

Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>ILO (2014) Social Security Inquiry: Database (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>South African Government <i>Old age pension</i>, <http://www.gov.za/services/social-benefits-retirement-and-old-age/old-age-pension> accessed 5 Mar 2016</p> <p>South African Social Security Agency (several years) Statistical Reports (February 2016), <http://www.sassa.gov.za/index.php/knowledge-centre/statistical-reports> accessed 05-Mar-16</p>

South Sudan

Variable	Description
Programme title	Capacity Building Institutional and Human Resource Development Project
Country	South Sudan
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2007 (World Bank 2010)
End date of programme	There is no official information whether the program has stopped or still ongoing.
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Integrated anti-poverty programme
Programme function	Employment guarantee
Main programme objectives	The program aims to alleviate poverty, provide work for the seasonally unemployed to develop infrastructure and to develop institutional capacity
Pilot	
Target population	The program targeted women, youth, seasonal unemployed, war veterans and returnees. The program sets a target of 50% female.
Beneficiary selection	Administrative and community targeting (Household beneficiary ranking)
Coverage – individual level	The project covers 2000 beneficiaries annually (World Bank 2010). Yearly details on the programme are yet to be found
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	Yes
Recipient of transfer	Worker
Payment regularity	Monthly (Subbarao et al. 2013)
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer guaranteed period	N/A
Transfer conditions – human capital	N/A
Transfer conditions – work	Yes
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Public Service & Human Resource Development-GoSS

Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized (Subbarao et al. 2013)
Local government discretion	NAc
Intermediation	NAc
Legal framework	NAc
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	Yes. Process evaluation conducted in 2009 and Impact evaluation conducted in 2010 (World Bank 2010)
Beneficiary registration	NAc
Appeals procedure	NAc
Social accountability and participation	NAc
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	NAc
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	NAc
National coordination	NAc
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	Annual cost: US\$ 1,674,337 (Subbarao et al. 2013)
Donor Financing	Yes. The programme is entirely financed by the government (Subbarao et al. 2013)
Government financing	
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	Subbarao, K., Ninno, C. d., Andrews, C. and Rodríguez-Alas, C. (2013) <i>Public Works as a Safety Net: Design, Evidence, and Implementation</i> . Washington DC, USA: World Bank World Bank (2010) <i>Making Public Works Work: Public Works Database</i> (Washington, DC)

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Old Age Grant (OAG)
Country	Swaziland
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2005
End date of programme	The programme is ongoing
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Old age pension
Main programme objectives	The program aims to reduce the extreme vulnerability experienced by the elderly
Pilot	NAp
Target population	The programme targets elderly of age 60 or older
Beneficiary selection	The selection process, besides selecting the elderly of age 60 and older, incorporates poverty and vulnerability as criteria for entitlement (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Coverage – individual level	In 2005/06, approximately 28,000 Swazis received the Old Age Grant. This number increased to 49,000 in 2006/07, a little less than 5.5 percent of the Swazi population. During 2007/08, the program was expected to cover approximately 60,000 beneficiaries (RHVP et al. 2010).
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	NAp
Means test – treatment of assets	NAc
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Pensioner
Payment regularity	Quarterly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	The value of the OAG has increased from E240 quarterly in 2005, to E300 per quarter in 2006 to E 500 in 2008, and then to E600 per quarter in 2009 (RHVP et al. 2010)
Transfer guaranteed period	For a lifetime
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Department of Social Welfare of the Office of the Prime Minister

Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	No
Beneficiary registration	NAc
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: the Swaziland Poverty Strategy and Action Plan
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	In 2007/08, the budget for the Old Age Grant was set to increase to E 65 million (US\$9.2 million) (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Cost	The government was expected to spend approximately E 60 million (US\$8.6 million) for 2006/07 for the Old Age Grant, twice that of the 2005/06 budget (Garcia and Moore 2012)
Donor Financing	No
Government financing	Yes. The Old Age Grant is funded by the budget, and the government has an obligation to provide transfers to all registered beneficiaries
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i> . Manchester, UK Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i> . Washington, DC: World Bank

	<p>RHVP, UNICEF and HelpAge International (2010) <i>Swaziland Old Age Grant Impact Assessment</i>. London, UK</p> <p>International Social Security Association (ISSA) (2011) <i>Social Security Programs Throughout the World: Africa 2011</i>. Geneva, Switzerland</p>
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Tanzania

Variable	Description
Programme title	Tanzania Community Based Conditional Cash Transfer
Country	Tanzania
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2008
End date of programme	The program ended in 2009
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Income transfer plus transfer for human development
Programme function	Conditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The program aims to improve Human capital indicator
Pilot	Yes
Target population	<p>The programme targets households in poverty, notably those having one or two chronically sick parents (for example, human immunodeficiency virus [HIV]/AIDS), chronically sick children, and vulnerable elderly. This latest group was defined as follows:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Elderly with no caregivers • Poor health • Very poor.
Beneficiary selection	<p>Targeting is done by a Community Management Committee using screening forms designed to identify vulnerable children and the elderly. During targeting about 31,594 households in all three pilot districts were visited and their information collected for further ranking in the MIS.</p> <p>At the household level, eligibility criteria for beneficiary households were based on household characteristics of the very poor that were defined by communities themselves through focus group discussions.</p> <p>In order to ensure that beneficiaries targeted qualify, validation of the list of eligible households was done in each village by Village Assembly.</p> <p>Supply Side Capacity Assessment was performed from February to July 2009 by the local government authorities to assess the capacity of primary schools and health facilities in order to ensure that they can meet the expected increased demand for these services, since the CBCCT pilot requires beneficiaries to comply with education and health conditionality i.e. regular attendance at primary schools by vulnerable children, and occasional visits to the health centres by elderly persons and children under 5 years. During the course of carrying the supply side capacity assessment about 82 health centres and 164 primary schools in all three pilot district councils were assessed.</p>
Coverage – individual level	The programme covered 6000 individuals in total in pilot districts: Kibaha District Council, Bagamoyo District Council, Chamwino District Council
Coverage – household level	The programme covered 2000 households (50 households per village) (Evans and Week 2008; Garcia and Moore 2012)
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A. Characteristics of the very poor were defined by the community. However, no details were provided on the parameters of the assessment.
Means test – treatment of work	N/A
Recipient of transfer	Head of households

Payment regularity	Bimonthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	Beneficiary households receive their cash benefits every two months, ranging from a minimum of US\$12 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Children = US\$ 6 / bimonthly (50% of food poverty line) - Elderly = US\$ 12 / bimonthly (100% of food poverty line)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	Beneficiary households receive their cash benefits every two months up to a maximum US\$36 <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Children = US\$ 6 / bimonthly (50% of food poverty line) - Elderly = US\$ 12 / bimonthly (100% of food poverty line)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAP
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to the continuation of the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	The role of conditions is to ensure that children go to primary school and that both the elderly and children visit health facilities, fostering long-term improvement in their education and health indicators. If beneficiaries failed to comply with the conditions, a warning was issued to them by the CMCs. This, however, did not yet affect their payments. If after the next monitoring period (eight months after the first payment), beneficiaries still failed to comply with the conditions, payments were reduced by 25 percent and a second warning was sent. After two warnings were issued, beneficiaries that failed to comply were suspended indefinitely, but allowed to return to the program after review and approval by the communities and TASAF (Evans et al. 2014)
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	World Bank
Agency type	Multilateral donor agency
Centralisation of decision making	Relatively high centralized decision making
Local government discretion	Local Governments intervene in supply side capacity assessment as well as community-targeting process (CMC)
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the local level
Appeals procedure	Yes. Case management covers the range of appeals, complaints, and other issues arising during the course of the program. Households that believed they met the beneficiary criteria and were unfairly excluded from the pilot could appeal to the local government authorities or TASAF. Beneficiaries could submit complaints to TASAF and the local government authorities on issues relating to payments, quality of education and health care services, and management of the program by community members, local government or TASAF staff. Other social welfare issues that come to light through the program (for example, violence or abuse in the households) were referred by the community to the relevant government ministry at the district level using existing procedures for dealing with such issues (Evans et al. 2014)
Social accountability and participation	Yes. There is a high involvement of local communities in the execution of the programme
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No

C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: Poverty reduction strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	Yes. The programme has been financed by the World Bank
Government financing	No. There is no evidence of government support to the programme.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Evans, D. and Week, H. D. (2008) <i>Tanzania: Community-Based Conditional Cash Transfer (CB-CCT) Pilot</i>. Washington DC, USA</p> <p>Evans, D. K., Hausladen, S., Kosec, K. and Reese, N. (2014) <i>Community-based conditional cash transfers in Tanzania: Results from a Randomized trial</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p>

Uganda

Variable	Description
Programme title	Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE)
Country	Uganda
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2011
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	The programme appears to be an extension of the Uganda Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) financed by DFID and UNICEF and reported in Barrientos et al. (2010)
Programme type	Income transfer plus human capital investment
Programme function	Conditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The program aims to help tackle chronic poverty in Uganda.
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targets vulnerable families and elderly
Beneficiary selection	Two targeting methodologies are being implemented in separate sub-counties of the 14 pilot districts. One – known as the Vulnerable Family Support Grant (VFSG) – employs a composite index based on demographic indicators of vulnerability to determine eligibility. The other – Senior Citizens Grant (SCG) – uses age to determine eligibility, with all individuals aged over 65 entitled to receive the transfer (over 60 in the Karamoja region) (Brook et al. 2014)
Coverage – individual level	The number of beneficiaries reached 105,836 in 2014 (Namuddu et al. 2014). The pilot is expected to reach around, around 600,000 people in about 95,000 households, 15% of households in 14 targeted districts, over a four-year period between 2011 and 2015 (Brook et al. 2014)
Coverage – household level	N/A. Yet, The pilot is expected to reach around 95,000 households, 15% of households in 14 targeted districts, over a four-year period between 2011 and 2015 (Brook et al. 2014)
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	N/A
Recipient of transfer	Head of households or caregivers
Payment regularity	Bimonthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	The average total value of transfers received is UGX 128,500 for SCG beneficiaries and UGX 138,500 for VFSG beneficiaries (Oxford Policy Management and UKAid 2015)
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	The transfer amount is reviewed and updated every year. The transfer is estimated UGX 23,000 in 2011. It has increased to UGX 25,000 by the time of the publication of Brook et al. (2014). The amount is transferred bi-monthly (approximately UGX 50,000 (Oxford Policy Management and UKAid 2015)
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to conditions attached to the programme and continuity

Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Government of Uganda
Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Local authorities and communities are involved in selection process and execution of the programme
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the local level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Yes. Communities are involved in selection
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	NAc
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrolment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	Brook, S., Jones, E. and Merttens, F. (2014) <i>Evaluation of the Uganda social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) Programme: Midline qualitative research evaluation report</i> . London, UK

	<p>Oxford Policy Management and UKAid (2015) <i>Evaluation of the Uganda Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) Programme: Impact after one year of programme operations 2012–2013</i>. London, UK</p> <p>Namuddu, J., Barrett, S., Wandera, A. and Okillan, B. <i>et al.</i> (2014) <i>Uganda’s Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE) Scheme and the feasibility of promoting sustainable livelihoods through a linkages approach</i>. Kigali, Rwanda</p>
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<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Uganda Social Assistance Grants for Empowerment (SAGE Pilot)
Country	Uganda
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2007
End date of programme	The program ended in 2010
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Income transfer plus human capital investment
Programme function	Conditional Cash Transfer
Main programme objectives	The programme aimed to improve the nutrition and health status of beneficiary households, increase attendance and reduce drop-out rates of beneficiary school children (6-18 years), increase preventive health care visits to health centers of children, older persons in targeted households, prevent the chronically poor from falling into destitution, generate information on the feasibility, costs and benefits and on the positive and negative impact of a social cash transfer scheme as a component of a social protection program for Uganda (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targets households in the lowest 10% quintile
Beneficiary selection	The programme uses a combination of proxy, geographical, categorical and community-driven targeting methods. Initially, the scheme will cover 4 districts out of 80 in the country: these districts were selected on the basis of the proportion of vulnerable people in the district population. This was done by summing up the share of children and elderly persons in the entire population. At the community level, communities will identify the beneficiaries (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Coverage – individual level	N/A
Coverage – household level	The pilot was expected to reach 9,000 households
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	Households in the lowest 10% quintile of poverty level.
Means test – treatment of work	No
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	A minimum of UGX 18,000
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	An additional UGX 2000 is added for each child and elderly person above 60 years old, up to 5 individuals (hence a maximum of UGX 28,000)
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites, conditions attached to the programme

Transfer conditions – human capital	Yes. Transfers are conditioned upon school attendance and health care visits
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	UNICEF / DFID / Government of Uganda
Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is little evidence of local government discretion although it is assumed that they may take part in beneficiary identification process
Intermediation	NAC
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the local level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Yes. There is evidence of community participation and social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: Poverty reduction Strategy Paper
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	First year estimate: US\$1.54 million. Later annual cost is estimated at US \$ 2.5 million (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Donor Financing	Yes: UNICEF/DFID, however no information is provided on their total contribution
Government financing	Yes but no information is provided on the total government contribution
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrolment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i> . Manchester, UK

Zambia

Variable	Description
Programme title	Child Grant Program
Country	Zambia
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2010
End date of programme	The program appears to be ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional Cash transfer
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to reduce extreme poverty and the intergenerational transfer of poverty. The objectives of the program (as specified in the child grant manual) are to (1) supplement and not replace household income; (2) increase the number of children enrolled in and attending primary school; (3) reduce the rate of mortality and morbidity among children under 5 years old; (4) reduce stunting and wasting among children under 5 years old; (5) increase the number of households owning assets such as livestock; and (6) increase the number of households that have a second meal a day.
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targets poor households with children under age 5 living in program districts
Beneficiary selection	Randomised selection both at the community and household level (American Institutes for Research 2013; FAO 2014b)
Coverage – individual level	The programme covers the districts of Kalabo, Kaputa and Shangombo. In 2014, the programme reaches 20 000 ultra-poor households with children under five years of age (FAO 2014b)
Coverage – household level	N/A
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	N/A
Recipient of transfer	Head of household
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	When the program started in 2010, the average cash transfer was 55 ZMK (US\$12) and reached 60ZMK the following year (FAO 2014b)
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and continuity of the programme

Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions –work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Community Development, Mother and Child Health
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	There is no evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the district level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc
Cost	NAc
Donor Financing	Yes. The programme is supported by UNICEF Zambia (American Institutes for Research 2013) but no information on total contribution could be found
Government financing	Yes but no information total contribution could be found
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	American Institutes for Research (2013) <i>Zambia's Child Grant Program: 24-Month Impact Report</i> . Washington DC, USA FAO (2014b) <i>The Child Grant Programme (CGP) positively impacted productive activities and labour allocation in Zambia</i> . Rome, Italy

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Pilot cash transfer scheme
Country	Zambia
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2004 pilot in Kalomo but has been rolled out in Kazungula in 2005, in Chipata in 2006 and in Monze and Katete in 2007 (Barrientos et al. 2010)
End date of programme	There is no official information whether the program has stopped or still ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional Cash transfer
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to reduce extreme poverty, generate information on the feasibility, costs and benefits of a social cash transfer scheme as a component of a social protection strategy for Zambia
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targets poor and vulnerable households with particular focus on each district: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In Katete beneficiaries are individuals over the age of 60 years old. More information on the scheme in Katete can be found in Pension Watch (2011) - In Kalomo, Kuazungula and Chipata the target is the 10% poorest households. - In Monze the target are children suffering from malnutrition.
Beneficiary selection	Community identification of beneficiaries using a set of household level criteria including the presence of older people, disabled or children. Multi-stage identification of the 10% poorest households by village, area, and district committees (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Coverage – individual level	
Coverage – household level	The programme covered approximately 1,027 households in the district of Kamolo during the first phase (Schubert 2005). The coverage increased to 1,180 households when Kazungula is included around 2005. The coverage continued to increase and reached 3,500 households in districts of Kalomo, Kazungula, Chipata, Monze and Katete by 2007 (ILO 2014)
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	N/A
Recipient of transfer	Head of the household
Payment regularity	The cash is transferred bi-monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	When the coverage expanded to Kalomo, Kazungula and Monze District in 2007, each approved household receives about US\$ 10.00 (40,000 Zambian kwacha) per month in cash, those with children (any number) get a bonus of approximately US\$ 2.50 (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	In Katete, pensioners receive US\$ 15 per month.
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	In 2004, households received US\$ 6 per month (ZMK 30,000)
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to the continuity of the programme

Transfer conditions – human capital	No. Although unconditional, higher transfers with bonuses for children enrolled in primary and secondary school are also tested in one pilot district (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Community Development and Social Services/UNICEF/DFID/GTZ
Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision making
Local government discretion	There is limited evidence of local government discretion although it is assumed that they may have intervened during in beneficiary selection process
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	No
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at district level
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	Yes. There is evidence of community participation and social accountability
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	Yes: Poverty Reduction Strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	
Cost	There is limited information on the annual cost of the programme. The ILO reported a total cost of ZMK 432,053,653 in 2005. Scale-up costs for Zambia's SCTs was expected to reach US\$41.4 million by 2012, when transfers will be given in 50 well-established and 22 newly opened districts (Garcia and Moore 2012). Barrientos et al. (2010) reported that the cost of rolling out the schemes is estimated to rise from US\$9.3 million in the first year of rollout when fifteen districts are covered to US\$44.4 million when the entire country is covered.
Donor Financing	Yes. The programme is financed by a consortium of donors including the AfDB, GTZ, and DFID. Details on annual donors' contribution are yet to be found (Schubert 2005).
Government financing	Yes. The programme received contribution of the government (Schubert 2005). Details on government contributions are yet to be found
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending

Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>Garcia, M. and Moore, C. M. T. (eds) (2012) <i>The Cash Dividend: The Rise of Cash Transfer Programs in Sub-Saharan Africa</i>. Washington, DC: World Bank</p> <p>Pension Watch (2011) <i>A social pension in Zambia: Perceptions of the cash transfer pilot in Katete</i> (2011), <http://www.globalaging.org/pension/world/2011/zambia%20pension.pdf></p> <p>Schubert, B. (2005) <i>The Pilot Social Cash Transfer Scheme: Kalomo District – Zambia</i>. Berlin, Germany</p>

Zimbabwe

Variable	Description
Programme title	Harmonised Social Cash Transfer Programme
Country	Zimbabwe
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2011
End date of programme	The program appears to be ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to strengthen the purchasing power of ultra-poor households who are labour-constrained. Primary objectives were to enable beneficiary households to increase their consumption to a level above the food poverty line, to reduce the number of ultra-poor households and to help beneficiaries avoid risky coping strategies such as child labour and early marriage. The program is expected to lead to improved nutritional status and to improved outcomes for children in health and education (FAO 2013)
Pilot	Yes
Target population	The programme targeted ultra-poor households, notably the labour-constrained households.
Beneficiary selection	Targeting and selection process are conducted through application of a household survey by the national statistics agency and verification by Department of Social Services (DSS) and UNICEF, guided by the HSCT Manual of Operations (FAO 2013)
Coverage – individual level	By June 2013, the programme covers approximately 152 016 household members, including 97 561 children in 13 districts of Zimbabwe (FAO 2013)
Coverage – household level	In the first scale up phase of the HSCT 10 districts have been covered. 19,827 labour constrained food poor households have been approved and are now receiving regular cash payments (Schubert and Chirchir 2012) . By June 2013, 32 591 households with 152 016 household members, including 97 561 children, were in receipt of an unconditional cash transfer in 13 districts of Zimbabwe (20 percent national coverage) (FAO 2013; World Bank 2014).
Entitlement requisites	N/A
Means test – treatment of income	N/A
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	Labor constraint is considered during assessment
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Bimonthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	The transfer is based on household size and equivalent to a minimum US\$ 10 per month, transferred bimonthly
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	The transfer is based on household size and equivalent to a maximum of US\$ 25 per month, transferred bimonthly
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A

Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and continuity of the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Government of Zimbabwe, UNICEF
Agency type	Hybrid
Centralisation of decision making	Highly centralized decision-making
Local government discretion	The programme operates at the district level but there is limited evidence of local governments discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Agency regulations
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	Yes
Beneficiary registration	Beneficiaries are registered at the district levels
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is limited evidence of community participation (FAO 2013)
Budgetary arrangements	Formal
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	NAC
National coordination	NAC
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	The annual cost is estimated at US\$ 6,949,800 (Schubert and Chirchir 2012)
Donor Financing	Yes. The HSCT is jointly funded by the Government of Zimbabwe and UNICEF through the multi-donor aligned Child Protection Fund (CPF) (FAO 2013). No details on donors' total contribution could be found.
Government financing	Yes. The HSCT is jointly funded by the Government of Zimbabwe and UNICEF through the multi-donor aligned Child Protection Fund (CPF) (FAO 2013). No details on total government contribution could be found.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrolment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending

Others	Pending
References	<p>FAO (2013) <i>Impacts of the Harmonised Social Cash Transfer Programme on Community Dynamics in Zimbabwe</i> (Rome, Italy), http://www.fao.org/docrep/018/i2968e/i2968e00.pdf</p> <p>Schubert, B. and Chirchir, R. (2012) <i>Zimbabwe Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Programme (HSCT): Analysis of the process and results of targeting labour constrained food poor households in the first 10 districts</i>. Harare, Zimbabwe</p>

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Public Assistance Programme
Country	Zimbabwe
Region	Africa
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 1998. The database considers information from 2000 onwards
End date of programme	The program appears to have ended in 2012 but there is no official information about it.
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to prevent chronic poverty. Vulnerable families are assisted with basic living costs so as to enhance their coping capacities and promote self-reliance. The assistance is in the form of maintenance allowances to elderly, people with disabilities, children in difficulty circumstances, families in distress and payments of transport through travel warrants.
Pilot	No
Target population	The programme targets old persons over 65 years of age, disabled or chronically ill; they must have no known family who can look after them disabled or family lacks connections
Beneficiary selection	NAC
Coverage – individual level	NAC
Coverage – household level	NAC
Entitlement requisites	NAC
Means test – treatment of income	NAC
Means test – treatment of assets	NAC
Means test – treatment of work	Yes. Labour incapacity is considered during assessment
Recipient of transfer	NAC
Payment regularity	NAC
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAC
Transfer guaranteed period	NAC
Transfer conditions – human capital	NAC
Transfer conditions – work	NAC
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Secretary for Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare, Public Assistance Section, Department of Social Welfare

Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Centralized decision-making (Munro 2003)
Local government discretion	Although beneficiaries are registered at the local level, there is little evidence of local government discretion in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation (Social Welfare Assistance Act, 1988)
Legal framework changes	NAc
Evaluation protocols	NAc
Beneficiary registration	NAc
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	No
Budgetary arrangements	NAc
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	NAc
National coordination	NAc
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	The ILO reported a total cost of ZWD 85 million in 2001. The cost has increased to ZWD 7,200 million in 2004 and later to ZWD 49,072 million in 2005 (ILO 2014)
Donor Financing	NAc
Government financing	NAc
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), < http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home > accessed 27 Feb 2016 Munro, L. (2003) <i>A Social Safety Net for the Chronically Poor?: Zimbabwe's Public Assistance in the 1990s</i> . Manchester, UK


China

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Minimum Living Standards Scheme - Rural Di Bao
Country	China
Region	Asia
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2003
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	N/A
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional Cash Transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to alleviate poverty in rural China
Pilot	No
Target population	All Rural residents whose net annual average income per person in a household is below the local minimum living standard.
Beneficiary selection	The programme uses income test, mean-tests, geographical and categorical targeting (Poor households residents of rural areas with limited ability to work, no source of income, and no supporting from family members)
Coverage – individual level	According to the China Statistical Yearbook, the programme covered 35.66 million beneficiaries in 2007. This amount has increased to 53.88 million in 2013 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2014). Yet, according to a UN report, the total coverage is estimated at 47 million in 2014 (UNESCAP 2014).
Coverage – household level	
Entitlement requisites	Registration at the civil affairs departmental office with all the relevant documents (application form, household registration card and personal identity card of each household member, income and benefit receipt verification, verification for employment or unemployment status, etc.), and then the local residential committee assesses the eligibility of the applicants at the preliminary stage.
Means test – treatment of income	Per capita income must fall below the local poverty line. The amount of benefits that a household receives depends on the minimum living expense and the resources taken into account when measuring household income.
Means test – treatment of assets	N/A
Means test – treatment of work	Yes. Labour capacity is taken into account during the assessment
Recipient of transfer	Beneficiary or Head of household
Payment regularity	Yearly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	Beneficiaries receive on average CHY 306 in addition to assistance in medical care, education and housing (ILO 2014). The transfers varies according to localities.
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	N/A

Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Civil Affairs and City Authorities / City Authorities
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Most decisions are taken at a lower level of governments (Low or no centralisation)
Local government discretion	High. Most decision-making at taken place at the local levels.
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	Yes. In 2007, the central government also implemented Dibao in all rural areas (UNESCAP 2014)
Evaluation protocols	The benefit line has been monitored quite closely by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but there are no rigorous evaluations of the impact on poverty. (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation in decision-making or execution of the programme
Budgetary arrangements	Formal. Shared fiscal responsibility between central and local governments with the exception of wealthier areas including Beijing, Fujian, Guangdong, Jiangsu, Shandong, Shanghai, and Zhejiang who have been excluded from receiving subsidies from the central government while others have received transfers from the central government in different proportions.
Website	http://www.mca.gov.cn/ 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	China has a 5-year plan which encompasses poverty and social security strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAc

Cost	According to the ILO, the Rural Dibao, along with China Wubao and Tekun costed approximately CNY 7,990 million in 2005. According to the UNU, this amount increased to CNY 10.4 billion CNY in 2007 and to CNY 20.7 billion in 2008.
Donor Financing	There is no evidence of donors' contribution to this programme
Government financing	The programme is financed through General Tax from local governments and subsidies from central governments
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>National Bureau of Statistics of China (2014) <i>China Statistical Yearbook: 2014</i>. Beijing, China: China Statistics Press</p> <p>UNESCAP (2014) <i>Towards income security in Asia and the Pacific: A focus on income support schemes</i>. Bangkok, Thailand</p>

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Minimum Living Standards Scheme - Urban Di Bao
Country	China
Region	Asia
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 1993
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	Dibao Pilot phase
Programme type	Pure Income Transfers
Programme function	Unconditional Cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme aims to assist poor households in urban China, especially in the context of structural adjustment and the marketization of SOEs.
Pilot	The programme had a pilot phase up to 1999.
Target population	The programme targets all poor residents of urban areas
Beneficiary selection	The programme uses income test, mean-tests, geographical and categorical targeting (Poor households residents of urban areas with limited ability to work, no source of income, and no supporting from family members). The scheme excludes unregistered migrants
Coverage – individual level	According to China Statistical Yearbook, the programme covered 22.72 million beneficiaries in 2007. The number increased to 23.45 million in 2009 but decreased slightly to 20.64 million in 2013 (National Bureau of Statistics of China 2014). Yet, according to the UN in 2014, the programme has covered already up to 70 million inhabitants (UNESCAP 2014). his amount has been constantly increasing and in 2013, the total coverage was estimated at
Coverage – household level	NAC
Entitlement requisites	Registration at the civil affairs departmental office with all the relevant documents (application form, household registration card and personal identity card of each household member, income and benefit receipt verification, verification for employment or unemployment status, etc.), and then the local residential committee assesses the eligibility of the applicants at the preliminary stage.
Means test – treatment of income	Per capita income falls below the poverty line. The amount of benefits that a household receives depends on the minimum living expense and the resources taken into account when measuring household income.
Means test – treatment of assets	NAP
Means test – treatment of work	Yes. Labour incapacity is taken into account during assessment
Recipient of transfer	Beneficiary or Head of household
Payment regularity	Monthly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	50
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	213.33
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	An average of 102 Yuan is provided (ILO 2014). The transfer amount depends on the cities and the poverty line of the region. In principle the benefit line is the costing of 20 items in a basic food and non-food basket. In addition, assistance in medical care, education and housing is provided.
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAP

Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme. Income threshold and requisites are reviewed at regular intervals
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Civil Affairs and City Authorities
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Highly decentralized decision-making
Local government discretion	Provinces and local authorities are highly involved in decision-making
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	The program was initiated by some of China's more economically developed regions in the 1990s and subsequently promoted nation-wide by MOCA through the issuance in 1998 of a regulation on urban Dibao by the State Council. The Central government enacted the “Regulation on Guaranteeing Urban Residents’ Minimum Standard of Living” in 1999 as a guideline for the local implementation of Dibao across the country. The regulation indicates that all urban residents whose household per capita income was lower than the local minimum living standard are entitled to basic assistance from the government and all local governments should include expenses for Dibao in the budget (UNESCAP 2014)
Evaluation protocols	The benefit line has been monitored quite closely by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, but there are no rigorous evaluations of the impact on poverty. (Barrientos et al. 2010)
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation in decision-making or execution of the programme
Budgetary arrangements	Formal. Before 1999, Dibao was solely financed by local governments. With the reform, it is financed by both local and central governments through general tax revenues.
Website	http://www.mca.gov.cn/ 
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	China has a 5-year plan which encompasses poverty and social security strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC

Cost	According to the UN, the programme costed CNY 1.2 billion in 1998 (UNESCAP 2014). This amount has been constantly increased and reach 19.9 billion in 2007 (ILO 2014). According to the latest report, the total cost was estimated at CNY 39.3 billion in 2008 (UNESCAP 2014).
Donor Financing	No. there is no evidence that the programme is supported by donors
Government financing	The funding of urban Dibao is shared by both central and local government, with the bulk from central government and mainly directed to middle and western parts of China. . General Tax: Local Government (UNESCAP 2014)
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Reference: Barrientos 2013/ China Statistical Yearbook
References	<p>Barrientos, A., Nino-Zarazua, M. and Maitrot, M. (2010) <i>Social Assistance in Developing Countries Database: Version 5.0</i>. Manchester, UK</p> <p>ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), <http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home> accessed 27 Feb 2016</p> <p>National Bureau of Statistics of China (2014) <i>China Statistical Yearbook: 2014</i>. Beijing, China: China Statistics Press</p> <p>(UNESCAP 2014; UNESCAP (2014) <i>Towards income security in Asia and the Pacific: A focus on income support schemes</i>. Bangkok, Thailand</p>

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Tekun Program
Country	China
Region	Asia
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	There is no information on the starting date of the programme
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	NAp
Programme type	Pure income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfer
Main programme objectives	The Tekun program is implemented in less economically developed regions in order to provide social assistance to poor rural households living in destitution. The support it offers is in cash and/or in-kind. Tekun is similar to rural Dibao in many respects including its intended beneficiaries (the poorest section of the rural population), methods of financing (both of them are locally financed programs), and levels of benefits (compatible with the local economy) (ILO 2014)
Pilot	No
Target population	All households in poverty.
Beneficiary selection	As for the rural Dibao, beneficiary selection is based upon income test, means test and categorical targeting methods.
Coverage – individual level	According to the ILO, 10.67 million individuals received Tekun assistance in 2005 (ILO 2014)
Coverage – household level	According to the ILO, 6.55 million households received Tekun assistance in 2005
Entitlement requisites	NAc
Means test – treatment of income	NAc
Means test – treatment of assets	NAp
Means test – treatment of work	NAc
Recipient of transfer	Head of households
Payment regularity	Yearly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	The ILO reported that beneficiaires received on average CHY 208 per capita per year.
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAp
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to the programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No
B. Programme Institutionalisation	

Implementing agency	Ministry of Civil Affairs and City Authorities
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Decision-making are decentralised
Local government discretion	The Tekun is entirely at the discretion of local authorities
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation in decision-making or execution of the programme
Budgetary arrangements	Discretionary. While the provision of Dibao benefits is based on a locally defined poverty line, whereas Tekun benefits are given at the discretion of local cadres. Also the level of benefits often depends on the availability of funds in relation to the number of poor households in need of support (ILO 2014)
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	China has a 5-year plan which encompasses poverty and social security strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	According to the ILO, the total expenditure of the programme is approximately CHY 2.78 billion per year.
Donor Financing	There is no evidence of donor financing to the programme
Government financing	Approximately CHY 2.78 billion per year.
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), < http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home > accessed 27 Feb 2016

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>
Programme title	Wubao Program
Country	China
Region	Asia
A. Programme Characteristics	
Start date of the programme	The program started in 2006
End date of programme	The program is still ongoing
Replace	The Wubao programme existed since 1996. Neew regulations were introduced in 2006.
Programme type	Income transfers
Programme function	Unconditional cash transfers
Main programme objectives	The programme comes in support to the maintenance of the basic living standards of the elderly, the disabled and children with the Three NOs.
Pilot	No
Target population	All households in poverty
Beneficiary selection	The programme uses income test, mean-test, and categorical targeting (vulnerable groups with the 'Three NOs' - no supporting family members, no ability to work and no source of income).
Coverage – individual level	According to the ILO, the programme covered a total of 0.88 million individuals in 2005. This number has been increasing and the China Statistical Yearbook reported a coverage 1.853 for the year of 2012 (ILO 2014; National Bureau of Statistics of China 2014).
Coverage – household level	NAc
Entitlement requisites	Registration at the civil affairs departmental office with all the relevant documents (application form, household registration card and personal identity card of each household member, income and benefit receipt verification, verification for employment or unemployment status, etc.), and then the local residential committee assesses the eligibility of the applicants at the preliminary stage.
Means test – treatment of income	NAc
Means test – treatment of assets	NAc
Means test – treatment of work	Labor incapacity is taken into account during assessment
Recipient of transfer	Head of households or beneficiary
Payment regularity	Yearly
Transfer minimum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer maximum (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer average (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc. Yet, benefits usually include food, clothing, medical care, housing and burial expenses, often referred to as the "Five guarantees".
Transfer fixed (domestic currency at current prices)	NAc
Transfer guaranteed period	Subject to pre-requisites and conditions attached to this programme
Transfer conditions – human capital	No
Transfer conditions – work	No

B. Programme Institutionalisation	
Implementing agency	Ministry of Civil Affairs and City Authorities
Agency type	Public agency
Centralisation of decision making	Decision-making are highly decentralised
Local government discretion	High degree of local discretion
Intermediation	No
Legal framework	Ordinary legislation
Legal framework changes	NAC
Evaluation protocols	NAC
Beneficiary registration	Applicants are required to register with Local Authorities
Appeals procedure	No
Social accountability and participation	There is no evidence of community participation in decision-making or execution of the programme
Budgetary arrangements	Formal: Financing is shared between local and central government
Website	No
C. Country-level Institutionalisation	
Poverty strategy	China has a 5-year plan which encompasses poverty and social security strategy
National coordination	Yes
D. Programme Budget	
Budget	NAC
Cost	According to the ILO, the program had a total cost of CHY 3.68 billion in 2005 (ILO 2014)
Donor Financing	There is no evidence of donor support to this programme
Government financing	CHY 3.68 billion in 2005 (ILO 2014)
E. Programme outcome	
Monitor	Pending
Poverty	Pending
Inequality	Pending
Work	Pending
Enrollment	Pending
Attendance	Pending
Health utilization	Pending
Immunization	Pending
Nutrition	Pending
Community / Local Economy outcome	Pending
Others	Pending
References	ILO (2014) <i>Social Security Inquiry: Database</i> (Geneva, Switzerland), < http://www.ilo.org/dyn/ilossi/ssimain.home > accessed 27 Feb 2016 National Bureau of Statistics of China (2014) <i>China Statistical Yearbook: 2014</i> . Beijing, China: China Statistics Press

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