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## **Institutions and governance in Mozambique**

A bird's eye view based on existing databases

Ines A. Ferreira\*

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**Abstract:** Using publicly available databases and drawing on a wide range of indicators, this paper reviews the institutional performance of Mozambique across seven broad categories: rule of law and judicial independence; voice and freedom of expression/association; political participation; accountability and transparency; political instability and violence, and external relations; state legitimacy and political leadership; and governance and state capacity. Overall, the selected indicators point to similar trends within each dimension and suggest limited progress during the last decades. Still, it is fundamental that these insights and the scores presented by the indicators are put into context, and that we understand the historical path of Mozambique, the internal and external factors at play, and the fact that it takes time for progress achieved to be reflected in this type of data.

**Key words:** Mozambique, institutions, governance, indicators, databases

**JEL classification:** O43, O55, P00

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\* Development Economics Research Group, Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark, [if@econ.ku.dk](mailto:if@econ.ku.dk)

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## 1 Introduction

An extensive literature in economics and political sciences has contributed to sustaining the idea that institutions matter for development. Historically, large development agencies translated institutions into ‘good governance’. The ‘structural adjustment programmes’ imposed on many low- and middle-income countries during the 1980s (following the crises of the early years of the decade) reflected the spread within the donor community of the discourse around the desirability of promoting ‘good governance’ to foster economic growth and development. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank relied on neoliberal reforms aimed at contributing to what they called sound macroeconomic management. However, the disappointing record of the structural adjustment programmes led, by the early 1990s, to increased debate around the relationship between institutions and patterns of development. After the turn of the millennium, development agencies based the allocation of foreign aid on composite indicators that were expected to reflect the quality of policies and institutions. This was so especially after the seminal paper by Burnside and Dollar (2000), who argued that aid is more effective in countries pursuing ‘good policies’, but whose findings were refuted in subsequent work (Dalgaard et al. 2004; Hansen and Tarp 2001). More recently, interest in governance and institutions has again been highlighted in the development discourse, given that Goal 16—‘peace, justice and strong institutions’—of the SDGs aims to ‘promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’.

In this context, measuring the quality of governance and institutions assumes great importance. Still, this is not a straightforward task. While there are many international sets of indicators focusing on governance, there is no common agreement on what should be measured and how data should be collected, and more systematic examinations of the quality of existing indicators are still needed (González et al. 2017: 8). Furthermore, frequently used indicators are often endogenous (see, e.g., Dalgaard et al. 2004).

This paper offers a starting point towards closing this gap, or at least towards coming to grips with the issues involved. It brings together a wide range of indicators from almost 20 publicly available datasets and proposes an organizing framework across broad institutional dimensions. It then applies this framework to an analysis of institutions and governance in a compelling study case, Mozambique. Located on the East Coast of Southern Africa, Mozambique has had an intricate history and endured many dramatic political and economic shifts and transformations, which have resulted in an externally dependent economy and a complex institutional environment. The discovery of huge gas resources has presented the country with new opportunities, but also with additional challenges that require strong institutions and adequate policies if expected socio-economic benefits are to emerge.

This paper adopts a pragmatic conceptual approach<sup>1</sup> and groups indicators across seven dimensions, which roughly follow well known datasets, such as the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), and are close to the typology used in Cruz et al. (2023). These dimensions are: rule of law and judicial independence; voice and freedom of expression/association; political

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<sup>1</sup> Institutions have been famously defined as ‘the rules of the game in society or, more formally, the humanly devised constraints that shape social interaction’ (North 1990: 3), ‘reduc[ing] uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction’ (North 1990: 6). The concept of institutions has been closely linked to that of governance, and the distinction between the two is regularly blurred.

participation; accountability and transparency; political instability and violence, and external relations; state legitimacy and political leadership; and governance and state capacity.

Despite its limitations (among which is the lack of a clear line between institutions and governance) a pragmatic approach allows us to address the question of what existing indicators related to institutions and governance have to tell us. Moreover, focusing on the Mozambican context means that we partially overcome the challenge of adapting indicators and measurement approaches to different cultural and institutional contexts (González et al. 2017: 7).

Overall, the analysis of the indicators indicates that, with some differences in terms of the timing of specific dips or peaks in the data, selected indicators point to similar trends within each dimension of the institutional indicators. The analysis suggests limited improvement across the dimensions of institutions and governance presented. In particular, it highlights challenges related to: the separation of powers and the functioning of the judicial system; freedom of expression, especially in terms of media freedom; the electoral process and the strength of the opposition; corruption and transparency in the political sphere; conflict management—in particular between Frelimo and Renamo and the recent lack of security in the province of Cabo Delgado; setting strategic priorities and guaranteeing the participation of civil society; and coordinating and implementing policies, as well as improving social protection and public goods provision.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data and the steps taken in selecting the indicators, as well as highlighting some of the analytical caveats. Section 3 describes Mozambique's performance across these indicators, around the seven broad institutional categories. Finally, Section 4 reflects and concludes.

## 2 Data

The starting point for the selection of data sources was the Quality of Government Dataset 2023 (Teorell et al. 2023) [QoG hereafter], which compiles data mostly from freely available datasets<sup>2</sup> and contains more than 2,000 variables. This dataset was used to obtain an overview of the existing indicators. The selection of variables proceeded as follows:

1. Using the QoG dataset, I kept only indicators for which data for Mozambique were available and covered the period since 2019.
2. The next step was to reduce the number of indicators to those that are most directly related to institutions and governance. Using the categorization from QoG, I restricted the list of indicators to those classified as 'civil society/population/culture', 'conflict', 'history', 'judicial', 'media', 'elections', 'political', 'quality', and 'welfare'.
3. After finding some discrepancies between the original datasets and the descriptions in the QoG, I decided to collect data individually from each of the relevant databases identified and to re-start the selection of relevant indicators. The main criteria used for selection were data availability and relevance for the analysis.<sup>3</sup> In the end, 20 data sources remained, from which relevant indicators were selected.

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<sup>2</sup> The exception here is the indicator of quality of government from the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) from the PRS Group (2023). While this dataset is not free, the variable used here is available from the QoG dataset.

<sup>3</sup> More specifically, dummy variables were not considered in this analysis, as they were deemed more relevant for a comparative study across countries.

4. Following that, indicators were grouped under seven broad categories: rule of law and judicial independence; voice and freedom of expression/association; political participation; accountability and transparency; political instability and violence, and external relations; state legitimacy and political leadership; and governance and state capacity. During this step, some further selection was carried out, based on considerations regarding the use of the indicators. For datasets that are more specialized, such as the Africa Integrity Indicators (AII) and the Varieties of Democracy dataset (VDEM), preference was given to more aggregate variables—in the case of VDEM, I focused solely on VDEM democracy indices and VDEM indicators. For datasets with wider coverage, such as the Freedom in the World (FH) and the Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG), preference was given to more specific indicators. For instance, the aggregate indices provided by IIAG were not included in the analysis, my focus instead being on their underlying sub-components. In the process of grouping variables and starting the analysis, two data sources were dropped.
5. The final step was to consider other available datasets, which, while not included in the QoG, could be of importance to the analysis. Five additional sources were considered. The first is the World Economic Forum Global Competitiveness Report. The dataset was not available for download and the data presented covered the period 2017–19 only, so it was not included in the final selection. Still, some of the indicators considered draw on this data source. The second is the Fragile States Index. While some of the political indicators used to assemble this composite measure could be relevant, the Fragile States Index encompasses other dimensions, making it difficult to analyse within the framework of this paper. I therefore decided not to include it.<sup>4</sup> Third, the Afrobarometer was clearly a relevant source, providing indicators of perceptions of institutions in Mozambique. The reasons for not including data from this source were related to the fact that the data are not harmonized between rounds, precluding the analysis of trends, which is a central goal in this paper. However, this data source is worth considering for an extension of the analysis presented. The final data sources considered were the Economic Freedom of the World from the Fraser Institute (FI) and the Index of Economic Freedom from the Heritage Foundation (EFIW), which were added to the list of data sources given the relevance of some of their indicators.

In total, 19 data sources and close to 200 indicators were used in the analysis described in the next section. A detailed description of each indicator is presented in Table A1.1 in the Appendix and the data sources are listed in Table 1. Except for the ICRG, which is not freely available and for which only one variable was used and obtained from the QoG, the table includes the webpage from which the data were retrieved. Before moving to the main description and analysis of the indicators, I should state some words of caution, which should be kept in mind throughout.

The first caveat regards the seven broad dimensions of institutions used to organize the next section. While their choice was based on broadly accepted institutional elements, they can be disputed, and arguments can be made about whether other elements (or groupings of elements) should be considered. Moreover, the allocation of indicators across the different dimensions is not strict and, in some cases, indicators could belong to more than one category. Still, I believe these dimensions offer a helpful organizing framework and highlight the links that can be drawn from related indicators.

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<sup>4</sup> A similar reasoning applies to other indices of fragility.

Table 1: Data sources

Name (acronym used)	Range of the variables	Webpage
Africa Integrity Indicators (All)	0–(25)–50–(75)–100. Defined criteria for levels 0 (worse), 50 and 100 (best), with intermediate levels 25 and 75 also permitted.	<a href="https://www.africaintegrityindicators.org/data">https://www.africaintegrityindicators.org/data</a>
Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI)	1–10 (best)	<a href="https://bti-project.org/en/downloads">https://bti-project.org/en/downloads</a>
UN e-Government Knowledgebase (EGOV)	0–1 (best)	<a href="https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/Data/Country-Information/id/116-Mozambique/dataYear/2003">https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/en-us/Data/Country-Information/id/116-Mozambique/dataYear/2003</a>
Freedom in the World from Freedom House (FH)	0–4 (greatest degree of freedom)	<a href="https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world">https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world</a>
Economic Freedom in the World (EFIW)	0–100 (best)	<a href="https://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-region-country-year&amp;countryids=116&amp;regionids=&amp;yearids=">https://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-region-country-year&amp;countryids=116&amp;regionids=&amp;yearids=</a>
Political Terror Scale (PTS)	5-point scale (best to worst)	<a href="https://www.politicalterrorsscale.org/Data/Download.html">https://www.politicalterrorsscale.org/Data/Download.html</a>
Global Peace Index (GPI)	1–5 (worst)	<a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/">https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/#/</a>
ICRG (ICRG)	0–1 (highest quality)	Obtained from QoG dataset. Note that this is not a publicly available dataset, but the variable used in the analysis is available from QoG.
Voter Turnout Database from IDEA (VTD)	0–100	<a href="https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout-database">https://www.idea.int/data-tools/data/voter-turnout-database</a>
Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG)	0–100 (best)	<a href="https://iiag.online/downloads.html#subject_info_menu">https://iiag.online/downloads.html#subject_info_menu</a>
National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy from NELDA (NELDA)	Yes/No, with some indicators including notes	<a href="https://nelda.co/#access">https://nelda.co/#access</a>
World Press Freedom Index from Reporters without Borders (RSF)	0–100 (best)	<a href="https://rsf.org/en/index?year=2012">https://rsf.org/en/index?year=2012</a>
Corruption Perceptions Index from Transparency International (CPI)	0–100 (lowest level of corruption)	<a href="https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/">https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2022/</a>
UCDP Dyadic Dataset from UCDP/PRIO (UCDP)	Text descriptions	<a href="https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/index.html#dyadic">https://ucdp.uu.se/downloads/index.html#dyadic</a>
V-Dem (VDEM)	0–1 (highest)	<a href="https://v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/country-year-v-dem-fullothers-v13/">https://v-dem.net/data/the-v-dem-dataset/country-year-v-dem-fullothers-v13/</a>
Global Terrorism Index (GTI)	0–10 (worst)	<a href="https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/">https://www.visionofhumanity.org/maps/global-terrorism-index/#/</a>
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)	-2.5 (weak) – 2.5 (strong)	<a href="https://www.govindicators.org/">https://www.govindicators.org/</a>
World Development Indicators (WDI)	1–6 (highest)	<a href="https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators#">https://databank.worldbank.org/source/world-development-indicators#</a>
Economic Freedom of the World from the Fraser Institute (FI)	0–10 (best)	<a href="https://www.fraserinstitute.org/economic-freedom/dataset?geozone=world&amp;year=2021&amp;page=dataset&amp;min-year=2&amp;max-year=0&amp;filter=1&amp;countries=MOZ">https://www.fraserinstitute.org/economic-freedom/dataset?geozone=world&amp;year=2021&amp;page=dataset&amp;min-year=2&amp;max-year=0&amp;filter=1&amp;countries=MOZ</a>

Note: see Table A1.1 in the Appendix for more details.

Source: author's elaboration.

The second caveat relates to measurement error and confidence in the scores (and ranks) provided by the different data sources, which are often relatively wide. Some of the databases include standard errors and/or confidence intervals along their indicators (e.g., IIAG; VDEM, which provides standard deviations and one standard deviation upper and lower bounds). While these are not presented the analysis, reference is made to them in some cases, especially for the WGI.

The third caveat relates to the discussion of trends and changes over time. As mentioned, it is important to consider not only that confidence intervals can be quite wide, but also the underlying changes (in, for instance, methodology and country samples) implemented between data releases and the relativity of the country scores, i.e. the fact that the position of a country may reflect changes not only in its own performance but also in the performance of others. This element is not always transparent from the metadata and codebooks of the databases.

The last words of caution concern two elements related to the interpretation of the indicators. The first stems from the lag that can exist between the time of the data collection underlying the indicators and the time of the data publication. While in some cases there is clearly no lag,<sup>5</sup> in others a careful reading of the dataset codebook is required to understand to which period the indicators refer. This is particularly important when we refer to peaks or dips in the data. To avoid confusion, the graphs in Section 3 present the data for the year provided by the data source or the corresponding report. Nevertheless, the descriptions do not always correspond exactly to a particular year. For example, FH and Reporters without Borders (RSF) report with a 1-year lag; IIAG's reports for a given year use data collected between September of two years prior and September of the previous year (e.g. 2023 results are based on data collected between September 2021 and September 2022), and similar timings apply to the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI), EFIW, Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), and FI.

The second element is the scale used in the graphs in Section 3. As described in Table 1 (and in more detail in Table A1.1 in the Appendix), scales and ranges vary between data sources. For simplicity, in some cases the scale of the indicators has been adjusted in their presentation in the figures. When this is the case, details are given in the notes, but otherwise indicators appear in their original scales, as indicated in Table 1. Except for the Global Peace Index (GPI) and the Global Terrorism Index (GTI), higher scores correspond to better outcomes.

Section 3 describes the performance portrayed by these indicators and puts them into context by linking the description of their scores and levels over time with arguments and insights brought together by Cruz et al. (2023).


### **3 Performance across different institutional dimensions**

Before delving more deeply into the broad dimensions of institutions and governance, we observe the overall trend conveyed by the ICRG indicator of quality of government, which scores countries between zero and one. The annual scores for Mozambique are depicted in Figure 1. Each score averages indicators of corruption, law and order, and bureaucratic quality. Mozambique starts at just over 0.5 in the late 1980s with some deterioration afterwards. There is an improvement after the peace agreement in 1992, followed by a decline until the 2000s. In the last 20 years, there has been a slight progressive improvement, more noticeable since around 2017, though quality of government is still at a low level. The next subsections explore these and other dimensions in more detail.

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<sup>5</sup> For instance, the UCDP Dyadic Dataset from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) reports events in the year they happened and, similarly, the indicators from the National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy Dataset (NEADA) reflect what happened in the election year they refer to.

Figure 1: ICRG Indicator of quality of government



Source: author's construction based on data from The PRS Group (2023) and Teorell et al. (2023).

### 3.1 Rule of law and judicial independence


This subsection covers indicators related to the separation of powers, the functioning of the judicial system, the enforcement of contracts and the protection of property rights. Starting with more general measures, Figure 2 portrays two indicators of the widely used WGI (scored between -2.5 and 2.5), both combining a variety of sources (including some of the indicators discussed here). ‘Regulatory quality’ measures how the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations is perceived. It shows an initial upward trend with a peak in 2000, followed by a decline until 2005. Similarly, there is an upward trend between 2005 and 2014, and a decline afterwards, though the magnitude of these changes is lower. Looking at ‘rule of law’ (combining the protection of persons and property, the independence and effectiveness of judges, and the enforcement of contracts), we again observe a declining trend since 2010, stabilizing at a low level in the last five years. While one should refrain from drawing definite conclusions about changes over time,<sup>6</sup> these indicators seem to suggest low levels of rule of law and regulatory quality in the last decade.

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<sup>6</sup> Bearing in mind that the values presented should be considered with caution, given the wide confidence intervals and the small size of the changes in levels between years.



Figure 2: Indicators of regulatory quality and rule of law from WGI



Source: author’s construction based on data from Kaufmann et al. (2010, 2023).

Figure 3 plots closely related indicators of rule of law and judicial independence from different data sources, which convey a similar story. Considering each data source separately and beginning with VDEM, the ‘liberal component’ covers the protection of civil liberties, the strength of rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and the effectiveness of checks and balances. It shows a low level in the period after independence and until peace in 1992, remaining stable at 0.6 since the early 1990s and decreasing slightly in the recent decade. ‘Judicial constraints’ (which refers to respect for the constitution and independence) and ‘legal constraints’ (representing oversight over the executive) are two of the sub-indicators included in the ‘liberal component’. The former shows a similar trend, whereas the latter has remained more constant in the recent period.


Turning to the indicators from BTI, ‘rule of law’ combines different sub-indicators, including ‘separation of powers’ and ‘independent judiciary’. With data available since 2005, ‘rule of law’ was initially classified as ‘fair’, the level deteriorating to ‘flawed’ since around 2014. The two sub-indicators suggest that, while separation of powers is formally established, it is weak in practice, and checks and balances are undermined. Moreover, even if the judiciary is mostly independent, some problems are also present, and these have worsened in the last decade.

The indicators from the remaining three data sources—EFIW, IAG, and FI—suggest that judicial effectiveness and independence have stayed at a low level (since independence) and not many changes have occurred, the EFIW indicator suggesting some improvement in the very recent period. Moreover, Mozambique scores low, with a 2 out of 4, between 2013 and 2023 in the indicators ‘Is there an independent judiciary?’ and ‘Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?’ published by FH.

The indicators from AII offer more specific information about the independence of the judiciary (Table 2). They are classified according to three main levels—0, 50, or 100—with intermediate levels of 25 or 75 also used, and cover the last decade. They highlight the lack of autonomy of both the judiciary and the supreme audit institution (low levels on indicators 2 and 7), which is undermined by the way appointments are made (indicators 3 and 8). More specifically, a merit-

based system exists but is not always applied and there are conflicts of interest.<sup>7</sup> This is in line with insights from key informants described in Cruz et al. (2023), which suggest that the lack of independence of the judiciary from the executive relates to the way in which the President of the Republic appoints actors in important judicial positions. Moreover, in general, laws are complex, and the judicial apparatus is seen as inefficient and heavy, which leads to weak law enforcement.

Figure 3: Indicators of rule of law and judicial independence



Note: VDEM indicators are multiplied by 100; original scores follow an interval scale from 0 to 1. BTI indicators are multiplied by 10; original scores follow a scale from 1 to 10. FI indicators are multiplied by 10; original scores follow a scale from 0 to 10.

Source: author's construction based on data from Coppedge et al. (2023a, 2023b); Donner et al. (2022); Gwartney et al. (2023); Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2022); Pemstein et al. (2023); The Heritage Foundation (2023).

Finally, an important element related to the rule of law is the protection of property rights. Figure 4 combines indicators from three different sources. Indicators from EFIW and FI both suggest that property rights are poorly defined and protected, while BTI classifies the level of property rights as 'fair', with even a slight improvement in the recent period. Two additional indicators corroborate the conclusion of a low degree of property rights protection. The FH score for the question 'Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors?' is a low 2 out of 4 in the last decade. The composite indicator 'property rights and rule-based governance' from Country Policy and Institutional Assessments (CPIA) (World Bank 2017, 2023)<sup>8</sup> has scored Mozambique on a level 2.5 out of 6 since 2013, reflecting uncertainties related to the protection of property rights and problems with the judicial system.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup> The FI indicators of judicial effectiveness (Figure A2.1 in Appendix A2) also suggest that since the early 2000s, there has been low legal enforcement of contracts, low 'legal integrity', and indications of a lack of impartiality of courts, as well as high military involvement in politics (linked to diminished democratic accountability).

<sup>8</sup> It is important to note here the issue of the endogeneity of the CPIA ratings. Dalgaard et al. (2004) provided evidence of a causal link between past growth performance and the CPIA index.

<sup>9</sup> The resolution of land issues is an important element in Mozambique, but not discussed in detail here.

Table 2: Indicators of judicial independence from All

Indicator number and description	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
2. In practice, the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.	0	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
3. In practice, national-level judges' appointments (justices or magistrates) support the independence of the judiciary.	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
4. In practice, national-level judges give reasons for their decisions/judgments.	100	75	75	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
7. In practice, the independence of the supreme audit institution is guaranteed.	25	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	25
8. In practice, appointments to the supreme audit institution support the independence of the agency.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
9. In practice, the supreme audit agency releases frequent reports that are accessible to citizens.	50	50	50	50	50	25	50	50	50	50

Source: author's construction based on data from Global Integrity (2023).

Figure 4: Indicators of property rights



Note: BTI indicator is multiplied by 10; original scores follow a scale from 1 to 10. FI indicator is multiplied by 10; original scores follow a scale from 0 to 10.

Source: author's construction based on data from Donner et al. (2022); Gwartney et al. (2023); The Heritage Foundation (2023).


### 3.2 Voice and freedom of expression/association

We move now to indicators related to the freedom of expression and belief, and of association in Mozambique. Starting again with a more general indicator, 'voice and accountability' from the WGI (Figure A2.2 in Appendix A2) suggests a progressive decline since 2005. There is a particularly sharp drop from 2014 to 2015, and the level stabilizes at the lowest point in the two

most recent data points available.<sup>10</sup> While this indicator covers freedom of expression and association and free media, it includes elements of participation in the selection of the government (covered in the next section) as well. Thus, we move to other more specific indicators.

Focusing on indices of freedom of expression (Figure 5), the VDEM indicator of ‘freedom of expression and alternative sources of information’ captures dimensions related to freedom of the press and media, interference by government in matters of public debate, and academic and religious freedom. As expected, the level was very low after independence and until the end of the war. There was a big improvement in the early 1990s and since then the level of freedom of expression has been relatively stable. A similar trend is portrayed by the BTI indicator of freedom of expression, which scores Mozambique with a 4 in the latest two periods available (early 2020s), a level corresponding to freedom of expression being frequently subject to interference or government restrictions and/or manipulation shaping matters of public debate. The IIAG ‘rights’ index has a wider scope and shows no major changes from around 60 out of 100 during the last decade.

Figure 5: Indicators of freedom of expression



Note: BTI indicators are multiplied by 10; original scores follow a scale from 1 to 10. VDEM indicator is multiplied by 100; original scores follow an interval scale from 0 to 1.

Source: author’s construction based on data from Coppedge et al. (2023a, 2023b); Donner et al. (2022); Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2022); Pemstein et al. (2023); Reporters sans Frontières (2022).

One of the most widely used indicators on media freedom, from RSF, classifies Mozambique as either ‘problematic’ or ‘difficult’ since 2013 (noting the change in methodology applied since 2022). The scores in statements 53, 55, and 56 of the AII (Table 3) suggest that, while there is no promotion of citizens’ self-censorship or impediments to citizens publishing information online, the same does not apply to the media. Moreover, it suggests that there are problems in the way reporting is carried out.<sup>11</sup> On the other hand, the BTI indicator of religious freedom shows that

<sup>10</sup> The difference between the levels in the early 2000s and in the most recent five years is statistically significant.

<sup>11</sup> In contrast, the pluralism of the media was identified as an institutional strength in the quantitative questionnaire (based on 149 responses) presented in Cruz et al. (2023).


there is no interference from the state. According to the four indicators from FH (Figure 6), the degree of freedom of the media, religion, and expression of own personal views has deteriorated when comparing the early 2010s with the most recent period available, while academic freedom has stayed the same.

Table 3: Indicators of media freedom and freedom of association from All

<b>Indicator number and description</b>	<b>2014</b>	<b>2015</b>	<b>2016</b>	<b>2017</b>	<b>2018</b>	<b>2019</b>	<b>2020</b>	<b>2021</b>	<b>2022</b>	<b>2023</b>
53. Journalists and editors adhere to strict professional practices in their reporting.	50	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
55. There is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) and the government does not promote the media's self-censorship.	25	25	0	25	0	0	0	0	25	0
56. There is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) of citizen-created content online and the government does not promote the self-censorship of citizens online.	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	75	50	75
65. Workers are not restricted from organizing themselves through trade unions.	75	50	100	75	75	75	75	75	75	75
66. Corporations observe labour laws and recognize and uphold human rights.	50	25	25	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
67. Citizens are able to associate freely.	25	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
68. The government does not create obstacles for existing non-profit organizations (NGOs) or put in place barriers to establishing new ones.	50	50	75	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
69. No NGO employees were killed, imprisoned, interrogated, threatened, or physically harmed in the past year.	50	50	50	50	50	100	100	50	100	75
70. No NGOs have been shut down or harassed with unwarranted administrative burdens, investigations, or sanctions as retribution for their work in the past year.	100	100	75	50	50	75	100	75	100	100

Source: author's construction based on data from Global Integrity (2023).


Figure 6: Indicators of freedom of expression and belief, and of association from FH



Source: author's construction based on data from Freedom House (2023).

Turning now to indicators of freedom of association (Figure 7), VDEM's indicator of freedom of association covers freedom to form parties and participate in elections and freedom of civil society organizations to form and operate. The figure shows that, since the end of the war, the level of freedom has been at around 0.8, with some indication of a slight decrease in recent years. Similarly, according to the AII indicators (Table 3, statement 67), in general, citizens are free to associate with their peers in public and express dissent or participate in civil and political organizations, though there are occasional instances of intimidation. In contrast, the indicator from BTI shows that association/assembly rights have deteriorated since 2006, with a particularly sharp decline from the early 2010s to a level 4 in the two most recent reports, which corresponds to some interference from government on association and assembly rights. The indicator for 'freedom of assembly' is also at level 2 in the scoring from FH (Figure 6).

Figure 7: Indicators of freedom of association



Note: VDEM indicator is multiplied by 10; original scores follow an interval scale from 0 to 1.


Source: author's construction based on data from Coppedge et al. (2023a, 2023b); Donner et al. (2022); Pemstein et al. (2023).

More specifically, while there are no indications of obstacles to organizing into trade unions, corporations occasionally fail to observe labour laws or to recognize and observe human rights (Table 3, statements 65 and 66). Moreover, FH scores Mozambique at level 2 in ‘freedom for trade unions and similar professional or labour organizations’ (Figure 6). With a few exceptions, there are no obstacles to creating or operating non-profit organizations (Table 3, statements 68–70), although, according to FH, there seems to have been a deterioration in the last decade (Figure 6).

### 3.3 Political participation

This subsection examines different elements related to political participation and deliberative processes, focusing on elections and the pluralism of parties. Starting with more aggregate measures (Figure 8), both the ‘participatory component’<sup>12</sup> from VDEM and the indicator of ‘participation’ from IIAG<sup>13</sup> score Mozambique at around 60 out of 100 in the last decade, following a steep improvement during the 1990s. The VDEM ‘deliberative component’, which relates to the process by which decisions are made and justified, has been on a slightly higher level throughout the period, but shows a progressive decrease since the early 2000s.

Figure 8: Composite indicators of participation



Note: VDEM indicators are multiplied by 100; original scores follow an interval scale from 0 to 1.

Source: author’s construction based on data from Coppedge et al. (2023a, 2023b); Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2022); Pemstein et al. (2023).


Figure 9 portrays similar trends. The VDEM indicator of ‘electoral democracy’ measures the extent to which suffrage is extensive, political and civil society organizations can operate freely, and elections are clean and affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. It has been stable since 1995 at around 0.4 out of 1, with a minor decline after the elections in 2014. The BTI ‘political participation’ score declined from ‘sound’ in the early 2000s to ‘flawed’ in the most recent year. Both ‘free and fair elections’ and ‘effective power to govern’ indicators show deterioration

<sup>12</sup> This indicator covers suffrage, engagement in civil society organizations, and elections of local/regional government power.

<sup>13</sup> Note that this index has a broader scope, considering freedom of association and assembly, political pluralism, civil society and space, and democratic elections.

over the period. In the most recent report, Mozambique’s scores on these indicators point to problems related, for example, to irregularities during the voting process and ballot count, restrictions in the rights to vote and run for office, and limited influence *de facto* over who governs, as well as limitations to the power to govern.

Figure 9: Indicators of political participation and electoral process



Note: VDEM indicators are multiplied by 10; original scores follow an interval scale from 0 to 1.

Source: author’s construction based on data from Coppedge et al. (2023a, 2023b); Donner et al. (2022); Pemstein et al. (2023).

Focusing more on the electoral process until 2019, while suffrage is *de jure* universal (and thus 100 per cent), the VDEM indicator of clean elections shows a decline since the elections in 2009. Table 4 presents the voter turnout in the different rounds of Parliamentary and Presidential elections in Mozambique. It is determined by the ratio of the total vote—the actual number of people who voted in an election (including invalid and blank votes)—and the number of people who were registered to vote in the election. While the voter turnout was very high in the first elections after peace was re-established, it decreased significantly afterwards, reaching the lowest point with the election of Armando Guebuza in 2004, when there was widespread abstention. While it has improved in the last three rounds of elections, only just over half of the people registered to vote did so in the 2019 elections.

Table 4: Voter turnout (%)

	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019
Parliamentary	87.89	68.09	36.34	44.44	48.84	51.41
Presidential	88.03	69.51	36.42	44.63	48.64	51.84

Source: author’s construction based on data from International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2018, 2023).

Table 5 lists different types of information about election events in Mozambique between 1994 and 2019. In line with the trend presented in Figure 9, these notes highlight, in particular, some challenges with the elections (both executive and legislative) in 2014: there were concerns before the elections were held that they would not be free and fair, as well as allegations of media bias in favour of the incumbent; though not widespread, there were riots and protests; the protests



involved allegations of vote fraud, but they were not confirmed by Western monitors. While opposition was allowed, and a new party—the MDM (Democratic Movement of Mozambique)—was running, there were allegations of fraud in the voting, as reported by Western monitors. In the 2019 elections, there were also concerns that they would not be free and fair due to violence and harassment of the opposition, and there were allegations of significant vote fraud.

Related indicators from FH (presented in Figure A2.3 in Appendix A2) corroborate this deterioration in the electoral process since 2017/18 in terms of free and fair elections for the head of government and legislative representatives, as well as in the fairness of electoral laws and their impartial implementation. Moreover, AII highlights problems related to the appointment of the agencies in charge of monitoring national elections and access to state-owned media outlets by political candidates/parties (Table A2.1 in Appendix A2).

Finally, we move to other dimensions of political participation, related to the party system and the strength of the opposition. FH scores Mozambique with a 2 out of 4 in terms of the right to organize into different political parties and of whether there are any obstacles to the formation or dissolution of competing parties or competitive political groupings (Figure 10). BTI classifies the party system as fairly stable, with moderate fragmentation, voter volatility, and polarization, and highlights a decrease in the range of interest groups and increase in the risk of polarization in the early 2010s (Figure A2.4 in Appendix A2).

The indicators also suggest some lack of strength of the opposition (Figure 10). The score from FH, referring to how realistic it is that the opposition will increase its support or gain power through elections, decreased from level 2 to level 1 after 2019. At the same time, the score for the political rights and opportunities for different segments of the population also deteriorated. Moreover, since around 2016, the freedom of political choices from forces external to politics or from political forces using extra-political means decreased (Figure 10).

In general, these indicators give some pointers to challenges in terms of political competition. However, they also require contextual information for a more complete picture of the situation in Mozambique—specifically, in terms of the polarization and violent conflict between Frelimo and Renamo, and its roots, as well as the dominance of Frelimo, the party that has been in power for over 45 years (discussed in detail in Cruz et al. 2023). These factors have had many implications, including the lack of separation of powers discussed in subsection 3.1.

Table 5: Information on election events in Mozambique from NEADA

	1994	1999	2004	2009	2014	2019
<b>Executive</b>						
Was opposition allowed? (At least one opposition political party existed to contest the election.)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Before elections, were there significant concerns that elections would not be free and fair?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes - There was widespread violence and harassment of the opposition that led to significant concern that this election would not be free or fair.
Were opposition leaders prevented from running?	No	No	No	No, though there was concern that the MDM candidate (Simango) would be banned from contesting the presidential election. Simango accused Frelimo, the incumbent party, of using the elections commission to try to ban his candidacy in the election.	No	No
Did some opposition leaders boycott the election?	No - Once elections began, the RENAMO party said it would boycott the elections. After UN talks, however, RENAMO decided to stay on the ballot.	No	No	No	No	No
In the run-up to the election, were there allegations of media bias in favour of the incumbent?	Unclear	No	No	No	Yes	Yes
Were there riots and protests after the election?	No	No	No	No	Yes, though not widespread	No - Renamo threatened to call for nationwide protests in December in response to the election result, but these protests did not happen.

If there were riots and protests after the election, did they involve allegations of vote fraud?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	Yes	N/A
If there were Western monitors present, were there allegations of significant vote-fraud by any Western monitors?	No	No	No, but the EU did cite some irregularities in the polling.	Yes	No - There was mention of irregularities, but Western observers repeatedly stated that, despite the objections of local observers, the election was generally free and fair.	Yes
<b>Legislative</b>						
Was opposition allowed? (At least one opposition political party existed to contest the election.)	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Before elections, were there significant concerns that elections would not be free and fair?	No	No	No	No	Yes	Yes - There was widespread violence and harassment of the opposition that led to significant concern that this election would not be free or fair.
Were opposition leaders prevented from running?	No	No	No	Yes - Opposition parties, most notably MDM, were banned from running in the National Assembly election and provincial assembly elections by the National Elections Commission (CNE). They alleged that missing registration documentation was the reason behind MDM's inability to run; nevertheless, there was significant concern regarding the transparency of Mozambique's multi-party elections.	No	No
Did some opposition leaders boycott the election?	No - Once elections began, the RENAMO party said it would boycott the elections. After UN talks,	No	No	No	No	No


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	however, RENAMO decided to stay on the ballot.						
In the run-up to the election, were there allegations of media bias in favour of the incumbent?	Unclear	No	No	No		Yes	Yes
Were there riots and protests after the election?	No	No	No	No		Yes	No - Renamo threatened to call for nationwide protests in December in response to the election results, but these protests did not happen.
If there were riots and protests after the election, did they involve allegations of vote fraud?	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A		Yes	N/A
If there were Western monitors present, were there allegations of significant vote-fraud by any Western monitors?	No	No	No, but the EU did cite some irregularities in the polling.	Yes		No	Yes

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Source: author's construction based on data from Hyde and Marinov (2012, 2021).

Figure 10: Indicators of political participation from FH



Source: author's construction based on data from Freedom House (2023).


### 3.4 Accountability and transparency

According to the CPIA ‘transparency, accountability and corruption in the public sector’ indicator—which captures the extent to which the executive is accountable for overseeing institutions and public employees for their performance, the extent to which civil society has access to information on public affairs, and whether there is state capture by narrow vested interests—the situation in Mozambique has deteriorated over time, decreasing from 3 out of 6 in 2005 to 2 since 2020. This subsection explores the performance of Mozambique in these institutional dimensions in more detail.

The WGI ‘control of corruption’ (Figure 11) shows a general declining trend since 2009, though the differences are of small magnitude. Figure 12 summarizes the trends of different corruption indicators. The BTI and IAG ‘anti-corruption’ indicators both show a low level—corresponding to higher levels of corruption—throughout the last two decades. The BTI anti-corruption policy indicator is consistently below level 4, which corresponds to the government not being willing/able to fully contain corruption, with few and mostly ineffective integrity mechanisms implemented (see also indicators 12–18 in Table 6). Common to both this indicator and the CPI indicator is the dip in 2018, likely reflecting the discovery of the ‘hidden debts’<sup>14</sup> in 2016 that led to the IMF suspending support for Mozambique and the freezing of foreign aid, with serious economic consequences for the country. The IAG anti-corruption indicator does not capture this important event to the same extent, showing a drop in 2017 but a quick recovery to higher levels in the following years; neither does the EFIW ‘government integrity’ indicator, which averages three sub-indicators of corruption and fluctuates between 20 and 30 throughout the period.


<sup>14</sup> These correspond to substantial loans taken from private foreign banks without the required approval and without informing any key government institutions, the public, or the development partners (see Cruz et al. 2023 for details).

Figure 11: Control of corruption from WGI



Source: author's construction based on data from Kaufmann et al. (2010, 2023).

Figure 12: Indicators of corruption



Note: BTI indicators are multiplied by 10; original scores follow a scale from 1 to 10.

Source: author's construction based on data from Donner et al. (2022); Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2022); The Heritage Foundation (2023); Transparency International (2023).

These trends are in line with the perception of widespread corruption in Mozambique and the lack of separation between private and government interests, highlighted by key informants as one of the central institutional challenges in Mozambique (Cruz et al. 2023). To these trends contribute not only the complexity of the legal system, discussed in subsection 3.1, but also the merging of political and economic powers that characterizes the country (discussed in detail in Cruz et al. 2023 as a proximate cause of institutional weaknesses in Mozambique).

Table 6: Indicators of accountability and transparency from All

Indicator number and description	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
12. Allegations of corruption against senior-level politicians and/or civil servants at any level are investigated by an independent body.	0	0	0	0	0	25	50	50	50	50
13. The body/bodies that investigate/s allegations of public sector corruption is/are effective.	25	25	25	25	25	50	50	50	50	50
14. Appointments to the body/bodies that investigate/s allegations of public sector corruption support the independence of the body.	25	25	25	25	0	0	0	0	0	0
18. The mechanism for citizens to report police misconduct or abuse of force is effective.	25	50	25	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
25. Major public procurements involve competitive bidding.	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26. Citizens can access the results and documents associated with procurement contracts (full contract, proposals, execution reports, financial audits, etc.).	25	0	0	25	25	0	0	0	0	0
28. Companies found guilty of violating procurement regulations are prohibited from participating in future bids.	0	0	0	50	50	50	50	50	25	50
29. Citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.	25	25	25	25	50	50	50	50	50	25
30. Citizens can access the financial records associated with natural resources exploitation (gas, oil, and mining), whether they involve the participation of public or private corporations.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
38. Civil servants' work is not compromised by political interference.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
39. Civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
42. Citizens' requests for public information are effective.	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
43. Citizens can access legislative processes and documents.	75	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	25	25
45. The asset disclosure process for senior officials of the three branches of government (heads of state and government, ministers, members of Parliament, judges, etc.) is effective.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
47. The asset disclosure process for members of the civil service is effective.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
49. Political parties regularly disclose public donations (funds that are sourced from the government) and the disclosures are easily available to the public.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
51. Political parties regularly disclose private donations and the disclosures are easily available to the public.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
52. Media organizations (print, broadcast, online) disclose the identities of their owners to the public.	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Source: author's construction based on data from Global Integrity (2023).

In the same vein, BTI scores Mozambique just below 4 in terms of 'prosecution of office abuse' (Figure 12), a level that corresponds to office abuse not being adequately prosecuted, with a drop as well in 2018. The FH reports a decrease in the score for the strength and effectiveness of the safeguards against official corruption since around 2016. The institutions to combat corruption in Mozambique are still weak and not independent from political influence.

The IIAG indicator of ‘accountability and transparency’ (combined score of institutional and civic checks and balances, absence of undue influence on government, and disclosure of public records and accessibility of public records) shows a decline in this dimension since 2012 (Figure 12). The FH scores Mozambique as a 2 out of 4 during the last decade in terms of the openness and transparency of the government. Several problematic aspects are highlighted in Table 6 as well: in terms of transparency of public procurement (statements 25, 26, and 28); the appointment of civil servants and the political interference in their work (statements 38 and 39); and, more generally, in terms of transparency and access to information (statements 42–52). The lack of transparency and the influence of connections rather than merit in recruitment and promotion in the public sector were also challenges highlighted by key informants in Cruz et al. (2023).

### **3.5 Political instability and violence, and external relations**

This subsection begins with a discussion of political instability and violence before briefly touching upon issues related to external relations. While Mozambique’s aid dependence and relations with its neighbour South Africa have played a very significant role in shaping its institutions, a brief mention of external cooperation is made here (see Cruz et al. 2023 for a detailed account).


Mozambique has experienced many significant (and extensive) episodes of armed conflict. The UCDP (an authority in the registration of conflict events) presents them in its dataset on dyadic conflicts. On the one hand, there is the (at times devastating) conflict between Renamo and Frelimo mentioned previously. Between 1977 and 1980, UCDP registers a ‘minor’ conflict (between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year) with Renamo, which escalates to the intensity of ‘war’ (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year) between 1981 and 1991, being ‘minor’ again in 1992. The same conflict is registered again in 2013, 2014, and 2016. Between 1985 and 1990, this conflict is classified as ‘internationalized intrastate’ conflict (due to the involvement of South Africa in particular), while the registered type is ‘intrastate’ for the rest of the period mentioned.

The Government of Mozambique is registered as having had two additional recent ‘minor’ conflicts, both relating to the armed insurgency by Islamic militants in Cabo Delgado (close to the major gas fields), whose causes are complex and yet consensual. One was with the militia group Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama (ASWJ) in 2018/19, the reported reason being a dispute over government. The second conflict was with the Islamic State (IS) over territory between 2019 and 2022. These events are roughly reflected in the CPIA trends in ‘political stability and absence of violence/terrorism’ (see Figure A2.5 in Appendix A2). Overall, there is a noticeable decline in the score, and it is worth noting that the differences between the scores during the period before 2005 and the lower scores in the recent decade are statistically significant.

Figures 13 and 14 complement this overview with the trends in different conflict-related indicators in Mozambique. Starting with the broader indicators, the BTI ‘conflict intensity’ indicator (Figure 13) mostly scored 4 out of 10 before 2015, but it increased afterwards. Looking at the IIAG ‘security and safety’ indicator (Figure 13), for which higher levels correspond to better outcomes, one sees a generally high level, with a slight decline in the recent period. This indicator covers different dimensions, ranging from armed conflict to violence against civilians or crime.




Figure 13: Indicators of conflict (I)



Note: BTI indicator is multiplied by 10; original scores follow a scale from 1 to 10. GTI indicator is multiplied by 10; original scores follow an interval scale from 0 to 1.

Source: author's construction based on data from Donner et al. (2022); Institute for Economics and Peace (2023b); Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2022).

Figure 14: Indicators of conflict (II)




Source: author's construction based on data from Gibney et al. (2023); Haschke (2023); Institute for Economics and Peace (2023a).

The two indicators from GPI also encompass extensive lists of sub-indicators (Figure 14). Both show a slightly worsening situation, especially in the recent period, but with very small changes. The deterioration in the recent period is likely linked to the ongoing events in Cabo Delgado and the continued conflict between Frelimo and Renamo (e.g. during the elections in 2019 and a few

months ago). This is also visible in the most specific indicators, such as the global terrorism index<sup>15</sup> (Figure 13). Mozambique scores high (above 60)—especially since 2017, when the problems in Cabo Delgado started unfolding. Similarly, the three Political Terror Scale (PTS)<sup>16</sup> indicators (Figure 14) show increasing control during the 1980s, when war escalated, and a higher score in the last three years.

Finally, I briefly discuss some indicators of international cooperation from BTI (Figure 15) and refer the reader again to comprehensive discussions in Cruz et al. (2023). The overall ‘international cooperation’ indicator shows a declining trend, having shifted from ‘excellent’ at the beginning of the period to ‘fair’ in the most recent data point. Looking at its sub-indicators, Mozambique’s score is quite positive in terms of regional cooperation, with a level of 7 in the last few years, which corresponds to cooperation with many neighbouring states and compliance with the rules set by regional and international organizations.

Figure 15: Indicators of international cooperation from BTI



Source: author’s construction based on data from Donner et al. (2022).

However, both the indicators of ‘effective use of support’ and ‘credibility’ show a decreasing trend. Both started at a high level at the start of the millennium but have fallen over the period. They suggest that, in the last couple of years, Mozambique has had challenges in terms of building a consistent long-term strategy and maintaining its credibility and reliability, potentially also as a result of the discovery of the ‘hidden debts’ discussed in subsection 3.4.

<sup>15</sup> Terrorism is defined as ‘the systematic threat or use of violence, by non-state actors, whether for or in opposition to established authority, with the intention of communicating a political, religious or ideological message to a group larger than the victim group, by generating fear and so altering (or attempting to alter) the behaviour of the larger group’ (Institute for Economics and Peace 2023b).

<sup>16</sup> Measuring abuse, political terror, or physical integrity rights violations.

### 3.6 State legitimacy and political leadership


This subsection serves as a bridge between the previous and the next subsections, covering institutional elements that are closely linked to the political instability and violence topic just discussed, and the theme of governance and state capacity, discussed below. While broadly there seems to be high acceptance of the nation state as legitimate (see ‘state identity’ indicator in Figure A2.6 in Appendix A2), this subsection briefly uncovers more about the strength of the state and democratic institutions as well as political leadership.

Reflecting some of the points made in previous subsections, indicators on the stability of democratic institutions from BTI (Figure A2.6 in Appendix A2) suggest that, in terms of both performance of and commitment to democratic institutions, Mozambique has scored at a low level in the recent period and the classification of the country in terms of ‘approval of democracy’ is ‘fairly low’.

Following from subsection 3.5, we can examine what the data say regarding the monopoly on the use of force. Indicators from both the BTI and FH show a decrease in the scores for Mozambique. While in the early 2000s, Mozambique’s state had close to the top score in terms of the monopoly on the use of force across the entire territory, according to the BTI, that score has been much lower since around 2016/17, suggesting challenges in some parts of the country, which is consistent with the events in Cabo Delgado. Similarly, FH gives Mozambique a zero score in the last couple of years on the question ‘Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?’.

Figure 16 shows that Mozambique’s scores on indicators of consensus-building are mostly in the middle levels: between 4 and 6 out of 10. The level of trust among the population (‘social capital’ indicator) has remained stable at the middle level across the period. On the upper level, there seems to be ‘consensus on goals’, but also some challenges in terms of strategic priorities. The control over ‘anti-democratic actors’ seems to have decreased when comparing the earliest with the most recent period for which data are available. The remaining three indicators suggest that, while the political leadership in Mozambique mostly prevents ‘cleavage-based conflicts’ from escalating, there are still some weaknesses in terms of processes of ‘reconciliation’, and in enabling ‘civil society participation’ and accommodating the interests of most civil society actors in policy formulation.

Figure 16: Indicators of consensus-building from BTI



Source: author's construction based on data from Donner et al. (2022).


### 3.7 Governance and state capacity

This last subsection offers a broad and brief overview of indicators related to governance and state capacity, with a focus on the administration of the country, the provision of basic public services and a safety net, and the respect for civil rights as well as the level of inclusion and equality in society. The WGI ‘government effectiveness’ indicator (Figure A2.7 in Appendix A2) summarizes different elements related to the quality of public services and the civil service, the degree of independence of the civil service from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. While the overall trend suggests a decline until the turning point in 2018, when there seems to be an improvement, one should bear in mind that the differences between the yearly scores are not statistically significant. The next paragraphs examine some of these dimensions in more detail.

Starting with more general indicators of governance (Figure 17), the score on BTI ‘basic administration’ is 5 in most years of the period, which corresponds to countries providing most basic public services throughout the country, with some deficiencies in the operation. The IIAG ‘public administration’ indicator covers different aspects related to the civil registration and statistical system, but also tax and revenue mobilization, and scores Mozambique at around 60 out of 100 throughout the period with available data. The CPIA ‘efficiency of revenue mobilization’ score (Figure 18) shows no change in level (4 out of 6) when comparing the beginning and the end of the last decade. More specifically, and perhaps surprisingly, the BTI ‘rural economy’ score (Figure 17) has been consistently at a fairly high level,<sup>17</sup> while there is still some room for improvement in terms of the ‘business and labour environment’, which links back to the previous discussion on the mixing of political and economic powers.

<sup>17</sup> A large portion of the Mozambican population relies economically on informal rural economic activities, especially smallholder agriculture, and there are challenges in terms of stagnation of the rural sector (Cruz et al. 2023).

Figure 17: Indicators of governance and functioning of the economy




Note: BTI indicators are multiplied by 10; original scores follow a scale from 1 to 10.

Source: author’s construction based on data from Donner et al. (2022); Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2022).

Moreover, the data suggest a reasonably high level of ‘structural difficulties’ constraining the political leadership’s governance capacity (Figure 17). The ‘steering capability’ of the leaders in Mozambique has been mostly classified as ‘fair’. Some of the weaknesses suggested by the underlying sub-indicators are related to prioritizing and organizing policy measures according to the strategic priorities set, and to their implementation. The lack of capacity to implement strategies and plans that have been formally approved and announced is a clear institutional weakness, which is partially a result of a lack of agency in strategic and policy formulation with historical roots (Cruz et al. 2023). Moreover, it has implications for an overall lack of vision and long-term strategic thinking for the country. In a similar vein, the CPIA ‘quality of public administration’ indicator, which assesses the extent to which civilian central government staff is structured to design and implement government policy and deliver services effectively, rates Mozambique as 3 out of 6 (Figure 18).

Figure 18: Indicators on governance from CPIA



Source: author's construction based on data from World Bank (2017, 2023).

Relatedly, 'efficiency in the use of resources' (Figure 17) has been scored as 'flawed' since around 2016, which is linked by the BTI scores to some challenges in the efficient use of the available human, financial, and organizational resources, and to a failure to coordinate policies and different parts of the government.<sup>18</sup> Table 7 also shows that there are some limitations in terms of government policies/strategies to support the socio-economic integration of the youth and of the creation of a social safety net to compensate for unemployment.<sup>19</sup> A middle score is also attributed to the country in the CPIA 'social protection rating', which assesses social protection and labour policies.

Delving more into the country's performance in promoting welfare and providing public goods, such as health, education, and infrastructure, existing indicators suggest that there are still weaknesses (see also Figure A2.8 in Appendix A2). The BTI 'welfare' indicator has been within the range of 'flawed' since the early 2000s, the IIAG 'index of human development', which averages composite indicators of health education, social protection and welfare, and sustainable environment, shows a slight increase, but still at a low level. The same applies to the indicator on infrastructure.<sup>20</sup> Mozambique has been characterized as lacking integration in terms of economic and physical infrastructure between the north/centre and the south, with large transport costs, as well as having a low quality of education, and permanent and serious spatial disparities in access to public services (Cruz et al. 2023).

<sup>18</sup> Key informants have characterized the state as costly and ineffective, and as having too many ministries and state institutions that lack coordination (Cruz et al. 2023).

<sup>19</sup> The fact that the Mozambican population is young and that the working-age population will therefore increase rapidly in the next decades will create challenges that require adequate employment policies (Cruz et al. 2023).

<sup>20</sup> On a more specific note, Figure A2.8 in Appendix A2 includes an indicator of e-government, which is a weighted average of normalized scores on the scope and quality of online services, the status of the development of telecommunication infrastructure, and inherent human capital. While the values fluctuate throughout the period, the low scores suggest that there is room for improvement.

Table 7: Indicators of discrimination and social safety nets from All


Indicator number and description	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
72. The government protects ethnic minorities from discrimination.	25	25	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
74. The government protects citizens from discrimination based on religious beliefs.	25	25	25	25	25	25	50	50	50	50
76. The government protects LGBT citizens from discrimination based on sexual orientation.	0	0	0	0	0	0	25	0	0	0
101. There is a government policy/strategy to increase the socio-economic integration of youth.	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	25
102. There is a government social safety net to assist the elderly.	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25	25
103. There is a government social safety net to assist those unable to work due to a permanent or temporary illness or health condition.	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50
104. There is a government social safety net to compensate for unemployment.	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0

Source: author's construction based on data from Global Integrity (2023).

Finally, another important element is respect for civil rights and the level of inclusion and equality in society. The indicators shown in Figure 19 suggest a deterioration in respect for civil rights since 2014 (BTI 'civil rights'), with Mozambique scoring at a low level in the most recent period, as well as weak respect for civil society traditions (a lower level of 'civil society traditions' corresponds to better outcomes). At the same time, the overall message from the indicators from both BTI and IIAG is that the performance of Mozambique in terms of inclusion and equality has not been improving in the last decade and is generally at a low level. Table 7 complements these findings with information about protection against discrimination, highlighting the need for improvement (statements 72, 74, and 76).<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> FH also gives Mozambique a score of 2 out of 4 on the question 'Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?' during the last decade.

Figure 19: Indicators of civil rights, inclusion, and equality



Note: BTI indicators are multiplied by 10; original scores follow a scale from 1 to 10. VDEM indicator is multiplied by 100; original scores follow an interval scale from 0 to 1.

Source: author's construction based on data from Coppedge et al. (2023a, 2023b); Donner et al. (2022); Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2022); Pemstein et al. (2023).

#### 4 Reflections and conclusion

The aim of this paper was to contribute to filling the gap in the measurement of institutions and governance by compiling a large selection of indicators across different dimensions and examining what they suggest about the performance of Mozambique. In general, within each dimension of institutions, selected indicators point to similar trends, with some discrepancies in terms of the timing of specific dips or peaks in the data. Bearing in mind the caveats discussed, the analysis suggests limited progress in Mozambique across the dimensions of institutions and governance presented here. In particular, the indicators illustrate many of the institutional challenges highlighted by Cruz et al. (2023) related to:

- the separation of powers and the functioning of the judicial system;
- freedom of expression, especially relating to freedom of the media;
- the electoral process and the strength of the opposition;
- corruption and transparency in the political sphere;
- the management of violent conflict and the recent lack of security in Cabo Delgado;
- the setting of strategic priorities and guaranteeing the participation of civil society; and
- the coordination and implementation of policies as well as the improvement of social protection and public goods provision.

Still, it is important that these insights and the scores presented by these indicators are put into context. In this case, it is crucial to understand the historical path of Mozambique, as well as the



internal and external factors at play, and also to recognize that the progress that has been achieved in some of areas will take time to be reflected in this type of data.

Compiling data from different available datasets has also highlighted a few additional points to consider when using these indicators. One set of considerations relates to the type of indicators used and the way in which the information is generated. First, while some indicators are quite specific in nature, such as the score of the country according to the answer to one question or statement (e.g. ‘the independence of the judiciary is guaranteed’), others are composite indicators that follow some aggregation procedure to combine sub-indicators (e.g. CPIA and WGI). Second, whereas the latter potentially combine indicators from other sources, the former usually rely on data collected by the same institution (e.g. AII or BTI). Relatedly, the compilation of indicators also highlights that many of the existing composite indicators (e.g. WGI or IIAG) draw from the same commonly used sources. Third, it is important to reflect on the fact that, given the conceptual nature of institutions and governance, many of the indicators are based on experts’ views and perceptions, which, while grounded in their experience and often triangulated with other existing information, have an inherent element of subjectivity.

The final two considerations relate to the use of these indicators. First, given the aim of discussing what one can learn from these datasets about institutions and governance in Mozambique, it becomes apparent that the indicators alone, especially those that offer a simple score (or a general description that fits all countries with that score), are limited in terms of assessing progress and underlying changes or events in a particular country. While the indicators from AII, NELDA, or UCDP offer additional qualitative notes that help us understand the numbers, in other cases, indicators give cues to points of change but do not provide additional information to uncover those transformations. That said, these indicators remain useful for comparative exercises between countries in a specific year and more careful quantitative analysis over time. The second element to consider is the need to evaluate the quality of these indicators (for example, in the spirit of Vaccaro 2021), as highlighted before by Gisselquist (2014) and González et al. (2017), which will also help in assessing their usefulness and main applicability.

Finally, the limitations of this analysis also point to some potential avenues for further exploration. Starting with the conceptual framework adopted, further work could be done in terms of grounding the dimensions selected in theory, and in drawing explicit links between the concepts used and the way they are operationalized into measurements. Moreover, in line with the points in the previous paragraph, the analysis could be further developed to explore comparisons, on the one hand, between the different indicators and, on the other hand, between Mozambique and its neighbour and/or peer countries.

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## Appendix

### A1 Data

Table A1.1: Details about the indicators included

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
Africa Integrity Indicators	2. The independence of the judiciary is guaranteed.	Rule of law and judicial independence	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	<p>A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>judges have autonomy to interpret and review existing laws, legislation and policy, and</li> <li>judges operate without fear or favor, independent from other branches of government.</li> </ol> <p>A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>judges' autonomy to interpret and review existing laws is occasionally restricted, or</li> <li>judges are occasionally subject to negative or positive political incentives (for example, judges are demoted/promoted or relocated to worse/better offices in retaliation/reward for making certain decisions).</li> </ol> <p>A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>judges rarely have autonomy to interpret and review existing laws, legislation and policy, or</li> <li>judges are routinely subject to negative or positive political incentives (for example, judges are frequently demoted/promoted or relocated to worse/better offices in retaliation/reward for making certain decisions).</li> </ol>	Data collection based on a questionnaire with 54 indicators, scored by in-country researchers based on an evidence-based investigation methodology, which requires that researchers compile evidence from several information sources, and pre-defined scoring criteria. Data points are then subject to double-blind review by a panel of peer reviewers.
	3. In practice, national-level judges' appointments (justices or magistrates) support the independence of the judiciary.	Rule of law and judicial independence	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	<p>A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>national-level judges are chosen through a merit-based selection system,</li> <li>they have security of tenure, and</li> <li>they are disciplined/removed/transferred only through due process by a peer panel/independent oversight body.</li> </ol> <p>A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>national-level judges are occasionally appointed without following a merit-based selection system,</li> <li>some judges are denied security of tenure, or</li> <li>occasionally judges are disciplined/removed/transferred without due process or the peer panel/independent oversight body occasionally includes representatives of the executive or legislative branches.</li> </ol> <p>A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>there's a merit-based selection system but it fails to require basic skills (ex. legal education, litigation experience, etc.) or is so weak that individuals with less merit are usually appointed over those with more merit,</li> <li>there is no security of tenure, or</li> <li>the due process usually involves the Executive or Legislative branches.</li> </ol>	
	4. In practice, national-level judges give reasons for their decisions/judgments.	Rule of law and judicial independence	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	<p>A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>judges routinely provide formal reasoning for their rulings,</li> <li>their reasoning references the laws/jurisprudence they considered and the specific interpretation they gave them in relation to the case, and</li> <li>their reasoning is public (for this indicator, national security exceptions are allowed).</li> </ol> <p>A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>judges occasionally fail to provide formal reasoning for their decisions,</li> <li>the reasoning occasionally lacks references to the laws/jurisprudence considered or the respective judges' interpretations, or</li> <li>it takes more than two weeks for citizens to obtain the reasoning after requested.</li> </ol> <p>A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>judges rarely provide formal reasoning for their rulings, or</li> <li>their reasoning rarely references the laws/jurisprudence they considered and/or the specific interpretations they gave them in relation to the case, or</li> <li>the reasoning is not public.</li> </ol>	
	7. In practice, the independence of the supreme audit institution is guaranteed.	Rule of law and judicial independence	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	<p>A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>auditors have autonomy to audit accounts,</li> <li>auditors operate without fear or favor, independent from other offices of government, and</li> <li>they have a predictable source of funding that is consistent from year to year.</li> </ol> <p>A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>auditors usually have autonomy to audit any account but exceptions exist,</li> <li>auditors are occasionally subject to negative or positive political incentives (for example, auditors are demoted/promoted or relocated to worse/better offices in retaliation/reward for not auditing/not auditing or issuing favorable/unfavorable resolutions), or</li> <li>funding is occasionally inconsistent.</li> </ol> <p>A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:</p>	

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
				1) auditors rarely have autonomy to audit accounts, 2) they routinely operate with fear or favor, dependent of other offices of government, or 3) the source of funding is usually inconsistent from year to year.	
	8. In practice, appointments to the supreme audit institution support the independence of the agency.	Rule of law and judicial independence	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) appointments to positions in the agency follow a merit-based system, 2) appointees are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections, political party affiliations or other biases, and 3) auditors are disciplined/removed/transferred only through due process by a peer panel/oversight body. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) appointments don't always follow a merit-based system, 2) appointees sometimes have conflicts of interest, or 3) auditors are sometimes disciplined/removed/transferred without observing due process by a peer panel/oversight body. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) appointments to positions in the agency rarely or never follow a merit-based system, or the merit-base system is so weak that individuals with less merit are usually appointed over those with more merit, 2) appointees usually have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections, political party affiliations or other biases, or 3) appointees are usually disciplined/removed/transferred without observing due process by a peer panel/oversight body.	
	9. In practice, the supreme audit agency releases frequent reports that are accessible to citizens.	Rule of law and judicial independence	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) the agency in average publishes 10 reports or more per year, and 2) the reports are published less than one month after issuance, and 3) they are accessible online or on paper within two weeks of requested at photocopying cost. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) the agency publishes between three and nine reports per year, 2) the reports are published more than one month after issued, or 3) they are available on paper but it takes more than two weeks after requested to obtain them or costs are higher than photocopying. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) the audit institution publishes one or less reports per year, or 2) the reports are not available to citizens.	
	12. Allegations of corruption against senior level politicians and/or civil servants of any level are investigated by an independent body.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) allegations against senior level politicians and/or civil servants of any level are investigated, and 2) the members of the body mandated to investigate the allegations work without fear or favor from other offices. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) not all allegations against senior level politicians and/or civil servants of any level are investigated, or 2) the members of the body mandated to investigate the allegations are occasionally subjected to positive/negative incentives to rule in favor/against a senior level politician and/or civil servant. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) allegations against senior level politicians and/or civil servants of any level are rarely or never investigated, or 2) the members of the body mandated to investigate the allegations routinely receive positive/negative incentives to rule in favor/against a senior level politician and/or civil servant.	
	13. The body/bodies that investigate/s allegations of public sector corruption is/are effective.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) the body has a functioning system in place to receive citizens' allegations of public sector corruption, 2) it investigates most of the allegations within three months of being reported, and 3) it exercises its own initiative to start investigations when/if needed. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) the system to receive citizens' allegations may not work for several days at a time, 2) not all cases reported are investigated or investigations take more than three months to start, or 3) the body rarely or never starts investigations out of its own initiative. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) there's no system to receive citizens' allegations, or 2) cases reported are rarely or never investigated.	
	14. Appointments to the body/bodies that investigate/s allegations of public sector corruption support/s the independence of the body.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) appointments follow a merit-based system, 2) appointees are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections, political party affiliations or other biases, and 3) appointees are disciplined/removed/transferred only through due process by a peer panel/oversight body. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) appointments don't always follow the merit-based system, 2) appointees occasionally have conflicts of interest, or 3) appointees are occasionally disciplined/removed/transferred without observing due process by a peer panel/oversight body. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) appointments to positions in the body rarely follow a merit-based system, 2) individuals appointed usually have conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections, political party	

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
				affiliations or other biases, or 3) due process by a peer panel/oversight body is rarely or never followed to discipline/remove/transfer the appointees.	
	18. The mechanism for citizens to report police misconduct or abuse of force is effective.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) the body has a functioning system in place to receive citizens' allegations of police misconduct or abuse of force, 2) it investigates most of the allegations within one week of being reported, and 3) it exercises its own initiative to start investigations when/if needed. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) the system to receive citizens' allegations may not work for several days at a time, 2) not all cases reported are investigated or investigations take more than one week to start, or 3) none or only a minority of the investigations are self-started by the body. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions are met: 1) there's no system to receive citizens' allegations, or 2) cases reported are rarely investigated.	
	21. Appointments the agency/agencies mandated to organize and monitor national elections support the independence of the agency/agencies.	Political participation	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) electoral officials are always chosen through merit-selection systems, 2) appointees are disciplined/removed only through due process by a peer panel/oversight body, and 3) appointees are not removed when a new administration takes power. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) electoral officials are generally chosen through merit-selection systems, but there are exceptions (for ex. sometimes candidates with less merit are selected over those with more merit). 2) appointees are occasionally disciplined/removed/transferred without following due process by a peer panel/oversight body, or 3) appointees are occasionally removed when a new administration takes power. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) where electoral officials are rarely chosen through merit-selection systems, or the selection system is so weak it can't guarantee candidates are appointed based on merit (for ex. no legal education is required, the President has discretion to decide who the top candidates are, etc.). 2) appointees are usually disciplined/removed without following due process, or the due process is so weak it doesn't support independence (for ex. members of the Executive or Legislative branches are part of the panel that conducts the due process), or 3) appointees are usually removed when a new administration takes power.	
	22. The agency/agencies mandated to organize and monitor national elections make/s timely, publicly available reports before and after a national election.	Political participation	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) the agency/agencies publish/es at least one report before the election and one report after the election, and 2) the publications are easily accessible to citizens less than one month after issuance online or at cost of photocopying. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) the agency only publishes one report before or after the election, or 2) the publication is generally accessible to citizens but published more than one month after issued or the cost is higher than photocopying. A 0 score is earned where no reports about the elections are published or reports are not available to the public.	
	23. Candidates/political parties have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.	Political participation	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) candidates/political parties have equal access to and receive fair treatment in state-owned media outlets, 2) access is equal in both news reports and editorial commentary, and 3) candidates/political parties are offered the same rates for campaign advertising. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) some candidates/political parties occasionally have more access to and receive better treatment in state-owned media outlets, 2) access is occasionally unequal in either news reports or editorial commentary, or 3) occasionally a candidate/political party is offered better rates for campaign advertising. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) some candidates/political parties usually have more access to and/or receive better treatment in state-owned media outlets, 2) access is usually unequal in both news reports or editorial commentary, or 3) some candidates/political parties are usually offered better rates for campaign advertising.	
	25. Major public procurements involve competitive bidding.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) bids from competing contractors, suppliers, or vendors are invited through open advertising of the scope, specifications, and terms of the proposed contract, and 2) the criteria by which the bids are evaluated is available for scrutiny. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) bids from competing contractors, suppliers, or vendors are invited though open advertising, but the advertising doesn't leave much time for bidders to prepare their offers or it lacks basic components (scope, specifications, or terms of the proposed contract), or 2) the criteria by which the bids are evaluated is not readily available for scrutiny. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) bids from competing contractors, suppliers, or vendors are rarely or never invited through open advertising of the scope,	

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
				specifications, and terms of the proposed contract, or 2) the criteria by which the bids are to be evaluated is rarely available for scrutiny.	
	26. Citizens can access the results and documents associated with procurement contracts (full contract, proposals, execution reports, financial audits, etc.).	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) there is an archive containing full records of all procurement contracts, whether in a central government office or at each contracting institution, and 2) full records are readily available on or off line for scrutiny by journalists, auditors, competitors and any citizen who request them. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) there is an archive but it doesn't contain complete records of all procurement contracts, whether in a central government office or at each contracting institution, and 2) full records are not readily available on/off line for scrutiny by journalists, auditors, competing contractors and any citizen who request them. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) there's no archive containing full records of all procurement contracts, whether in a central government office or at each contracting institution, or 2) full records are rarely or never available on/off line for scrutiny by journalists, auditors, competitors or any citizen who request them.	
	28. Companies found guilty of violating procurement regulations are prohibited from participating in future bids.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) companies found guilty of violating the law (procurement, tax, labor, corruption, etc.) are forbidden from participating in future bidding in the country, whether indefinitely or for a limited period of time, and 2) there is a registry of companies forbidden from bidding that citizens can access immediately or in less than two weeks upon request. A 100 is also earned if there is a registry in place that at the time of this research is empty because no company has violated the law. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) companies found guilty of violating the law (procurement, tax, labor, corruption, etc.) are generally forbidden from participating in future bidding, but there is evidence that some exceptions exist, or 2) citizen access to the full list of companies forbidden from participating takes more than two weeks. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) companies found guilty of violating the law (procurement, tax, labor, corruption, etc.) are rarely forbidden from participating in future bidding, or 2) there is no registry of companies forbidden from participating or it exists but it's not public.	
	29. Citizens can access the financial records of state-owned companies.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) financial records of state-owned companies are available on/offline to journalists, auditors and citizens at least quarterly, and 2) the records can be obtained immediately for free online or on paper in less than two weeks of requested at cost of photocopying. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) financial records of state-owned companies are available less than quarterly, or 2) obtaining the records takes two weeks to a month, or costs are higher than photocopying. A 0 score is earned where financial records of state-owned companies are rarely available to the public or don't exist.	
	30. Citizens can access the financial records associated with natural resources exploitation (gas, oil and mining), whether they involve the participation of public or private corporations.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) financial records associated with natural resource projects are available on/offline to journalists, auditors and citizens at least quarterly, and 2) the records can be obtained immediately for free online or on paper in less than two weeks of requested at cost of photocopying. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) financial records associated with natural resource projects are available less than quarterly, or 2) obtaining the records occasionally takes more than two weeks of requested, or costs are higher than photocopying. A 0 score is earned where financial records associated with natural resource projects are rarely available to the public or don't exist.	
	38. Civil servants' work is not compromised by political interference.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) civil servants are disciplined/removed/transferred only through due process by a peer panel/oversight body, and 2) civil servants are not removed when a new administration takes power. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) civil servants are occasionally disciplined/removed/transferred without following due process by a peer panel/oversight body, or 2) civil servants are occasionally removed when a new administration takes power. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) the due process is so weak it doesn't protect civil servants (for ex. the members of the panel that conducts the due process have a particular interest in how the issue is decided), or 2) civil servants are usually removed when a new administration takes power.	
	39. Civil servants are appointed and evaluated according to professional criteria.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) appointments to the civil service are made on a merit-based system, 2) individuals appointed are free of conflicts of interest due to personal loyalties, family connections, political party affiliations	



Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
				<p>or other biases, and</p> <p>3) performance evaluations are based on standard benchmarks.</p> <p>A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) not all civil servants are appointed because of their merits,</li> <li>2) not all appointees are free of conflicts of interest, or</li> <li>3) performance evaluations are not always based on standard benchmarks.</li> </ol> <p>A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) no merit-based system is in place or it's so weak it's useless,</li> <li>2) civil servants frequently have conflicts of interest, or</li> <li>3) performance evaluations are usually based on personal, discretionary criteria.</li> </ol>	
	42. Citizen requests for public information are effective.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	<p>A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) records are available online or on paper less than two weeks after requested, and</li> <li>2) costs are limited to photocopying. A 100 score is possible even if there are exceptions for information protected by national security or individual privacy laws.</li> </ol> <p>A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) many records are not online and/or it takes between two and four weeks for citizens' to obtain them, or</li> <li>2) costs sometimes are higher than photocopying.</li> </ol> <p>A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions applies:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) most records are not online and it takes more than a month for a citizen to obtain them, or 2) costs are usually higher than photocopying.</li> </ol>	
	43. Citizens can access legislative processes and documents.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	<p>A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) legislative records (at least transcripts of debates/votes, roll call vote, and full text of bills) are accessible to the public online or at the cost of photocopying,</li> <li>2) most records are available within a day of legislative proceedings, and</li> <li>3) there is a complete, easily available legislative archive either on or off line.</li> </ol> <p>A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) occasionally legislative records (at least transcripts of debates/votes, roll call vote, and full text of bills) are not accessible to the public online or the cost is higher than photocopying;</li> <li>2) records are usually available within a week of legislative proceedings, or</li> <li>3) citizens have limited access to a legislative archive either on or off line or the archive is not complete.</li> </ol> <p>A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) legislative records (at least transcripts of debates/votes, roll call vote, and full text of bills) are rarely accessible to the public online,</li> <li>2) records take more than a week after legislative proceedings to be available, or</li> <li>3) there is no legislative archive or citizens don't have access to it.</li> </ol>	
	45. The asset disclosure process for senior officials of the three branches of government (heads of state and government, ministers, members of Parliament, judges, etc.) is effective.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	<p>A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) senior officials of the three branches of government file their asset disclosures,</li> <li>2) their disclosures contain detailed information about assets belonging to them and their immediate family (including real estate, movable property, cash, salaries, and income from investments), and</li> <li>3) disclosures are available to the public online or within two weeks of requested at the cost of photocopy.</li> </ol> <p>A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) not all senior officials of the three branches of government file their asset disclosures, 2) their disclosures don't contain detailed information about them and their immediate family, or</li> <li>3) disclosures are not always available to the public (they're not online, paper versions take more than two weeks to obtain, or costs are higher than photocopying).</li> </ol> <p>A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) senior officials of the three branches of government routinely fail to file asset disclosures,</li> <li>2) asset disclosures contain so little information they are useless (for ex. they don't disclose assets of the immediate family, or cite real estate but not movable property, cash, salaries, and income from investments), or</li> <li>3) asset disclosures are not available to the public. A 0 score is also earned where no law requires asset disclosures.</li> </ol>	
	47. The asset disclosure process for members of the civil service is effective.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	<p>A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) all members of the civil service file their asset disclosures,</li> <li>2) their disclosures contain detailed information about assets belonging to them and their immediate family (including real estate, movable property, cash, salaries, and income from investments), and</li> <li>3) disclosures are available to the public online or within two weeks of requested at the cost of photocopy.</li> </ol> <p>A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) most but not all members of the civil service file their asset disclosures,</li> <li>2) their disclosures are not complete (for ex., they contain real estate assets but not movable property, or list the asset but don't provide its estimated value), or</li> <li>3) disclosures are not always available to the public (they're not online, paper versions take more than two weeks to obtain, or costs are higher than photocopying).</li> </ol> <p>A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) members of the civil service routinely fail to file asset disclosures,</li> <li>2) asset disclosures contain so little information they are useless (for ex. they don't disclose assets of the immediate family,</li> </ol>	

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
				or cite real estate but not movable property, cash, salaries, and income from investments), or 3) asset disclosures are not available to the public. A 0 score is also earned where no law requires asset disclosures.	
	49. Political parties regularly disclose public donations (funds that are sourced from the government) and the disclosures are easily available to the public.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) political parties disclose public donations within a month of received, and 2) they are easily available online or at the cost of photocopy. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) political parties don't always disclose public donations or disclose them more than a month of received, or 2) disclosures are not available online or the cost of paper versions is higher than photocopying. A 0 score is earned where political parties rarely disclose public donations.	
	51. Political parties regularly disclose private donations and the disclosures are easily available to the public.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) political parties disclose private donations within a one month of received, and 2) they are easily available online or at the cost of photocopy. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) political parties don't always disclose private donations or disclose them more than a month of received, or 2) disclosures are not available online or the cost of paper versions is higher than photocopying. A 0 score is earned where political parties rarely disclose private donations.	
	52. Media organizations (print, broadcast, online) disclose the identities of their owners to the public.	Accountability and transparency	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) major media organizations disclose the names of their owners to the public, and 2) the information is readily available to any citizen (online, on the newspaper, etc.). A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) only some major media organizations disclose the name of their owners or they disclose only some of the owners, or 2) the information is public but obtaining it takes two weeks or more. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) major media organizations don't disclose the names of their owners, or 2) the information is available only to the government.	
	53. Journalists and editors adhere to strict, professional practices in their reporting.	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) major media organizations have a formal document with standards guiding journalistic work (Code of Ethics, Editorial Guidelines, Statement of Principles, Code of Conduct, etc.), 2) the document codifies standards for use of anonymous sources, conflicts of interest, and impartiality, and 3) major media organizations enforce this document. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) some but not all major media organizations have a formal document, 2) the formal document contains only one of the three aspects mentioned in 100 (use of anonymous sources, conflicts of interest, and impartiality), or 3) major media organizations enforce this document but some exceptions exist. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) most major media organizations lack a formal document, 2) the formal document is vague and doesn't provide guidance on use of anonymous sources, conflicts of interest, and impartiality, or 3) major media organizations rarely or never enforce this document.	
	55. There is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) and the government does not promote the media's self-censorship.	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) the government never prevents the publication of information, and 2) the government doesn't promote the media's self-censorship (for ex. with threats, discrimination in the application of tax laws, government advertising, etc.). A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) the government occasionally prevents the publication of information, or 2) it occasionally encourages the media to self-censor (for ex. with threats, discrimination in the application of tax laws, government advertising, etc.). A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) the government usually prevents the publication of information, or 2) it usually encourages the media to self-censor (for ex. with threats, discrimination in the application of tax laws, government advertising, etc.).	
	56. There is no prior government restraint (pre-publication censoring) of citizen-created content online and the government does not promote the self-censorship of citizens online.	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) the government never prevents the publication online of information by citizens, and 2) the government doesn't promote citizen's self-censorship (for ex. with arrests, threats to prosecute, interrogations, etc.). A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) the government occasionally prevents the publication online of information by citizens, or 2) it occasionally encourages citizens to self-censor (for ex. with arrests, threats to prosecute, interrogations, etc.). A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) the government usually prevents the publication online of information by citizens, or 2) it usually encourages citizens to self-censor (for ex. with arrests, threats to prosecute, interrogations, etc.).	
	65. Workers are not restricted from organizing themselves through trade unions.	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) workers organize into trade unions regardless of political ideology, religion or objectives, and 2) trade union organizers have widely understood rights and are free from intimidation or violence.	

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
				A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) there are occasional obstacles to organizing into trade unions, or 2) occasionally trade union organizers' rights are not understood or they are subject to intimidation or violence. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) there are major obstacles to organizing into trade unions, or 2) trade union organizers' rights are generally misunderstood or subject to intimidation or violence.	
	66. Corporations observe labour laws and recognize and uphold human rights.	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) corporations observe labor laws, and 2) recognize and observe human rights. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) occasionally some corporations fail to observe labor laws, or 2) some corporations occasionally fail to recognize and observe human rights. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) corporations rarely observe labor laws, or 2) corporations rarely recognize and observe human rights.	
	67. Citizens are able to associate freely.	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) citizens are able to associate freely with their peers in public, and 2) they are free to express dissent in public settings and participate in civic and political organizations. It scores 100 even if there are prohibitions against blocking public roads as part of public protests. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) occasionally citizens face obstacles to associate freely with their peers in public, or 2) occasionally they face obstacles to freely express dissent in public settings or participate in civic and political organizations. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) citizens can rarely associate freely with their peers in public, or 2) they are rarely free to express dissent in public settings or participate in civic and political organizations.	
	68. The government does not create obstacles for existing non- profit organizations (NGOs) or put in place barriers for establishing new ones.	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) NGOs can organize freely, 2) there are no major obstacles to setting up a new NGO, and 3) NGOs are not required to file more paperwork than other legal persons. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) NGOs occasionally face obstacles to organize freely, 2) occasionally there are major obstacles to setting up a new NGO (for ex. the government gives discretionary permits to some but not all NGOs), or 3) occasionally NGOs have to file more paperwork than other legal persons. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) NGOs can rarely or never organize freely, 2) there generally are major obstacles to setting up a new NGO, or 3) NGOs are usually required to file more paperwork than other legal persons. A 0 score is also earned if NGOs are forbidden by law.	
	69. No NGO employees were killed, imprisoned, interrogated, threatened or physically harmed in the past year.	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where no NGO employees were killed, imprisoned, interrogated, threatened or physically harmed in relation to their work in the last year. A 50 score is earned where NGO employees are occasionally killed, imprisoned, interrogated, threatened or physically harmed in relation to their work in the last year. A 0 score is earned where there were many cases of NGO employees being killed, imprisoned, interrogated, threatened or physically harmed in relation to their work in the last year.	
	70. No NGOs have been shut down or harassed with unwarranted administrative burdens, investigations or sanctions in the past year as retribution for their work.	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) NGOs are not shut down, and 2) NGOs are not harassed by the government with unwarranted administrative burdens, investigations or sanctions as retribution for their work. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) NGOs are occasionally shut down, and/or 2) NGOs are occasionally harassed by the government with unwarranted administrative burdens, investigations or sanctions as retribution for their work. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) NGOs are regularly shut down, and/or 2) NGOs are regularly harassed by the government with unwarranted administrative burdens, investigations or sanctions as retribution for their work.	
	72. The government protects ethnic minorities from discrimination.	Governance and state capacity	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) there is an official mechanism that receives and investigates complaints of ethnic discrimination (whether investigations are undertaken independently or in collaboration with other entities), 2) in the last year, the mechanism has been proactive and implemented programs designed to reduce/ combat ethnic discrimination (such as conducting sensitization campaigns), and 3) the mechanism is accessible to most members of minority ethnic groups.	

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
				<p>A 50 score is earned where where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) the mechanism exists, but it doesn't always investigate complaints of ethnic discrimination,</li> <li>2) it's not always functional, or</li> <li>3) some members of minority groups don't have access to it due to geographic or other limitations.</li> </ol> <p>A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) the mechanism to receive complaints of ethnic discrimination doesn't exist, or</li> <li>2) it exists but doesn't investigate and is generally unresponsive.</li> </ol>	
	74. The government protects citizens from discrimination based on religious beliefs.	Governance and state capacity	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	<p>A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) there is an official mechanism that receives and investigates complaints of religious discrimination (whether investigations are undertaken independently or in collaboration with other entities),</li> <li>2) in the last year, the mechanism has been proactive and implemented programs designed to reduce/ combat religious discrimination (such as conducting sensitization campaigns), and</li> <li>3) the mechanism is accessible to most members of minority religious groups.</li> </ol> <p>A 50 score is earned where where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) the mechanism exists, but it doesn't always investigate complaints of religious discrimination,</li> <li>2) it's not always functional, or</li> <li>3) some members of minority religious groups don't have access to it due to geographic or other limitations.</li> </ol> <p>A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) the mechanism to receive complaints of religious discrimination doesn't exist, or</li> <li>2) it exists but doesn't investigate and is generally unresponsive.</li> </ol>	
	76. The government protects LGBT citizens from discrimination based on sexual orientation.	Governance and state capacity	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	<p>A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) there is an official mechanism that receives and investigates complaints of LGBT discrimination (whether investigations are undertaken independently or in collaboration with other entities),</li> <li>2) in the last year, the mechanism has been proactive and implemented programs designed to reduce/ combat LGBT discrimination (such as conducting sensitization campaigns), and</li> <li>3) the mechanism is accessible to most members of LGBT groups.</li> </ol> <p>A 50 score is earned where where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) the mechanism exists, but it doesn't always investigate complaints of LGBT discrimination,</li> <li>2) it's not always functional, or</li> <li>3) some members of LGBT groups don't have access to it due to geographic or other limitations.</li> </ol> <p>A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) the mechanism to receive complaints of LGBT discrimination doesn't exist, or</li> <li>2) it exists but doesn't investigate and is generally unresponsive.</li> </ol>	
	101. There is a government policy/strategy to increase the socio-economic integration of youth.	Governance and state capacity	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	<p>A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) there is a department or equivalent mandated to ensure the socio-economic integration of youth,</li> <li>2) in the last year it implemented permanent programs to ensure education, employment and/or housing, and</li> <li>3) all or most in this population have access to these programs.</li> </ol> <p>A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) there is a department or equivalent mandated to ensure the socio-economic integration of youth but it also has other priorities,</li> <li>2) in the last year it implemented sporadic programs to ensure education, employment, and/or housing, or</li> <li>3) only some in this population have access to these programs.</li> </ol> <p>A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) there is no department or equivalent mandated to ensure the socio-economic integration of youth, or</li> <li>2) in the last year no programs were implemented to ensure education, employment and housing.</li> </ol>	
	102. There is a government social safety net to assist the elderly.	Governance and state capacity	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	<p>A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) there is a department or equivalent mandated to ensure a social safety net for the elderly,</li> <li>2) in the last year, it implemented permanent programs to ensure health care, housing and other basic needs, and</li> <li>3) all or most in this population have access to these programs.</li> </ol> <p>A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) there is a department or equivalent mandated to ensure a social safety net for the elderly but it also has other priorities,</li> <li>2) in the last year, it implemented sporadic programs to ensure health care, housing and other basic needs, and</li> <li>3) only some in this population have access to these programs.</li> </ol> <p>A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) there is no department or equivalent mandated to ensure a social safety net for the elderly, or</li> <li>2) in the last year, no programs were implemented to ensure health care, housing and other basic needs.</li> </ol>	
	103. There is a government social safety net to assist those who can't work due to a permanent or temporary illness or health condition.	Governance and state capacity	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	<p>A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) there is a department or equivalent mandated to ensure a social safety net for those who can't work due to a permanent or temporary illness or health condition,</li> <li>2) in the last year, it implemented permanent programs to ensure health care, housing and other basic needs, and</li> <li>3) all or most in this population have access to these programs.</li> </ol> <p>A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>1) there is a department or equivalent mandated to ensure a social safety net for those who can't work due to permanent or temporary illnesses or health conditions, but it also has other priorities,</li> <li>2) in the last year, it implemented sporadic programs to ensure health care, housing and other basic needs, or</li> </ol>	

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
				3) only some in this population have access to these programs. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) there is no department or equivalent mandated to ensure a social safety net for those who can't work due to a permanent or temporary illness or health condition, or 2) in the last year, no programs were implemented to ensure health care, housing and other basic needs.	
	104. There is a government social safety net to compensate for unemployment.	Governance and state capacity	0-(25)-50-(75)-100	A 100 score is earned where all the following conditions are met: 1) there is a department or equivalent mandated to ensure a social safety net for the unemployed, 2) in the last year, it implemented permanent programs to ensure health care, housing and other basic needs, and 3) all or most in this population have access to these programs. A 50 score is earned where any of the following conditions apply: 1) there is a department or equivalent mandated to ensure a social safety net for the unemployed, but it also has other priorities, 2) in the last year, it implemented sporadic programs to ensure health care, housing and other basic needs, or 3) only some in this population have access to these programs. A 0 score is earned where at least one of the following conditions apply: 1) there is no department or equivalent mandated to ensure a social safety net for the unemployed, or 2) in the last year, no programs were implemented to ensure health care, housing and other basic needs.	
Bertelsmann Transformation Index	Q1.1 Monopoly on the use of force	State legitimacy and political leadership	1-10 (integer)	1 - There is no state monopoly on the use of force. 4 - The state's monopoly on the use of force is established only in key parts of the country. Large areas of the country are controlled by guerrillas, paramilitaries or clans. 7 - The state's monopoly on the use of force is established nationwide in principle, but it is challenged by guerrillas, mafias or clans in territorial enclaves. 10 - There is no competition with the state's monopoly on the use of force throughout the entire territory.	Data collection based on country reports providing an analysis of the state of transformation and governance in the country and fundamentation for that analysis. Country reports include numerical scores assigned to 49 questions, based on four different response options for each question. These numerical ratings are reviewed and adjusted three times.
	Q1.2 State identity	State legitimacy and political leadership	1-10 (integer)	1 - The legitimacy of the nation-state is questioned fundamentally. Different population groups compete for hegemony and deny citizenship to others. 4 - The legitimacy of the nation-state is frequently challenged. Significant aspects of citizenship are withheld from entire population groups. 7 - The legitimacy of the nation-state is rarely questioned. Some groups are denied full citizenship rights. 10 - The large majority of the population accepts the nation-state as legitimate. All individuals and groups enjoy the right to acquire citizenship without discrimination.	
	Q1.3 No interference of religious dogmas	Voice and freedom of expression/association	1-10 (integer)	1 - The state is theocratic. Religious dogmas define legal order and political institutions. 4 - Secular and religious norms are in conflict about the basic constitution of the state or are forming a hybrid system. 7 - The state is largely secular. However, religious dogmas have considerable influence on legal order and political institutions. 10 - The state is secular. Religious dogmas have no noteworthy influence on legal order or political institutions.	
	Q1.4 Basic administration	Governance and state capacity	1-10 (integer)	1 - The administrative structures of the state are limited to keeping the peace and maintaining law and order. Their territorial scope is very limited, and broad segments of the population are not covered. 4 - The administrative structures of the state are extending beyond maintaining law and order, but their territorial scope and effectivity are limited. 7 - The administrative structures of the state provide most basic public services throughout the country, but their operation is to some extent deficient (lack of resources, corruption, inefficiency). 10 - The state has a differentiated administrative structure throughout the country which provides all basic public services.	
	Q2 Political Participation	Political participation	1-10	1 - 2.49 - Poor; 2.5 - 4.49 - Flawed; 4.5 - 6.49 - Fair; 6.5 - 8.49 - Sound; 8.5 - 10 - Excellent. Combines indicators of free and fair elections, effective power to govern, association/assembly rights, and freedom of expression.	
	Q2.1 Free and fair elections	Political participation	1-10 (integer)	1 - National elections, if held at all, are entirely unfair. 4 - General elections are held, but serious irregularities during voting process and ballot count occur. The rights to vote, campaign and run for office are restricted, and elections have de facto only limited influence over who governs. 7 - General, multi-party elections are held, conducted properly and accepted as the means of filling political posts. However, there are some constraints on the fairness of the elections with regard to registration, campaigning or media access. 10 - There are no constraints on free and fair elections.	
	Q2.2 Effective power to govern	Political participation	1-10 (integer)	1 - Political decision-makers are not elected. Or: Elected bodies have no influence at all. 4 - Democratically elected political representatives have limited power to govern. Strong veto groups are able to undermine fundamental elements of democratic procedures. 7 - Democratically elected political representatives have considerable power to govern. However, individual power groups can set their own domains apart or enforce special-interest policies. 10 - Democratically elected political representatives have the effective power to govern. No individual or group is holding any de facto veto power.	
	Q2.3 Association / assembly rights	Voice and freedom of expression/association	1-10 (integer)	1 - Association and assembly rights are denied. Independent civic groups do not exist or are prohibited. 4 - Association and assembly rights are often subject to interference or government restrictions. Residents and civic groups that do not support the government often cannot exercise these rights. 7 - Association and assembly rights are occasionally subject to interference or government restrictions, but generally there are no outright prohibitions of independent political or civic groups. 10 - Association and assembly rights are guaranteed against interference or government restrictions. Residents and civic groups can fully exercise these rights.	

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
	Q2.4 Freedom of expression	Voice and freedom of expression/association	1-10 (integer)	1 - Freedom of expression is denied. Independent media do not exist or are prohibited. 4 - Freedom of expression is often subject to interference or government restrictions. Distortion and manipulation shape matters of public debate. 7 - Freedom of expression is occasionally subject to interference or government restrictions, but there are generally no incidents of blatant intrusions like outright state censorship or media shutdowns. 10 - Freedom of expression is guaranteed against interference or government restrictions. Individuals, groups and the press can fully exercise these rights.	
	Q3 Rule of Law	Rule of law and judicial independence	1-10	1 - 2.49 - Poor; 2.5 - 4.49 - Flawed; 4.5 - 6.49 - Fair; 6.5 - 8.49 - Sound; 8.5 - 10 - Excellent. Combines indicators of separation of powers, independent judiciary, prosecution of office abuse, and civil rights.	
	Q3.1 Separation of powers	Rule of law and judicial independence	1-10 (integer)	1 - There is no separation of powers, neither de jure nor de facto. 4 - The separation of powers is formally established but weak in practice. One branch, generally the executive, has largely undermined checks and balances. 7 - The separation of powers is in place and functioning. Checks and balances are occasionally subject to interference, but a restoration of balance is sought. 10 - There is a clear separation of powers with mutual checks and balances.	
	Q3.2 Independent judiciary	Rule of law and judicial independence	1-10 (integer)	1 - The judiciary is not independent and not institutionally differentiated. 4 - The independence of the judiciary is heavily impaired by political authorities and high levels of corruption. It is to some extent institutionally differentiated, but severely restricted by functional deficits, insufficient territorial operability and scarce resources. 7 - The judiciary is largely independent, even though occasionally its decisions are subordinated to political authorities or influenced by corruption. It is institutionally differentiated, but partially restricted by insufficient territorial or functional operability. 10 - The judiciary is independent and free both from unconstitutional intervention by other institutions and from corruption. It is institutionally differentiated, and there are mechanisms for judicial review of legislative or executive acts.	
	Q3.3 Prosecution of office abuse	Accountability and transparency	1-10 (integer)	1 - Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption can do so without fear of legal consequences or adverse publicity. 4 - Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption are not adequately prosecuted, but occasionally attract adverse publicity. 7 - Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption generally are prosecuted under established laws and often attract adverse publicity, but occasionally slip through political, legal or procedural loopholes. 10 - Officeholders who break the law and engage in corruption are prosecuted rigorously under established laws and always attract adverse publicity.	
	Q3.4 Civil rights	Governance and state capacity	1-10 (integer)	1 - Civil rights are systematically violated. There are no mechanisms and institutions to protect residents against violations of their rights. 4 - Civil rights are codified by law, but even the most fundamental rights (i.e., to life, liberty and physical integrity) are violated in practice. Mechanisms and institutions to prosecute, punish and redress violations of civil rights are largely ineffective. 7 - Civil rights are codified by law, but are not properly respected and protected. Mechanisms and institutions to prosecute, punish and redress violations of civil rights are in place, but are not consistently effective. 10 - Civil rights are codified by law and respected by all state institutions, which actively prevent discrimination. Residents are effectively protected by mechanisms and institutions established to prosecute, punish and redress violations of their rights.	
	Q4.1 Performance of democratic institutions	State legitimacy and political leadership	1-10 (integer)	1 - There are no democratic institutions as such (authoritarian regime). 4 - Democratic institutions exist, but they are unstable and ineffective. 7 - Democratic institutions perform their functions in principle, but often are inefficient due to friction between institutions. 10 - The ensemble of democratic institutions is effective and efficient. As a rule, political decisions are prepared, made, implemented and reviewed in legitimate procedures by the appropriate authorities.	
	Q4.2 Commitment to democratic institutions	State legitimacy and political leadership	1-10 (integer)	1 - There are no democratic institutions as such (authoritarian regime). 4 - Only individual institutions are accepted, while influential actors hold vetoes. Acceptance remains unstable over time. 7 - Most democratic institutions are accepted as legitimate by most relevant actors. 10 - All democratic institutions are accepted as legitimate by all relevant actors.	
	Q5 Political and Social Integration	Political participation	1-10	1 - 2.49 - Poor; 2.5 - 4.49 - Flawed; 4.5 - 6.49 - Fair; 6.5 - 8.49 - Sound; 8.5 - 10 - Excellent. Combines indicators of party system, interest groups, approval of democracy, and social capital.	
	Q5.1 Party system	Political participation	1-10 (integer)	1 - There is no party system to articulate and aggregate societal interest. 4 - The party system is unstable with shallow roots in society: high fragmentation, high voter volatility and high polarization. 7 - The party system is fairly stable and socially rooted: moderate fragmentation, moderate voter volatility and moderate polarization. 10 - The party system is stable and socially rooted: it is able to articulate and aggregate societal interest with low fragmentation, low voter volatility and low polarization.	
	Q5.2 Interest groups	Political participation	1-10 (integer)	1 - Interest groups are present only in isolated social segments, are on the whole poorly balanced and cooperate little. A large number of social interests remain unrepresented. 4 - There is a narrow range of interest groups, in which important social interests are underrepresented. Only a few players dominate, and there is a risk of polarization. 7 - There is an average range of interest groups, which reflect most social interests. However, a few strong interests dominate, producing a latent risk of pooling conflicts.	

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
				10 - There is a broad range of interest groups that reflect competing social interests, tend to balance one another and are cooperative.	
	Q5.3 Approval of democracy	State legitimacy and political leadership	1-10 (integer)	1 - Approval of democratic norms and procedures is very low. 4 - Approval of democratic norms and procedures is fairly low. 7 - Approval of democratic norms and procedures is fairly high. 10 - Approval of democratic norms and procedures is very high.	
	Q5.4 Social capital	State legitimacy and political leadership	1-10 (integer)	1 - There is a very low level of trust among the population, and civic self-organization is rudimentary. 4 - There is a fairly low level of trust among the population. The small number of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations is unevenly distributed or spontaneous and temporary. 7 - There is a fairly high level of trust among the population and a substantial number of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations. 10 - There is a very high level of trust among the population and a large number of autonomous, self-organized groups, associations and organizations.	
	Q9 Private Property	Rule of law and judicial independence	1-10	1-10; 1 - 2.49 - Poor; 2.5 - 4.49 - Flawed; 4.5 - 6.49 - Fair; 6.5 - 8.49 - Sound; 8.5 - 10 - Excellent. Combines property rights and private enterprise indicators.	
	Q10 Welfare Regime	Governance and state capacity	1-10	1 - 2.49 - Poor; 2.5 - 4.49 - Flawed; 4.5 - 6.49 - Fair; 6.5 - 8.49 - Sound; 8.5 - 10 - Excellent. Combines indicators of social safety nets, and equal opportunity.	
	Q13.1 Structural constraints	Governance and state capacity	1-10 (integer)	1 - The structural constraints on governance are very low. (best) 4 - The structural constraints on governance are fairly low. 7 - The structural constraints on governance are fairly high. 10 - The structural constraints on governance are very high.	
	Q13.2 Civil society traditions	Governance and state capacity	1-10 (integer)	1 - Traditions of civil society are very strong. (best) 4 - Traditions of civil society are fairly strong. 7 - Traditions of civil society are fairly weak. 10 - Traditions of civil society are very weak.	
	Q13.3 Conflict intensity	Political instability and violence, and external relations	1-10 (integer)	1 - There are no violent incidents based on social, ethnic or religious differences. 4 - There are only few violent incidents. Radical political actors have limited success in mobilizing along existing cleavages. Society and the political elite, however, are divided along social, ethnic or religious lines. 7 - There are violent incidents. Mobilized groups and protest movements dominate politics. Society and the political elite are deeply split into social classes, ethnic or religious communities. 10 - There is civil war or a widespread violent conflict based on social, ethnic or religious differences.	
	Q14 Steering Capability	Governance and state capacity	1-10	1 - 2.49 - Poor; 2.5 - 4.49 - Flawed; 4.5 - 6.49 - Fair; 6.5 - 8.49 - Sound; 8.5 - 10 - Excellent. Combines indicators of prioritization, implementation, and policy learning.	
	Q14.1 Prioritization	Governance and state capacity	1-10 (integer)	1 - The government does not set strategic priorities. It relies on ad hoc measures, lacks guiding concepts and reaps the maximum short-term political benefit. 4 - The government claims to be setting strategic priorities, but replaces them regularly with short-term interests of political bargaining and office seeking. Policy measures are rarely prioritized and organized. 7 - The government sets strategic priorities, but sometimes postpones them in favor of short-term political benefits. It shows deficits in prioritizing and organizing its policy measures accordingly. 10 - The government sets strategic priorities and maintains them over extended periods of time. It has the capacity to prioritize and organize its policy measures accordingly.	
	Q14.2 Implementation	Governance and state capacity	1-10 (integer)	1 - The government is not able to implement any of its policies. 4 - The government fails to implement many of its policies. 7 - The government fails to implement some of its policies. 10 - The government is able to implement its policies effectively.	
	Q14.3 Policy learning	Governance and state capacity	1-10 (integer)	1 - The government demonstrates no willingness or ability in policy learning. 4 - The government demonstrates little willingness or ability in policy learning. Policies are rigidly enforced, and the routines of policymaking do not enable innovative approaches. 7 - The government demonstrates a general ability of policy learning, but its flexibility is limited. Learning processes inconsistently affect the routines and the knowledge foundation on which policies are based. 10 - The government demonstrates a pronounced ability of complex learning. It acts flexibly and replaces failed policies with innovative ones.	
	Q15 Resource Efficiency	Governance and state capacity	1-10	1 - 2.49 - Poor; 2.5 - 4.49 - Flawed; 4.5 - 6.49 - Fair; 6.5 - 8.49 - Sound; 8.5 - 10 - Excellent. Combines indicators of efficient use of assets, policy coordination, and anti-corruption policy.	
	Q15.1 Efficient use of assets	Governance and state capacity	1-10 (integer)	1 - The government wastes all available human, financial and organizational resources. 4 - The government makes efficient use of only some of the available human, financial and organizational resources. 7 - The government makes efficient use of most available human, financial and organizational resources. 10 - The government makes efficient use of all available human, financial and organizational resources.	
	Q15.2 Policy coordination	Governance and state capacity	1-10 (integer)	1 - The government fails to coordinate conflicting objectives. Its policies thwart and damage each other. The executive is fragmented into rival fiefdoms that counteract each other. 4 - The government often fails to coordinate between conflicting objectives. Different parts of the government tend to compete among each other, and some policies have counterproductive effects on other policies. 7 - The government tries to coordinate conflicting objectives, but friction, redundancies and gaps in task assignment are	

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
				significant. 10 - The government coordinates conflicting objectives effectively and acts in a coherent manner.	
	Q15.3 Anti-corruption policy	Accountability and transparency	1-10 (integer)	1 - The government fails to contain corruption, and there are no integrity mechanisms in place. 4 - The government is only partly willing and able to contain corruption, while the few integrity mechanisms implemented are mostly ineffective. 7 - The government is often successful in containing corruption. Most integrity mechanisms are in place, but some are functioning only with limited effectiveness. 10 - The government is successful in containing corruption, and all integrity mechanisms are in place and effective.	
	Q16.1 Consensus on goals	State legitimacy and political leadership	1-10 (integer)	1 - There are no major political actors who want to establish democracy or a market economy. 4 - The major political actors are in conflict over both democracy and a market economy as strategic, long-term goals of transformation. Or: any proclaimed consensus on goals is rudimentary, very fragile and likely to be challenged by powerful actors. 7 - The major political actors agree on one of the goals (democracy or market economy) as a strategic, long-term goal of transformation. Or: there is a general consensus on both goals, which is weakened by significant controversy over strategic priorities. 10 - All major political actors agree on establishing or consolidating democracy and a market economy as strategic, long-term goals of transformation.	
	Q16.2 Anti-democratic actors	State legitimacy and political leadership	1-10 (integer)	1 - Reformers have no control over anti-democratic actors. 4 - Reformers have little control over powerful anti-democratic actors, who can use their influence to severely disrupt the reform process. 7 - Reformers cannot completely control all powerful anti-democratic actors, but can limit their influence significantly. 10 - Reformers can successfully exclude or co-opt all actors with anti-democratic interests.	
	Q16.3 Cleavage / conflict management	State legitimacy and political leadership	1-10 (integer)	1 - The political leadership exacerbates existing cleavages for populist or separatist purposes. 4 - The political leadership does not prevent cleavage-based conflicts from escalating. 7 - The political leadership prevents cleavage-based conflicts from escalating. 10 - The political leadership depolarizes cleavage-based conflict and expands consensus across the dividing lines.	
	Q16.4 Civil society participation	State legitimacy and political leadership	1-10 (integer)	1 - The political leadership obstructs civil society participation. It suppresses civil society organizations and excludes its representatives from the policy process. 4 - The political leadership neglects civil society participation. It frequently ignores civil society actors and formulates its policy autonomously. 7 - The political leadership permits civil society participation. It takes into account and accommodates the interests of most civil society actors. 10 - The political leadership actively enables civil society participation. It assigns an important role to civil society actors in deliberating and determining policies.	
	Q16.5 Reconciliation	State legitimacy and political leadership	1-10 (integer)	1 - The political leadership manipulates memories of historical injustices as a weapon against political opponents. 4 - The political leadership does not address historical acts of injustice and does not initiate a process of reconciliation. 7 - The political leadership recognizes the need to deal with historical acts of injustice, but its attempts for reconciliation encounter difficulties. 10 - The political leadership achieves reconciliation between the victims and the perpetrators of past injustices.	
	Q17 International Cooperation	Political instability and violence, and external relations	1-10	1 - 2.49 - Poor; 2.5 - 4.49 - Flawed; 4.5 - 6.49 - Fair; 6.5 - 8.49 - Sound; 8.5 - 10 - Excellent. Combines indicators of effective use of support, credibility, and regional cooperation.	
	Q17.1 Effective use of support	Political instability and violence, and external relations	1-10 (integer)	1 - The political leadership either uses international assistance for rent-seeking or considers any form of international cooperation as undesired political interference. There is no viable long-term development strategy. 4 - The political leadership uses international assistance for short-term expediences and fails to devise a consistent long-term strategy. 7 - The political leadership uses international assistance for its own development agenda, but falters in devising a consistent long-term strategy capable of integrating this support effectively. 10 - The political leadership makes well-focused use of international assistance in order to implement its long-term strategy of development.	
	Q17.2 Credibility	Political instability and violence, and external relations	1-10 (integer)	1 - The government repeatedly acts unreliably, and cooperating with the state entails major risks. The government does not contribute (and often undermines) international cooperation efforts. 4 - The government rarely acts as a credible and reliable partner. It shows little engagement in international cooperation efforts. 7 - For the most part, the government acts as a credible and reliable partner. It shows notable engagement in international cooperation efforts. 10 - The government acts as a credible and reliable partner. It frequently demonstrates initiative in advancing international cooperation efforts and actively contributes to them.	
	Q17.3 Regional cooperation	Political instability and violence, and external relations	1-10 (integer)	1 - The political leadership is uncooperative. It does not seek to build relations with neighbors and obstructs regional or international organizations. 4 - The political leadership cooperates selectively or sporadically with individual neighboring states and is reluctant to accept the rules set by regional and international organizations. 7 - The political leadership cooperates with many neighboring states and complies with the rules set by regional and international organizations.	



Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
				10 - The political leadership actively and successfully builds and expands cooperative neighborly and international relationships. It promotes regional and international integration.	
UN e-Government Knowledgebase	E-Government Development Index value	Governance and state capacity	0 to 1	The E-Government Development Index (EGDI) is a weighted average of normalised scores on the three most important dimensions of e-government, namely: scope and quality of online services (Online Service Index, OSI), status of the development of telecommunication infrastructure (Telecommunication Infrastructure Index, TII) and inherent human capital (Human Capital Index, HCI).	International Telecommunication Union, UNDP, UNESCO, Data collected on online service index.
Freedom in the World (Freedom House)	A1. Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?	Political participation	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Was the current head of government or other chief national authority elected through free and fair elections?' and underlying questions.	Data produced each year by a team of in-house and external analysts and expert advisers from the academic, think tank, and human rights communities. They use a broad range of sources, including news articles, academic analyses, reports from nongovernmental organizations, individual professional contacts, and on-the-ground research, and score countries and territories based on the conditions and events within their borders during the coverage period. These proposed scores are discussed and defended at a series of review meetings and the end product represents the consensus of the analysts, outside advisers, and Freedom House staff, who are responsible for any final decisions.
	A2. Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?	Political participation	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Were the current national legislative representatives elected through free and fair elections?' and underlying questions.	
	A3. Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies?	Political participation	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Are the electoral laws and framework fair, and are they implemented impartially by the relevant election management bodies?' and underlying questions.	
	B1. Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?	Political participation	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Do the people have the right to organize in different political parties or other competitive political groupings of their choice, and is the system free of undue obstacles to the rise and fall of these competing parties or groupings?' and underlying questions.	
	B2. Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?	Political participation	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Is there a realistic opportunity for the opposition to increase its support or gain power through elections?' and underlying questions.	
	B3. Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means?	Political participation	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Are the people's political choices free from domination by forces that are external to the political sphere, or by political forces that employ extrapolitical means?' and underlying questions.	
	B4. Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT +, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?	Political participation	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Do various segments of the population (including ethnic, racial, religious, gender, LGBT +, and other relevant groups) have full political rights and electoral opportunities?' and underlying questions.	
	C2. Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?	Accountability and transparency	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Are safeguards against official corruption strong and effective?' and underlying questions.	
	C3. Does the government operate with openness and transparency?	Accountability and transparency	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Does the government operate with openness and transparency?' and underlying questions.	
	D1. Are there free and independent media?	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Are there free and independent media?' and underlying questions.	
	D2. Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Are individuals free to practice and express their religious faith or nonbelief in public and private?' and underlying questions.	
	D3. Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination?	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Is there academic freedom, and is the educational system free from extensive political indoctrination?' and underlying questions.	
	D4. Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Are individuals free to express their personal views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution?' and underlying questions.	

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
	without fear of surveillance or retribution?				
	E1. Is there freedom of assembly?	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Is there freedom of assembly?' and underlying questions.	
	E2. Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations, particularly those that are engaged in human rights- and governance-related work?	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Is there freedom for nongovernmental organizations, particularly those that are engaged in human rights- and governance-related work?' and underlying questions.	
	E3. Is there freedom for trade unions and similar professional or labor organizations?	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Is there freedom for trade unions and similar professional or labor organizations?' and underlying questions.	
	F1. Is there an independent judiciary?	Rule of law and judicial independence	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Is there an independent judiciary?' and underlying questions.	
	F2. Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?	Rule of law and judicial independence	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Does due process prevail in civil and criminal matters?' and underlying questions.	
	F3. Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?	State legitimacy and political leadership	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Is there protection from the illegitimate use of physical force and freedom from war and insurgencies?' and underlying questions.	
	F4. Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?	Governance and state capacity	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Do laws, policies, and practices guarantee equal treatment of various segments of the population?' and underlying questions.	
	G2. Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors?	Rule of law and judicial independence	0 (smallest degree of freedom) to 4 (greatest degree of freedom)	Score to the question 'Are individuals able to exercise the right to own property and establish private businesses without undue interference from state or nonstate actors?' and underlying questions.	
Economic freedom in the World	Property Rights	Rule of law and judicial independence	0 to 100 (best)	The property rights component assesses the extent to which a country's legal framework allows individuals to acquire, hold, and utilize private property and the extent to which these rights are secured by applicable laws that the government enforces effectively. Relying on a mix of survey data and independent assessments, it provides a quantifiable measure of the degree to which a country's laws protect private property rights and the extent to which those laws are respected. It also assesses the level of state expropriation of private property. The more effective the legal protection of property is, the higher a country's score will be. Similarly, the greater the chances of government expropriation of property are, the lower a country's score will be. The score for this component is derived by averaging scores for three equally weighted sub-factors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Risk of expropriation;</li> <li>• Respect for intellectual property rights; and</li> <li>• Quality of contract enforcement, property rights, and law enforcement.</li> </ul>	Credendo, Country Risk and Insights; U.S. Chamber of Commerce, Global Innovation Policy; World Bank, WGI
	Judicial Effectiveness	Rule of law and judicial independence	0 to 100 (best)	Properly functioning legal frameworks are essential for protecting the rights of all citizens against unlawful acts by others, including governments and powerful private parties. Judicial effectiveness requires efficient and fair judicial systems to ensure that laws are fully respected and appropriate legal actions are taken against violations. The score for the judicial effectiveness component is derived by averaging scores for three equally weighted sub-factors: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Judicial independence,</li> <li>• Quality of the judicial process, and</li> <li>• Perceptions of the quality of public services and the independence of the civil service.</li> </ul>	Freedom in the World; World Bank, WGI
	Government Integrity	Accountability and transparency	0 to 100 (best)	Corruption erodes economic freedom by introducing insecurity and coercion into economic relations. Of greatest concern is the systemic corruption of government institutions and decision-making by such practices as bribery, extortion, nepotism, cronyism, patronage, embezzlement, and graft. The lack of government integrity that such practices cause reduces public trust and economic vitality by increasing the costs of economic activity. The score for this component is derived by averaging scores for three equally weighted sub-factors: Perceptions of corruption; Bribery risk, and Control of corruption including "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.	Transparency International; Trace International; World Bank, WGI
Political Terror Scale	PTS Amnesty International	Political instability and violence, and external relations	5-point scale	Higher scores indicate higher levels of abuse, political terror, or physical integrity rights violations than lower scores. 'NAs' imply missing values.	PTS-scores based on information contained in Amnesty International's annual human rights reports.
	PTS Human Rights Watch	Political instability and violence, and external relations	5-point scale	Higher scores indicate higher levels of abuse, political terror, or physical integrity rights violations than lower scores. 'NAs' imply missing values.	PTS-scores based on information contained in annual human rights reports published by Human Rights Watch.

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
	PTS State Department	Political instability and violence, and external relations	5-point scale	Higher scores indicate higher levels of abuse, political terror, or physical integrity rights violations than lower scores. 'NAs' imply missing values.	PTS-scores based on information contained in the annual human rights reports produced by the US Department of State.
Global Peace Index	Ongoing domestic and international conflict	Political instability and violence, and external relations	1-5 (worse)	Composite indicator of number and duration of internal conflicts; number of deaths from external organised conflict; number of deaths from internal organised conflict; number, duration and role in external conflicts; intensity of organised internal conflict; relations with neighbouring countries.	IEP; UCDP Battle-Related Deaths Dataset, Non-State Conflict Dataset and One-sided Violence Dataset; UCDP Georeferenced Event Dataset; Economist Intelligence Unit.
	Safety and security	Political instability and violence, and external relations	1-5 (worse)	Composite indicator of level of perceived criminality in society; number of refugees and internally displaced people as a percentage of the population; political instability; Political Terror Scale; impact of terrorism; number of homicides per 100,000 people; level of violent crime; violent demonstrations; number of jailed population per 100,000 people; number of internal security officers and police per 100,000 people; ease of access to small arms and light weapons.	Gallup World Poll; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; Economist Intelligence Unit; PTS; GTI; UNODC Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems; ACLED; Institute for Criminal Policy Research at Birkbeck, University of London, World Prison Brief.
ICRG	ICRG Indicator of Quality of Government		0-1 (higher quality)	(from QoG) Mean of corruption, law and order and bureaucracy quality.	Information not available from the PRS website.
Voter Turnout Database (IDEA)	Voter turnout (parliamentary)	Political participation	0-100	The total vote (the actual number of people who voted in an election as reported by the national EMB, including invalid and blank votes) divided by the number of registered voters (the number of people who were registered for to vote in an election as reported by the national EMB) and presented in percentage terms.	Based on data gathered from desk research by International IDEA staff; surveys of electoral management bodies (EMBs); and the publications Voter Turnout since 1945 (López Pintor and Gratschew 2002) and Voter Turnout in Western Europe since 1945 (International IDEA 2004). The primary sources for the data on voter registration, total vote and corresponding voter turnout are the national EMBs and national statistical bureaus of countries listed in the Database. Data from EMBs are obtained from either their official reports or information provided in their official web portals. In a small number of cases, when data are not available from the EMB, the information on voter turnout is obtained from secondary sources. Population data are obtained from secondary sources.
	Voter turnout (presidential)	Political participation	0-100	The total vote (the actual number of people who voted in an election as reported by the national EMB, including invalid and blank votes) divided by the number of registered voters (the number of people who were registered for to vote in an election as reported by the national EMB) and presented in percentage terms.	
Ibrahim Index of African Governance	Security and Safety	Political instability and violence, and external relations	0 to 100 (best score); relative score	Combined score of absence of armed conflict; absence of violence against civilians; absence of forced migration; absence of human trafficking and forced labour; absence of crime.	Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project; Uppsala Conflict Data Program; Political Terror Scale; Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre; United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; ENACT Africa; V-Dem; World Health Organization
	Rule of Law and Justice	Rule of law and judicial independence	0 to 100 (best score); relative score	Combined score of indicators for Executive Compliance with the Rule of Law; Impartiality of the Judicial System; Judicial Processes; Equality before the Law; Law Enforcement; Property Rights.	V-Dem; World Justice Project; African Institute for Development Policy; Global Integrity; Freedom House; World Economic Forum; Bertelsmann Stiftung
	Accountability and Transparency	Accountability and transparency	0 to 100 (best score); relative score	Combined score of Institutional checks and balances; absence of undue influence on Government; civic checks and balances; disclosure of public records; accessibility of public records.	Bertelsmann Stiftung; V-Dem; World Justice Project; Freedom House; African Institute for Development Policy; Global Integrity; International Budget Partnership
	Anti-Corruption	Accountability and transparency	0 to 100 (best score); relative score	Combined score of anti-corruption mechanisms; absence of corruption in state institutions; absence of corruption in the public sector; public procurement procedures; absence of corruption in the private sector.	African Institute for Development Policy; Global Integrity; Bertelsmann Stiftung; V-Dem; World Justice Project; World Economic Forum; World Bank
	Participation	Political participation	0 to 100 (best score); relative score	Combined score of freedom of association and assembly, political pluralism, civil society and space, and democratic elections.	African Institute for Development Policy; Global Integrity; Freedom House; V-Dem; Ghana Center for Democratic Development
	Rights	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0 to 100 (best score); relative score	Combined score of personal liberties, freedom of expression and belief, media freedom, digital rights and protection against discrimination	Freedom House; V-Dem; World Justice Project; African Institute for Development Policy; Global Integrity; Reporters Without Borders; Digital Society Project
	Inclusion and Equality	Governance and state capacity	0 to 100 (best score); relative score	Combined score of equal political power; equal political representation; equal civil liberties; equal socioeconomic opportunity; and equal access to public services.	V-Dem; Freedom House; Inter-Parliamentary Union; African Institute for Development Policy; Global Integrity
	Women's Equality	Governance and state capacity	0 to 100 (best score); relative score	Combined score of political power and representation of women; equal rights and civil liberties for women; socioeconomic opportunity for women; equal access to public services for women; laws on violence against women.	African Institute for Development Policy; Global Integrity; Inter-Parliamentary Union; V-Dem; World Bank

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
	Public Administration	Governance and state capacity	0 to 100 (best score); relative score	Combined score of civil registration; capacity of the statistical system; tax and revenue mobilisation; budgetary and financial management; effective administration.	African Institute for Development Policy; Global Integrity; Open Data Watch; V-Dem; World Bank; African Development Bank; United Nations University - World Institute for Development Economics Research; World Bank
	Business and Labour Environment	Governance and state capacity	0 to 100 (best score); relative score	Combined score of regional integration; economic diversification; business and competition regulations; access to banking services; labour relations; secure employment opportunities.	African Development Bank; African Union Commission; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; Observatory for Economic Complexity; Bertelsmann Stiftung; World Bank; Global System for Mobile Communications; International Monetary Fund; World Economic Forum; International Labour Organization
	Infrastructure	Governance and state capacity	0 to 100 (best score); relative score	Combined score of transport network; access to energy; mobile communications; internet and computers; and shipping and postal network.	African Development Bank; World Economic Forum; World Bank; World Health Organization; Inter-Parliamentary Union; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; Universal Postal Union
	Rural Economy	Governance and state capacity	0 to 100 (best score); relative score	Combined score of rural land and water access; rural market access; rural economy support; rural representation and participation.	International Fund for Agricultural Development
	Index of Human Development	Governance and state capacity	0 to 100 (best score); relative score	Combined score of health; education; social protection and welfare; sustainable environment.	V-Dem; World Health Organization; United Nations Children's Fund; Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation; United Nations Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation; United Nations Maternal Mortality Estimation Inter-agency Group; United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs; United Nations Children's Fund; World Bank; United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; Bertelsmann Stiftung; World Economic Forum; African Institute for Development Policy; Global Integrity; African Development Bank; Fund for Peace; World Inequality Database; Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa; United Nations Human Settlements Programme; Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; World Justice Project; Health Effects Institute; Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation; World Resources Institute; ENACT Africa; Yale Center for Environmental Law & Policy; Center for International Earth Science Information Network Earth Institute, Columbia University
National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA)	3. Was opposition allowed?	Political participation	yes/no	This variable indicates whether at least one opposition political party existed to contest the election. Some countries have multiple government parties but no opposition political party. An opposition party is one that is not in the government, meaning it is not affiliated with the incumbent party in power. Note that if No is coded, other opposition questions (nelda13, nelda14, and nelda15) may be coded as "N/A." If there are no political parties, the answer is always "no" with the possible exception of countries in which parties do not exist but there are well defined groups of candidates that are distinguishable as affiliated with the government and opposition.	Different primary sources (selection listed on the website).
	11. Before elections, are there significant concerns that elections will not be free and fair?	Political participation	yes/no	A "Yes" indicates that there was evidence of domestic or international concern that the election process was not going to be free or fair. A "Yes" is also coded when the elections were widely perceived to lack basic criteria for competitive elections, such as more than one political party.	
	13. Were opposition leaders prevented from running?	Political participation	yes/no	A "Yes" was coded when at least some opposition leaders were prevented from running and contesting the elections. A decision to boycott the election was coded "Yes" here only if it was in response to the government preventing opposition figures from running. Cases where opposition was not allowed were also coded as "yes." Note that this question is similar to nelda3 (was opposition allowed?), but is distinct in that it should be coded as "Yes" if any specific opposition party candidates are explicitly prevented from running. If nelda3 is coded "No" this question is coded "N/A." If nelda3 is "Yes" then this question is coded on a "Yes"/"No" basis.	
	14. Did some opposition leaders boycott the election?	Political participation	yes/no	If at least some opposition leaders announced and carried out a public boycott of the election, a "Yes" was coded. If not, a "No" was coded. A boycott implies an overt decision by a political party not to contest the election. Typically, these leaders also encourage their supporters to boycott the election by not voting. If opposition was banned, or if there was no opposition, (if nelda3 is "No") then an "N/A" was coded.	

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
	16. In the run-up to the election, were there allegations of media bias in favour of the incumbent?	Political participation	yes/no	If there were reports by either domestic or outside actors of media bias in favor of the incumbent or ruling party, it is coded as a "yes." In cases where the media is totally controlled by the government, and/or no opposition is allowed, the answer is "yes." It is possible that the answer is "No" even if the political system is tightly controlled.	
	29. Were there riots and protests after the election?	Political participation	yes/no	If so, a "Yes" is coded. The riots and protests should at least somewhat be related to the handling or outcome of the election.	
	30. If there were riots and protests after the election, did they involve allegations of vote fraud?	Political participation	yes/no	Question 30 was coded as "Yes" if the riots or protests are backed with allegations of vote fraud. If there are no allegations of vote fraud fueling the riots or protests, a "No" was coded. If question 29 is coded "no," "N/A" was coded here. For multiround elections, this question should be coded only for the outcome of the election round.	
	47. If Western monitors were present, were there allegations by Western monitors of significant vote-fraud?	Political participation	yes/no	If there were no Western monitors, or no international monitors, "N/A" was coded. If there were Western monitors present and there were allegations of significant vote-fraud by any Western monitors, then "Yes" was coded. If there were no allegations of fraud, "No" was coded. The word "fraud" is not required. Other forms of electoral malpractice like vote-buying are considered forms of fraud for the purposes of this question, as are any allegations of significant manipulation that undermine the credibility of the electoral process. International monitors sometimes use diplomatic language to describe their concerns, so sharp outright criticism may not be necessary for a "Yes" to be coded here. Language expressing serious concerns about the credibility of the process or describing a process that failed to meet international standards should lead to a "Yes" being coded.	
World Press Freedom Index	Media freedom (2013-2021)	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0-100 (best score)	Press freedom is defined as the ability of journalists as individuals and collectives to select, produce, and disseminate news in the public interest independent of political, economic, legal, and social interference and in the absence of threats to their physical and mental safety. [85 ; 100 points]: Good situation; [75 ; 85 points]: Satisfactory situation; [65 ; 75 points]: Problematic situation; [45 ; 65 points]: Difficult situation; [0 ; 45 points]: Very serious situation.	Combined qualitative data (pooling responses of experts to a questionnaire devised by RSF) with quantitative data on abuses and acts of violence against journalists during the period evaluated.
	Media freedom (2022-2023)	Voice and freedom of expression/association	0-100 (best score)	Press freedom is defined as the ability of journalists as individuals and collectives to select, produce, and disseminate news in the public interest independent of political, economic, legal, and social interference and in the absence of threats to their physical and mental safety. [85 - 100 points]: Good; [70 - 85 points]: Satisfactory; [55 - 70 points]: Problematic; [40 - 55 points]: Difficult; [0 - 40 points]: Very serious.	This score is calculated on the basis of two components: 1) quantitative tally of abuses against journalists in connection with their work, and against media outlets; 2) qualitative analysis of the situation in each country or territory based on the responses of press freedom specialists (including journalists, researchers, academics and human rights defenders) to an RSF questionnaire.
Corruption Perceptions Index (Transparency International)	Corruption Perceptions Index	Accountability and transparency	0-100 (lowest level of perceived corruption)	The methodology follows four basic steps: selection of source data, rescaling source data, aggregating the rescaled data and then reporting a measure for uncertainty.	African Development Bank CPIA; Bertelsmann Stiftung; Economist Intelligence Unit; Freedom House; Global Insight Country Risk Ratings; IMD World Competitiveness Center; Political and Economic Risk Consultancy Asian Intelligence; ICRG; World Bank CPIA; World Economic Forum; World Justice Project; V-Dem
UCDP Dyadic Dataset (UCDP/PRIO)	Unique identifier of dyad	Political instability and violence, and external relations	identifier	UCDP defines state-based armed conflict as: "a contested incompatibility that concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths in a calendar year."	Data collected by the UCDP Dyadic Dataset authors.
	Side B of the conflict	Political instability and violence, and external relations	string	Identifying the opposition actor or country of side B in the dyad. In an intrastate conflict, this includes a military opposition organization. Note that this is a primary party to the conflict.	
	Reason for incompatibility	Political instability and violence, and external relations	string	Incompatibility concerning government: Incompatibility concerning type of political system, the replacement of the central government, or the change of its composition. Incompatibility concerning territory: Incompatibility concerning the status of a territory, e.g. the change of the state in control of a certain territory (interstate conflict), secession or autonomy (intrastate conflict).	
	Level of intensity	Political instability and violence, and external relations	string	Minor: between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year. War: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year.	
	Type of conflict	Political instability and violence, and external relations	string	Extrasystemic (between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory, where the government side is fighting to retain control of a territory outside the state system). Interstate (both sides are states in the Gleditsch and Ward membership system). Intrastate (side A is always a government; side B is always a rebel group; there is no involvement of foreign governments with troops, i.e. there is no side_a_2nd or side_b_2nd coded). Internationalized intrastate (side A is always a government; side B is always a rebel group; there is involvement of foreign governments with troops, i.e. there is at least ONE side_a_2nd or side_b_2nd coded).	
V-Dem	Electoral democracy index	Political participation	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	To what extent is the ideal of electoral democracy in its fullest sense achieved? The electoral principle of democracy seeks to embody the core value of making rulers responsive to citizens, achieved through electoral competition for the electorate's approval under circumstances when suffrage is extensive; political and civil society organizations can operate freely; elections are clean and not marred by fraud or systematic irregularities; and elections affect the composition of the chief executive of the country. In between elections, there is freedom of expression and an independent media capable of presenting alternative views on matters of political relevance. In the V-Dem conceptual scheme, electoral democracy is understood as an essential element of any other conception of representative democracy — liberal, participatory, deliberative, egalitarian, or some other. The index is formed by taking the average of, on the one hand, the weighted average	Composed of other variables that are coded by different types of agents, which are based on extant sources and factual in nature or based on country expertise.

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
				of the indices measuring freedom of association thick, clean elections, freedom of expression, elected officials, and suffrage and, on the other, the five-way multiplicative interaction between those indices.	
	Freedom of Expression and Alternative Sources of Information index	Voice and freedom of expression/association	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	To what extent does government respect press and media freedom, the freedom of ordinary people to discuss political matters at home and in the public sphere, as well as the freedom of academic and cultural expression? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for media censorship effort, harassment of journalists, media bias, media self-censorship, print/broadcast media critical, and print/broadcast media perspectives, freedom of discussion for men/women, and freedom of academic and cultural expression.	
	Freedom of association thick index	Voice and freedom of expression/association	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	To what extent are parties, including opposition parties, allowed to form and to participate in elections, and to what extent are civil society organizations able to form and to operate freely? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for party ban, barriers to parties, opposition parties autonomy, elections multiparty, CSO entry and exit and CSO repression.	
	Share of population with suffrage	Political participation	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	Share of adult citizens as defined by statute who have the legal right to vote in national elections. It covers legal de jure restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice de facto. Universal suffrage is coded as 100%.	
	Clean elections index	Political participation	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	Free and fair connotes an absence of registration fraud, systematic irregularities, government intimidation of the opposition, vote buying, and election violence. The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for EMB autonomy, EMB capacity, election voter registry, election vote buying, election other voting irregularities, election government intimidation, non-state electoral violence, and election free and fair.	
	Liberal component index	Rule of law and judicial independence	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	The liberal principle of democracy emphasizes the importance of protecting individual and minority rights against the tyranny of the state and the tyranny of the majority. The liberal model takes a "negative" view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. This is achieved by constitutionally protected civil liberties, strong rule of law, an independent judiciary, and effective checks and balances that, together, limit the exercise of executive power. Average of the indices for equality before the law and individual liberties, judicial constraints on the executive, and legislative constraints on the executive.	
	Judicial constraints on the executive index	Rule of law and judicial independence	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	To what extent does the executive respect the constitution and comply with court rulings, and to what extent is the judiciary able to act in an independent fashion? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for executive respects constitution, compliance with judiciary, compliance with high court, high court independence, and lower court independence.	
	Legislative constraints on the executive index	Rule of law and judicial independence	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	To what extent are the legislature and government agencies e.g., comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman capable of questioning, investigating, and exercising oversight over the executive? The index is formed by taking the point estimates from a Bayesian factor analysis model of the indicators for legislature questions officials in practice, executive oversight, legislature investigates in practice, and legislature opposition parties.	
	Participatory component index	Political participation	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	The participatory principle of democracy emphasizes active participation by citizens in all political processes, electoral and non-electoral. It is motivated by uneasiness about a bedrock practice of electoral democracy: delegating authority to representatives. Thus, direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. This model of democracy thus takes suffrage for granted, emphasizing engagement in civil society organizations, direct democracy, and subnational elected bodies. This index is formed by averaging the following indices: civil society participation, elected local government power or elected regional government power — whichever has higher score — and direct popular vote.	
	Deliberative component index	Political participation	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	The deliberative principle of democracy focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. According to this principle, democracy requires more than an aggregation of existing preferences. There should also be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. To measure these features of a polity we try to determine the extent to which political elites give public justifications for their positions on matters of public policy, justify their positions in terms of the public good, acknowledge and respect counter-arguments; and how wide the range of consultation is at elite levels. The index is formed by point estimates drawn from a Bayesian factor analysis model including the following indicators: reasoned justification, common good justification, respect for counterarguments, range of consultation, and engaged society.	
	Egalitarian component index	Governance and state capacity	Interval, from low to high (0-1).	The egalitarian principle of democracy holds that material and immaterial inequalities inhibit the exercise of formal rights and liberties, and diminish the ability of citizens from all social groups to participate. Egalitarian democracy is achieved when 1 rights and freedoms of individuals are protected equally across all social groups; 2 resources are distributed equally across all social groups; and 3 access to power is equally distributed by gender, socioeconomic class and social group. This index is formed by averaging the following indices: equal protection index, equal access index and equal distribution of resources.	
Global Terrorism Index	global terrorism index	Political instability and violence, and external relations	0-10	The GTI therefore defines terrorism as "the systematic threat or use of violence, by non-state actors, whether for or in opposition to established authority, with the intention of communicating a political, religious or ideological message to a group larger than the victim group, by generating fear and so altering (or attempting to alter) the behaviour of the larger group." Log transformed weighted average of total number of incidents, total number of fatalities, total number of injuries and total number of hostages.	The GTI is based on data from Dragonfly's TerrorismTracker database.
Worldwide Governance Indicators	Voice and Accountability, Estimate	Voice and freedom of expression/association	Estimate of governance in standard normal units ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance.	Voice and accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.	Economist Intelligence Unit; Freedom House; Gallup World Poll; Institutional Profiles Database; ICRG; Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom Index; V-Dem

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism, Estimate	Political instability and violence, and external relations	Estimate of governance in standard normal units ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance.	Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism measures perceptions of the likelihood of political instability and/or politically motivated violence, including terrorism.	Economist Intelligence Unit; Cingranelli Richards Human Rights Database and Political Terror Scale; iJET Country Security Risk Ratings; Institutional Profiles Database; ICRG; IHS Markit World Economic Service
	Government Effectiveness, Estimate	Governance and state capacity	Estimate of governance in standard normal units ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance.	Government effectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.	Economist Intelligence Unit; World Economic Forum; Gallup World Poll; Institutional Profiles Database; ICRG; IHS Markit World Economic Service
	Regulatory Quality, Estimate	Rule of law and judicial independence	Estimate of governance in standard normal units ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance.	Regulatory quality captures perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.	Economist Intelligence Unit; World Economic Forum; Heritage Foundation; Institutional Profiles Database; ICRG; IHS Markit World Economic Service; Other non-representative sources
	Rule of Law, Estimate	Rule of law and judicial independence	Estimate of governance in standard normal units ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance.	Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.	Economist Intelligence Unit; World Economic Forum; Gallup World Poll; Institutional Profiles Database; ICRG; US State Department Trafficking in People Report; V-Dem; IHS Markit World Economic Service; Other non-representative sources.
	Control of Corruption, Estimate	Accountability and transparency	Estimate of governance in standard normal units ranging from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance.	Control of corruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.	Economist Intelligence Unit; World Economic Forum; Gallup World Poll; Institutional Profiles Database; ICRG; V-Dem; IHS Markit World Economic Service.
World Development Indicators	CPIA efficiency of revenue mobilization rating	Governance and state capacity	1 (low) to 6 (high)	Efficiency of revenue mobilization assesses the overall pattern of revenue mobilization--not only the de facto tax structure, but also revenue from all sources as actually collected. This criterion assesses the overall pattern of revenue mobilization, not only the tax structure as it exists on paper, but revenue from all sources as they are actually collected. Separate sub-ratings should be provided for: (a) tax policy; and (b) tax administration. For the overall rating, these two dimensions should receive equal weighting.	All criteria within each cluster receive equal weight. The scores depend on the level of performance in a given year assessed against the criteria, rather than on changes in performance compared with the previous year. In assessing country performance, World Bank staff evaluate the country's performance on each of the criteria and assign a rating, based on a detailed description of each rating level. The ratings reflect a variety of indicators, observations, and judgments based on country knowledge and on relevant publicly available indicators. To ensure that scores are consistent across countries, the process involves two key phases. In the benchmarking phase a small representative sample of countries drawn from all regions is rated. Country teams prepare proposals that are reviewed first at the regional level and then in a Bankwide review process. A similar process is followed to assess the performance of the remaining countries, using the benchmark countries' scores as guideposts. The final ratings are determined following a Bankwide review.
	CPIA quality of public administration rating	Governance and state capacity	1 (low) to 6 (high)	Quality of public administration assesses the extent to which civilian central government staff is structured to design and implement government policy and deliver services effectively. This criterion covers the core administration defined as the civilian central government (and subnational governments, to the extent that their size or policy responsibilities are significant) excluding health and education personnel, and police. The criterion assesses the functioning of the core administration in three areas: (a) managing its own operations; (b) ensuring quality in policy implementation and regulatory management; and (c) coordinating the larger public sector Human Resources Management regime outside the core administration (de-concentrated and arms-length bodies and subsidiary governments).	
	CPIA social protection rating	Governance and state capacity	1 (low) to 6 (high)	Social protection and labor assess government policies in social protection and labor market regulations that reduce the risk of becoming poor, assist those who are poor to better manage further risks, and ensure a minimal level of welfare to all people. The criterion assesses social protection (SP) and labor policies, namely those engaged in risk prevention by supporting savings and risk pooling through social insurance, protection against destitution through redistributive safety net programs and promotion of human capital development and income generation, including labor market programs. It also assesses the functioning of an SP system, including its effectiveness in a crisis and in providing arrangements and incentives to help beneficiaries to move from protection, to promotion and prevention, including through interactions with private, informal means of SP. The criterion covers: (a) the overall SP system; (b) social safety net programs; (c) labor markets programs and policies, namely those aiming to promote employment creation and productivity growth while protecting core labor standards and ensuring adequate working conditions; (d) local service delivery and civil society participation in community development programs; and (e) pension and old age savings programs.	
	CPIA transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector rating	Accountability and transparency	1 (low) to 6 (high)	Transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector assess the extent to which the executive can be held accountable for its use of funds and for the results of its actions by the electorate and by the legislature and judiciary, and the extent to which public employees within the executive are required to account for administrative decisions, use of resources, and results obtained. The three main dimensions assessed here are the accountability of the executive to oversight institutions and of public employees for their performance, access of civil society to information on public affairs, and state capture by narrow vested interests.	

Database /Institution	Indicator	Topic	Range	Description	Data sources
	CPIA property rights and rule-based governance rating	Rule of law and judicial independence	1 (low) to 6 (high)	Property rights and rule-based governance assess the extent to which private economic activity is facilitated by an effective legal system and rule-based governance structure in which property and contract rights are reliably respected and enforced.	
Fraser Institute Economic Freedom of the World	2A Judicial independence	Rule of law and judicial independence	0-10	Average of variables related to judicial independence from the three data sources.	World Economic Forum; V-Dem; Staton et al. (2019)
	2B Impartial courts	Rule of law and judicial independence	0-10	Average of variables related to judicial independence from the three data sources.	World Economic Forum; Worldwide Governance Indicators; V-Dem.
	2C Property rights	Rule of law and judicial independence	0-10	Average of variables related to judicial independence from the two data sources.	World Economic Forum; World Bank (CPIA)
	2D Military interference	Rule of law and judicial independence	0-10	Military in Politics: "A measure of the military's involvement in politics. Since the military is not elected, involvement, even at a peripheral level, diminishes democratic accountability. Military involvement might stem from an external or internal threat, be symptomatic of underlying difficulties, or be a fullscale military takeover. Over the long term, a system of military government will almost certainly diminish effective governmental functioning, become corrupt, and create an uneasy environment for foreign businesses".	ICGR
	2E Legal integrity	Rule of law and judicial independence	0-10	Average of variables related to judicial independence from the two data sources.	ICRG; V-Dem
	2F Contracts	Rule of law and judicial independence	0-10	Average of variables related to judicial independence from the two data sources.	World Bank; Business Environment Risk Intelligence


Note: most of the descriptions are very close to the information provided in the original sources. The reader should refer to individual databases for further information and complete references for their underlying data sources, mentioned in the final column of the table.

Source: author's compilation based on information gathered from websites and codebooks of the different databases—Global Integrity (2023); Donner et al. (2022); Transparency International (2023); The Heritage Foundation (2023); Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2022); Freedom House (2023); Gwartney et al. (2023); Institute for Economics and Peace (2023a, 2023b); The PRS Group (2023) and Teorell et al. (2023); Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2022); Hyde and Marinov (2012, 2021); Gibney et al. (2023) and Haschke (2023); Reporters sans Frontières (2022); Davies et al. (2023), Harbom et al. (2008) and Pettersson (2023); Coppedge et al. (2023a, 2023b) and Pemstein et al. (2023); International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2018, 2023); World Bank (2017, 2023); Kaufmann et al. (2010, 2023).




## A2 Additional illustrations of discussed indicators

Figure A2.1: Indicators related to judicial effectiveness from FI




Source: author's construction based on data from Gwartney et al. (2023).

Figure A2.2: Indicator of voice and accountability from WGI



Source: author's construction based on data from Kaufmann et al. (2010, 2023).

Figure A2.3: Indicators of electoral process from FH




Source: author's construction based on data from Freedom House (2023).

Table A2.1: Indicators of monitoring of national elections and access to media outlets from All

Indicator number and description	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023
21. Appointments the agency/agencies mandated to organize and monitor national elections support the independence of the agency/agencies.	25	25	25	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
22. The agency/agencies mandated to organize and monitor national elections make/s timely, publicly available reports before and after a national election.	25	50	50	50	50	50	25	25	25	25
23. Candidates/political parties have equitable access to state-owned media outlets.	100	100	25	0	0	0	0	50	25	25


Source: author's construction based on data from Global Integrity (2023).

Figure A2.4: Indicators of political participation




Source: author's construction based on data from Donner et al. (2022).

Figure A2.5: Indicator of political stability and absence of violence/terrorism from WGI




Source: author's construction based on data from Kaufmann et al. (2010, 2023).

Figure A2.6: BTI indicators of state identity and democratic institutions




Source: author's construction based on data from Donner et al. (2022).

Figure A2.7: Indicator of government effectiveness from WGI



Source: author's construction based on data from Kaufmann et al. (2010, 2023).

Figure A2.8: Indicators of welfare and public services



Note: BTI indicator is multiplied by 10; original scores follow a scale from 1 to 10. EGOV indicator is multiplied by 100; original scores follow an interval scale from 0 to 1.

Source: author's construction based on data from Donner et al. (2022); Mo Ibrahim Foundation (2022); Department of Economic and Social Affairs (2022).